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1 INTRODUCTION  
I have always loved miniatures: all tiny, cute little things that someone else would 
see as meaningless and pointless, just too small to be taken seriously. What 
caught my interest when I was a child were all kinds of little figures, those that 
came from inside chocolate eggs, those that were used to decorate dollhouses, and 
those that I made myself of clay or wood, some of them smaller than the size of 
my fingertip. What captivates me about miniatures is that at first they may seem 
too small to be recognized. However, once you have noticed them and have 
finally taken a closer look at them you can see that they make visible things that 
are so much bigger than themselves.  
Celebrity, here understood as a pseudo-individual made well-known through 
media representations (see Boorstin 1992 [1961]: 45–76), is one of the figures in 
which I have been interested for the past five years. But celebrity has not been the 
only figure, albeit the most spectacular one, in my play. I have tried to figure out 
bigger things through the relationship of four small characters: the celebrity as the 
centre of attention, the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ as the gossipers talking about the 
celebrity and the media as those technologies and content that not only provide 
the whole scene but act on it as well. For me, these four figures represent a 
miniature of celebrity gossip that I understand as the mediated genre of human 
relationships through which individuals’ private lives are made a public issue. I 
see celebrity gossip as a characteristic example of communication in the public 
spaces of contemporary western culture. By this I mean the Internet with its 
comment sections, blogs and social media spaces that have finally made it 
possible to see all these four main characters acting on the same scene at the same 
time.  
Although the celebrity seems to be the most attractive character, I argue that it is 
time to put the ‘self’, the anonymous and ordinary, in the spotlight. This study 
focuses on the ‘self’ as the character whose acts in internet spaces are socially 
meaningful. By these acts, I mean self-expressions, which I define as the 
evaluative and hence subjective comments that individuals aim at sharing with 
those with whom they communicate. Self-expressions are at home in the 
meaning-making practices surrounding celebrity phenomena, for being a celebrity 
or evaluating celebrities involves the art of the self. Online environments provide 
new, intriguing possibilities for this art, as the celebrity culture scholar P. David 
Marshall (2010) suggests. Self-expressions require the art of persuasion, namely, 
rhetoric. A characteristic of self-expressions is getting closer to one’s 
interlocutor(s), which may go hand in hand with the mocking and moralizing of 
others, particularly those epitomized by the celebrity figure. The figures of the 
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‘co-gossiper’ (the proximate ‘other’) and the ‘celebrity’ (the representative of 
distant ‘others’), simultaneously existing in the mediated context, symbolize the 
complexity of self-expressions particularly tense in online environments. Thus 
self-expressions are not merely about the individual; they also involve trust, 
values and persuasion as a collective issue through the relationships of proximity 
and distance. Celebrity culture, by which I mean all the ways of defining and 
controlling individuality through media representations of publicly well-known 
individuals (see e.g. Marshall 2006: 6–7; 2010), is a particularly complex field of 
relationships, which also makes it an interesting subject of study. As the media 
scholar Roger Silverstone (2007: 48) points out, the contemporary cult of 
celebrity, in terms of sameness and difference, is more complex than we often 
realize.  
What interests me in celebrity gossip is exactly this complexity of sameness 
(proximity) and difference (distance). In this study, therefore, I explore proximity 
and distance in the rhetoric of online gossipers’ self-expressions. A rhetorical 
approach is in line with the study of self-expressions because rhetoric highlights 
the role of individual agents (see Puro 2007: 13). That is because rhetorical 
studies underline free choice-making related to persuading and getting persuaded, 
which are issues of individual responsibility. Moreover, rhetoric used in digital 
contexts is self-expressive as it highlights identity but it is also surrounded by 
affordances and constrains, both social and technological, which means that 
individual rhetors expressing themselves through new media are not all-powerful 
although they have the power to make individual choices (Zappen 2005). I see 
proximity and distance as concepts that are needed when discussing the 
complexity of the rhetoric of self-expressions in online celebrity gossip.  
1.1 Proximity and distance in communication 
Proximity and distance are broad, philosophical concepts characterizing the social 
relations involved in communication. To approach self-expressions as relational 
expressions, I have utilized the ethical remarks of the sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman (1993). His theory of Postmodern Ethics concerns the relationships that 
the ‘self’ (the Self) has with both the proximate ‘other’ (the Other) and the distant 
one (the Third). While proximity is the relationship connecting the Self and the 
Other (those communicating on an emotional and moral level), distance is the 
realm of justice and social rules that comes with the Third who is also a sort of 
other but a distant one, an outsider, as Bauman (ibid. 112–116, 132) argues. The 
Third refers to groups of people living in society where relationships are faceless 
and stereotype-based, not personal or private (ibid. 112–116, 130). The 
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relationships of proximity and distance are particularly complex in 
communication via media that show us all kinds of beings and provoke us to 
position ourselves in relation to them, as Silverstone (2007) argues. These beings 
are those represented by mediated faces and voices. They are part of our world, 
often also our society, and we therefore have legal duties to them, but we do not 
meet them face-to-face. Thus we do not know them in person.  
The Other and the Third as philosophical concepts were first introduced by the 
philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas1 (1969) who saw these concepts as fundamental 
to being the Self as a moral and ethical agent. In the field of rhetorical studies, by 
which I mean the branch of communication studies focusing on the art of 
persuasion, Pat J. Gehrke (2009: 152–157) suggests that the relation to the Other 
is the first relation of alterity essential to the Self as a (social) being, since it 
involves the basic idea of otherness that makes other relationships possible. The 
first relation, however, is not the only relation in which the ‘self’ is involved for 
‘relationality never occurs merely as one-to-one but rather that one always begins 
in community’ (ibid. 159). The ‘self’ in this study means the rhetor, the person 
responsible for self-expression, while ‘other’ (the Other) means the proximate 
audience as the addressed group of hearers or readers. ‘Others’ (the Third) refers 
to people and groups outside this proximity, either distant or distanced. Moreover, 
by proximity I mean the emotional and moral realm of trust between the ‘self’ and 
the ‘other’. By distance, conversely, I mean the way the ‘self’ positions itself in 
relation to other people through difference.  
As rhetorical concepts, proximity and distance can be seen as dialectical (polar). 
As the rhetorician Kenneth Burke (1969: 184–189) argues, such a dialectical logic 
is characteristic of philosophical thinking in rhetorical studies. Moreover, a 
special type of dialectical relationship in rhetoric is ‘ultimate dialectic’ by which 
Burke (ibid. 189) means a transformative relationship in which polar concepts are 
ways into each other. I understand proximity and distance as transformative 
concepts which, despite their polarity, are still flexible. This means that they are 
not either-or ways of positioning the ‘self’ in relation to other people. In other 
words, they both are to be seen as simultaneously present in the rhetoric of self-
expressions. On the one hand, proximity is utilized as a way of creating distance 
from ‘othered’ beings through shared mockery and moralizing separating ‘us’ 
                                                 
 
1 Note that Lévinas was not a rhetorician: he was critical towards the idea of rhetoric as such. 
However, his theory of otherness can be applied to rhetorical criticism which deals with oth-
erness. Despite his criticism towards rhetoric, Lévinas’ idea of ‘Other’ can be seen as close to 
the rhetorical criticism’s concept of audience meaning the otherness that the ‘self’ is responsi-
ble for addressing. (see Davis 2005: 193–194) 
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from ‘them’. Such a form of proximity is common to mediated communication in 
which media representations, such as celebrity gossip stories, are objects 
evaluated in rhetoric. On the other hand, distance, as referring to communal rules 
in self-expressions, creates proximity that connects people together on a shared 
normative basis. Consequently, proximity can be a way into distance and distance 
can be a way into proximity. Moreover, the rhetorical practice in which the ‘self’ 
builds a relationship to both ‘other’ and ‘others’ through proximity and distance is 
seen here as moral positioning. Thus ‘morality’ in this study is approached as a 
social order empirically involved in rhetoric which concerns people and their 
behaviour. 
A tension between proximity and distance is characteristically present in gossip, 
since gossipers create proximity as emotional togetherness at the expense of 
distanced ‘others’.  According to the sociologist Jörg R. Bergmann (1993), gossip 
is a moral genre in which groups of individuals, such as neighbours or friends, 
evaluate, often with an accusing tone, the behaviour and character of those not 
present in the conversation and by so doing contribute to the normative 
achievement of social integration in a community. In private sphere gossip, the 
gossip producer, gossip recipient and targets of gossip are part of the same gossip 
triad, which means that their roles may shift in a way that each member of the 
community has a similar potentiality to become the object of evaluation (ibid. 45–
70). Gossip was the medium of mass communication before technical 
reproduction (see ibid. vii). This is because gossip is a reconstructive genre that is 
reproduced after reproductions as it reaches new people (ibid. 19–44). In that 
sense, gossiping may be socially risky for the reputation of gossipers, particularly 
if they tell false or misleading details about someone who belongs to the gossip 
community (ibid. 102–107). Thus the target of gossip – despite being temporally 
absent – can never be entirely excluded because in the next moment that very 
same person may be the co-gossiper. Perhaps this is why the private sphere of 
gossip involves the negotiation of moral principles and social norms as situated 
meanings with the purpose of also identifying with the targets of gossip, not 
condemning them entirely (see ibid. 130–134). 
In contemporary (western) cultures, gossip is not limited to local communities: 
celebrity gossip serves as the mediated genre of shared emotions, values and 
moral meanings. While face-to-face gossip touches small communities, celebrity 
gossip speaks to the general category of ‘ordinary’ people living in society, which 
also makes it one of the central products in contemporary media participation. In 
this study, celebrity gossip is defined as the mediated genre that makes 
individuals’ private lives a public issue and by so doing serves as a way of 
defining the individual. Celebrity gossip comes to life in the meaning-making 
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practices of tabloids and their audiences (e.g. Hermes 1995; Turner 2004; 
Hinerman 2006). Celebrities are not only individuals known of their ‘well-
knownness’ (see Boorstin 1992 [1961]: 57), but first and foremost they are 
cultural exemplars whose behaviour and character as topics of media content are 
materials for social meaning-making (e.g. Hermes 1995; Rojek 2001: 51–68; 
Turner 2004: 118; Meyers 2013: 19–20). Celebrities are not symbolically distant 
from the ‘self’; rather they carry moral meanings precisely because they also are 
seen to represent private, moral selves (Hinerman 2006: 456–458). In general, all 
the social and mediated practices of defining identity, individuality, nationality, 
norms and values through making meanings of well-known individuals can be 
seen as practices of celebrity culture (see e.g. Marshall 2006: 6–7; 2010). I regard 
celebrity gossip as the basic product of celebrity culture.  
Unlike private sphere gossip, mass-mediated gossip is not based on the circle of 
acquaintanceship between gossip participants and their targets (Bergmann 1993: 
51). Celebrities, therefore, easily become ‘fair game’ of moral discourse that does 
not threaten the reputation of gossipers or call for their responsibility. That is to 
say, celebrities are often treated as invulnerable objects ‘made’ to be evaluated in 
accordance with one’s own pleasures and preferences. Celebrity gossip connects 
the ‘self’ to the ‘other’ and takes place because of distance from celebrities that 
also are close to the gossipers. The relation of proximity and distance in celebrity 
culture (see Silverstone 2007: 48) is particularly tense when media texts and 
audience’s online participation concern low-status celebrities who are represented 
as both ordinary and exceptional individuals, often in terms of moral troubles or 
health issues, such as addictions (e.g. Tiger 2013). According to Laura Saarenmaa 
(2010), ‘intimate voices’ in celebrity gossip magazines are spectacular stories of 
celebrities’ personal miseries that are not authentic confessions but stories meant 
for commercial purposes.  
There seems to be a demand for the spectacular stories of celebrities’ downfall. 
Accordingly, one of the central phenomena in contemporary celebrity culture is 
Schadenfreude, the enjoyment of celebrities’ miseries as Steve Cross and Jo 
Littler (2010) point out. The reactions of mocking and moralizing put ‘others’ 
represented by celebrities in the category of moral ‘inferiors’. Such 
categorizations are here understood as othering, that is, ways of disidentifying 
with the person seen to represent ‘inferiors’ among and like ‘us’. One of the 
prominent groups in celebrity culture often put in the category of moral ‘inferiors’ 
is a young, working class or middle class woman – one single body who is seen to 
represent all moral vices (Tyler 2008; Paasonen & Pajala 2010; Williamson 2010; 
see also Skeggs 2005). She is called the ‘chav’, the ‘bitch’ and the ‘attention 
whore’. Interesting in this sort of othering is that the moral ‘inferior’ is not the 
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‘suspicious alien’, such as an ‘illegal’ immigrant, but a proximate stranger who is 
part of the same national and cultural collective as her oppressors (see Skeggs 
2005: 970; also Bhabha 1996). Compared with humanitarian appeals in which 
physically and socially distant sufferers are represented as obvious characters of 
‘them’ (see Orgad 2012: 160–161; Chouliaraki 2013: 54–66), celebrities seen as 
moral inferiors are examples of ‘others’ characterized by their status as 
‘ordinary’. By ordinary people I mean individuals that are part of the same 
culture with media participants and who do not have any specific, achieved merit 
or position that legitimizes their public visibility (see e.g. Turner 2010).  
Online spaces characterize an important shift in celebrity culture by highlighting 
the active role of the celebrity-gossip audience in cultural production, as Erin A. 
Meyers (2013: 15) argues. In such spaces of media content, gossip texts and 
pictures produced by media industries become objects for audience’s reactions. 
This means that gossip no longer has the function of disclosing something in 
celebrities’ lives that is ‘secret’ or ‘private’. Anne Graefer (2013) sees celebrity 
gossip blogs as discourses of new media participation that make the reactions to 
celebrity objects an essential content of media discourse itself. In other words, it 
is the self-expressive participation of those interested in celebrity gossip that 
reveals something new and not yet widely explored in celebrity culture. However, 
online comments as reactions to celebrity gossip are not separate from the mass-
mediated gossip but belong to the same chain. Consequently, I see also online 
participants’ reactions to celebrity topics as part of celebrity gossip itself.  
What is striking in celebrity gossip on blogs and in discussion forums in 
particular is that preferences are socially organized ways of categorizing certain 
ordinary people into the group of ‘others’ (Fairclough 2008; Tyler 2008; Meyers 
2010; 2013; Paasonen & Pajala 2010). By these collective preferences, I mean 
belief systems of domination (particularly sexism, racism and class-based 
domination) that aim at constructing moral ‘inferiors’. Moreover, celebrity gossip 
does not only concern the ‘ordinary’ but it also is a genre made for – and 
particularly in online contexts, made by – ordinary people characterized by their 
more or less prominent anonymity in public spaces. According to Joke Hermes 
(1995), most celebrity gossipers are women and gay men, that is, groups that are 
often othered in their own culture and society. As Sofia Johansson (2007: 144, 
148, 189) argues, tabloid reading offers the disempowered celebrity audience 
feelings of empowerment and gives hope in terms of social mobility when they 
have the power to momentarily position themselves above celebrities.  
Despite celebrities’ ‘fame capital’, contemporary celebrities and celebrity 
gossipers are often related to each other through the idea of ordinary people. One 
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significant group of online gossip participants evaluating celebrities in online 
spaces is that of (young) women themselves (Fairclough 2008: 10–12, 17–19; 
Meyers 2010: 227; also Meyers 2013: 11). According to Meyers (2010: 227), 
most consumers of celebrity gossip blogs are white, heterosexual women 
belonging to the middle or upper-middle class. Thus the gossip discourse that 
provides a momentary joy of proximity may always turn against the social group 
of gossipers who condemn and mock those who are, in one way or another, like 
themselves. However, celebrity gossip in online spaces, despite its prominently 
sexist and classist meanings, is highly complex and also involves some forms of 
resistance (see Meyers 2010: 228, 309, 320). For instance, some celebrity gossip 
blogs contribute to positive coverage of black celebrity culture, while others aim 
at challenging sexist ideologies (Meyers 2010: 309). According to Graefer (2013: 
240), resistance in online celebrity gossip is related to the playful and humorous 
style of participation which attacks traditional understanding of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, 
‘proper’ and ‘improper’. Such playfulness, however, does not mean that online 
celebrity gossip would be free of oppressive tendencies. As Meyers (2010: 317) 
argues, the ‘fun of gossip and celebrity culture can often mask more troubling 
readings of celebrities as markers of race, class, gender, and sexuality’. 
Positioning that temporarily reinforces proximity between interlocutors 
evaluating selected ‘others’ among and like ‘us’, is here called emotivist morality. 
This moral positioning derives from emotivism. Emotivism, according to Alasdair 
MacIntyre (2003 [1985]: 11–12), one of its best-known critics, is ‘the doctrine 
that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are 
nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar 
as they are moral or evaluative in character’. The argument of emotivism goes on 
to claim that because morality is about preferences, it is an individualistic and 
hence a subjectivist issue (see MacIntyre 2003 [1985]: 6–35; also Sayer 2011: 24, 
32–35). Note that both MacIntyre and Sayer see emotivism as a doctrine 
according to which values and norms in general are in the eye of beholder. 
Emotivist morality in my study refers to a moral positioning in which the 
treatment of ‘others’ is a rhetorical means to create a proximate relationship to the 
‘other’. Hence, in emotivist morality, preferences are not merely individual but 
they become socially shared. Emotivist morality as a rhetorical phenomenon is 
more thoroughly discussed in Section 1.3. 
Emotivist morality occurring in self-expressive media contents can be seen as a 
rhetorical performance that opposes a moral positioning called conventionalism. 
In conventionalism, the discourse of ethics as theoretical formalism is equated 
with moral positioning. According to Andrew Sayer (ibid. 24, 33, 153–158), 
conventionalism can be seen as the doctrine of rationalized moral norms which 
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are not at all sensitive to the specific and complex contexts of human social life.  
In contemporary individualistic societies, morality is criticized because it is 
associated with such a restricting form of relationship, as Sayer (2011: 16) argues. 
In rhetorical terms, conventionalism focuses on the power of the rhetor to 
effectively and ‘objectively’ transfer meanings to the audience. The ‘objective’ 
distance has its roots in the Enlightenment project in which the educational 
discourse of deductive reasoning supported rationalistic, and hence impersonal, 
ways of dealing with moral problems (see Jonsen & Toulmin 1988: 277–278). 
Such ‘objectivity’ was later transformed into the modernist idea of public 
communication in which the relationship of those participating in public forums is 
ideally characterized by a rational distance (Bauman 1993: 83). The rationalistic 
participation in public spaces can be seen as an heir of the Enlightenment project 
according to which a ‘universalistic’ relationship in public rhetoric is convincing.  
The systemic and forced form of rationality belongs to the first phase of 
modernity, which Bauman (2000) calls ‘solid’ modernity to distinguish it from 
the modernity’s ‘liquid’ phase. Bauman (ibid. 34) stresses that both phases of 
modernity, despite their differences, are focused on individualization. While 
‘solid’ modernity is the phase of heavy, rationalistic and fixed individualization, 
modernity in its ‘liquid’ form can be understood as a relational and networked 
phase of individualization involving uncertainty and instability of values and of 
the purpose of life. To translate Bauman’s remarks into the language of rhetorical 
studies, the rhetoric of solid modernity is an authorial construct while the liquid 
phase is more dependent on each audience and context in which rhetorical 
practices take place.  
While conventionalism is based on a distant relationship between interlocutors, 
emotivist morality highlights proximity of those involved in a rhetorical practice. 
These two moral positionings, albeit seemingly opposed to each other, have one 
essential thing in common. They both emphasize a certain form of discourse as 
the ultimate source of positioning the ‘self’ in relation to the ‘other’ (see Sayer 
2011: 33–34). While conventionalism reflects a rationalized form of moral 
positioning at the expense of proximity to the ‘other’, emotivist morality 
highlights emotional togetherness with the ‘other’ and at the expense of ‘others’.  
Both MacIntyre (2003 [1985]) and Sayer (2011) defend a third option: seeing 
morality as neither formalistic rules nor emotional preferences, but as the 
practical issue of purpose. Such a practical moral positioning, here called 
practical morality, focuses on virtues which can be defined as dispositions 
acquired by human beings in order to live a good life and achieve its purpose (see 
MacIntyre 2003 [1985]: 181–203). A characteristic genre of practical morality is 
the narrative as the shared story in which people aim at understanding their moral 
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character in relation to other people (MacIntyre 2003 [1985]: 204–225). Thus 
narratives, such as autobiographical accounts, are stories that may involve self-
reflections of authors (see Linde 1993). By self-reflection, I mean that the ‘self’ 
tries to see itself from a distance and, in turn, the distant or distanced being(s) as 
proximate. Such moral positioning involves norms that are applied in context and 
seen as ‘lived’ values. Thus narratives are related to experienced time: something 
has happened and the narrator evaluates the event at a temporal distance. In self-
reflective narratives, proximity and distance are not torn apart between ‘other’ 
(the preferred, proximate audience) and ‘others’ (the distanced audience). In that 
sense, self-reflection differs from those dissonant self-expressions that contribute 
to emotivist morality. Self-reflection is closely related to what Bauman (1993: 
50–51; 60) means by morality as internally determined identification and the 
personal moral call that appeals to the responsibility of the ‘self’. In Silverstone’s 
(2003; 2007: 47–48; see also Orgad 2011) terms, moreover, positioning based on 
such critical self-reflection would be called ‘proper distance’, by which he means 
a relationship that makes possible to identify with other people, even the mediated 
faces, through both difference and sameness. Compared with conventionalism in 
which effective transfer of meanings is central, both emotivist and practical 
morality are more focused on the audience. While the persuasiveness of emotivist 
morality is based on the emotions of the audience, practical morality is a way of 
addressing the audience as a moral equal. The reason why I discussed all three of 
these categories of moral positioning (conventionalism, emotivist morality, 
practical morality) is that they characterize rhetors’ rhetorical choices of social 
order involved in their self-expressions.  
The expressions of individuals in and through media have become prominent 
because of the demotic turn, which Graeme Turner (2004: 82–85; 2010) defines 
as the cultural shift of the 21st century that has made the participation of 
‘ordinary’ individuals the issue of mediated togetherness, particularly on the 
Internet. In terms of distance and proximity, the Internet is particularly 
interesting, since the physical and social distance between interlocutors is so 
immense, technological and incomprehensible that people aim at overcoming it 
by creating intimacy as the most instant form of proximity (Silverstone 2003). 
The desire for intimate relationships does not only characterize online 
participants, but is typical of contemporary media culture in general. In the 
contemporary mediapolis, which Silverstone (2007: 25–55) defines as the shared, 
technological and mediated space of appearance, appearing trustworthy means 
reducing distance from the ‘other’ (ibid. 123). I understand intimacy as an object-
focused relationship that wipes out distance between the rhetor and audience. 
Such intimacy, synonymously called ‘aesthetic proximity’ (see Bauman 1993: 
115; 130–132), is characteristic of participation in online celebrity gossip in 
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which instant reactions to media artefacts (pictures, videos, texts) representing 
celebrities become the way of addressing the audience (see Graefer 2013). 
Also Robert Arpo (2005: 282–283) describes an online discussion forum in a way 
that aptly illustrates this intense form of proximity. According to his description, 
an online discussion forum is like a dark room. We never know whether there is 
someone communicating with us, so we have to yell and provoke in order to get a 
response (ibid.). Another relevant description of online, technologized 
communication comes from Sherry Turkle (2011) who argues that we are ‘alone 
together’ in the digital terrain. We use technology to share our personal interests, 
to seek acceptance and trust by attracting attention through our self-expressions. 
Consequently, self-expressions are fundamentally rhetorical: they are acts that 
aim at affecting other people. The understanding of communicative practices as 
acts is at the heart of rhetorical studies, which provides a useful starting point for 
the analysis of self-expressions in online celebrity gossip. 
Although there is a growing number of empirical studies exploring the ways 
celebrities and other public figures are evaluated online (e.g. Fairclough 2008; 
Jerslev 2010; Meyers 2010; Paasonen & Pajala 2010; Graham & Harju 2011; 
Tileagă 2012; Graefer 2013; Meyers 2013; Tiger 2013; Jerslev 2014), the 
rhetorical tension of proximity and distance involved in online celebrity gossip 
has thus far not been explored. Empirical analyses focusing on mediated 
representations of distant ‘others’, such as images of starving Africans in 
humanitarian campaigns, have been conducted (e.g. Orgad 2012: 160–161; 
Chouliaraki 2013: 54–66). Moreover, Graefer’s (2013) study of online gossip 
blogs focuses on representations of those celebrities who were seen as privileged 
individuals. What still remains almost untouched is the idea of the ordinariness2 
of ‘others’ evaluated in self-expressions that are produced and shared daily over 
the Internet. Thus my study of online self-expressions focusing on celebrities as 
representatives of ordinary ‘others’ fills a research gap. Moreover, although many 
celebrities are globally well known, gossip about their life is also a local issue, 
invoking moral meaning-making of nationally meaningful themes. Essential for 
the understanding of the role of distance and proximity in online celebrity gossip 
is the comparison between culturally and nationally limited contexts (and thus 
potentially less plural social and geographical environments) and contexts that 
welcome participants from backgrounds that are geographically and socially 
spread-out. 
                                                 
 
2 I would like to thank specifically Shani Orgad for encouraging me to find the problématique of 
this study in the ordinariness of ‘others’ in celebrity culture.  
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1.2 Aim and research questions  
This dissertation explores proximity and distance in self-expressions of English-
speaking and Finnish online participants of celebrity gossip. The overall aim of 
this study is to better understand how the rhetoric of self-expressions in online 
celebrity gossip characterizes proximity and distance. By exploring distance and 
proximity as interrelated concepts, this study is consistent with the approach to 
rhetoric in which the argumentative (or logical) and aesthetic (or emotional) 
strands are seen to form a synthesis (see e.g. Fisher 1984). Thus argumentative 
and aesthetic aspects of rhetoric are not inflexibly polar: they are always 
intertwined with each other in self-expressions. I treat self-expressions as 
rhetorical ‘speeches’ made by those who are not known by their name as an 
indication of their authority but rather remain more or less anonymous. Rather 
than assuming that emotivist morality is the only possible social order online 
gossip participants contribute to, I explore the celebrity-concerned online 
comment sections as prominent sites where emotivist morality becomes 
persuasive, in that it entails proximity between ‘us’ (online gossip participants 
and a group they identify with) at the expense of certain ‘others’ (celebrities as 
representatives of ‘inferior’ groups). Although I assume that emotivist morality is 
to be found in online celebrity gossip, this study should not be read as a normative 
defence of that moral positioning. 
For two reasons, this study focuses on online celebrity gossip representing 
violence involving celebrities. Firstly, violent acts are based on subjective 
preferences in treating people and thus involve issues of power and domination 
made evident by media representations within popular culture (see Fiske 1989: 
127–130). Secondly, from the viewpoint of the rhetoric of self-expressions, 
violence is a particularly interesting phenomenon. As the rhetoricians Chaïm 
Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (2000 [1969]: 54–59, 62) discuss, violence 
can be understood as the force through which the possibility of the ‘other’ to 
make a choice is denied. Thus violence, from that perspective, is the point where 
persuasion no longer matters. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (ibid. 
62), violence is given a free hand by sceptics and fanatics, that is, those who 
attack against the idea of free choice-making important in rhetoric and 
argumentation. Violence as a rhetorical phenomenon seems like a paradox. How 
can rhetorical (practices based on the freedom of choice of individuals) and 
violent (practices attacking the very idea of individual freedom) expression be one 
and the same thing? From the point of view of ‘ultimate’ concepts, violence is to 
be seen as a special case of rhetoric, like slaying is a special case of identification 
or war is a special case of peace (see Burke 1969: 19–20). Violence as a special 
case of rhetoric is involved in the late-modern ‘liquidity’ or ‘lightness’ in which 
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freedom is associated with individuals’ free choice-making and acting as such, 
despite the issues of responsibility in the choice-making and acting (see Bauman 
2000).  
Online forums and other networked contexts are interesting from the viewpoint of 
rhetorical violence because participation in online spaces is based on individuals’ 
freedom of choice (individuals can find a forum that matches their own interests) 
but rhetorical practices in those spaces may contribute to crowd behaviour 
creating more and more sameness. Rhetorical violence is an impulsive reaction 
that aims at altering the in-dividual whole through a freely chosen intimacy that 
excludes otherness. Thus self-expressions involving rhetorical violence are based 
on a distance from the empathetic proximity to human beings. At the same time, 
such self-expressions try to force others to an intimate proximity to themselves. 
Rhetorical violence, tensely individualist and social at the same time, is 
characteristic of the comments of online participants of celebrity gossip in which 
embodied, often humorous, reactions to objects become the way of positioning 
the ‘self’ in relation to the audience (see Graefer 2013). Although such 
aesthetically creative reactions seem to be the sign of ‘active’ participation of 
individuals (see ibid. 153), online commenting just for fun may still involve 
aggressive practices attacking otherness (see Meyers 2010: 317). These tensions 
provide an interesting starting point for the rhetorical criticism of self-expressions 
in online celebrity gossip.  
Moreover, online gossip comments that are analysed in this study concern 
domestic violence and fights involving female celebrities. In the Finnish context, 
research into the various meanings of gendered violence is part of a relatively 
new academic interest in understanding different types of violence as different 
kinds of cultural and social problems (Ronkainen & Husso 2013). In other words, 
meanings of gendered violence are so deeply rooted in culture that self-
expressions concerning different types of gendered violence (e.g. men’s domestic 
violence against women or violence between women) may differ from one 
another. Although the meanings of gendered violence are not the main focus of 
the present study, I explore online comments on both domestic violence and 
female celebrities’ fights, assuming that the rhetoric of self-expressions is related 
to cultural meanings given to the two types of gendered violence.   
It is noteworthy that in media representations (such as in documentaries and other 
genres of popular culture) discussing fans who are deeply involved in celebrities’ 
lives, there is the stereotype of ‘fan emotivism’ in accordance with which fans are 
shown as pathological beings with an excessive and irrational interest in 
celebrities (Hills 2007). As Meyers (2010: 228, 309, 320) and Graefer (2013: 
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240) argue, practices in celebrity culture, such as online celebrity gossip, may 
also involve moments of intended resistance to common sense meanings and 
values. Thus emotivist morality in online celebrity gossip is not irrational but it 
can be understood as rhetorical performance that is impulsive for a reason. To 
avoid blindly supporting the stereotype of ‘fan emotivism’, I have chosen a 
rhetorical approach that helps to uncover, contextualize and understand the 
expressions of those interested in celebrities. I also bear in mind the potential 
resistance that online celebrity gossip may involve. However, such resistance also 
is analysed critically in this study because the playful expression common to 
online comments evaluating celebrities may involve oppressive meanings (see 
Meyers 2010: 317). 
The present study is based on the New Rhetoric, focusing on rhetorical criticism 
of the moral dimension of persuasion (see Kuypers & King 2009: 8). Roughly 
put, while the moral dimension is involved in everyday persuasion in the form of 
evaluations of people, rhetorical criticism is an art that aims at uncovering such 
evaluations and thereby producing critical understanding of human 
communication (see Kuypers & King 2009: 8; Kuypers 2009: 13). In other words, 
those utilizing rhetorical criticism as their approach aim at increasing the 
understanding of the specific qualities of rhetorical artefacts (i.e. texts and other 
human-made pieces of art) based on clearly defined criteria (see German 1985: 
87). Successful rhetorical criticism, therefore, is liberating when it offers critics, 
as well as their audiences, new insights into persuasive texts and enhances 
awareness of the persuasive means promoted by these texts (Brummett 1994: 76–
77; 102–103). The use of rhetorical criticism as the ethical approach of this study 
is indebted to the North American rhetorical tradition in which rhetoric is not seen 
as mere stylistic tricks or forms of argumentation but rather is regarded as the 
essential art of human communication. Moreover, although women are a central 
group of ‘others’ in celebrity culture, rhetorical criticism in this study is a way of 
approaching the categorizations of moral ‘inferiority’ in online celebrity gossip 
more broadly, without any particular feminist point of view.  
Although I position this study in the broad field of rhetorical studies, rhetorical 
criticism as practiced here should be seen as multidisciplinary. Rhetorical 
concepts form the core of rhetorical criticism in my study, but I also utilize 
findings and ideas originating from media studies and cultural studies on the 
moral and social relations of human beings. Findings and discussions in these 
fields are significant when explaining the specific contexts that surround online 
self-expressions. As an approach to communication, the rhetorical criticism of 
this study starts with the idea that communication is never a simple or neutral 
transfer of meanings, but rather involves meaning-making struggles, tensions and 
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ambiguities in terms of otherness. In this sense, the rhetorical criticism of the 
present study approaches communication as a relational practice grounded in 
social (inter)action and representations of otherness and not in the efficient 
transfer of meaning determined by sheer human will (see Gehrke 2009: 153; see 
also Orgad 2012: 15–51).  
I approach the relationship of proximity and distance in self-expressions by 
reviving, and revising, the concept of ethos as the idea of character essential for 
the Ancient polis. Particularly the Aristotelian ethos involving both reason and 
emotion is essential when approaching the tension of distance and proximity in 
online participation. Although the idea of the individual was not as prevalent in 
the Ancient polis as it is in the contemporary mediapolis (about the mediapolis, 
see Silverstone 2007), the Aristotelian ethos deals with how the speech of one 
single speaker is addressed to the audience and contributes to the collective issue 
of trust. The verb contribute is central here, because in the Aristotelian ethos, the 
‘self’, the rhetor, is intrinsically social. Ethos exclusively lies neither in a person 
nor in a community but rather is circulated throughout and among the speaker, 
audience, scene and polis, as Kristie S. Fleckenstein (2005; 2007) states. Because 
of its social and communal meaning, the concept of rhetorical ethos, particularly 
the Aristotelian one, should be revived (and also revised) in the digital era in 
which no single rhetor is credited as the master of speech (e.g. Warnick 2004; 
Fleckenstein 2005; 2007; Pildal Hansen 2007; Losh 2009: 47–95). 
According to Aristotle, ethos is the means of persuasion based on character 
through which rhetors construct their credibility in front of the audience (Rhetoric 
I.ii.1356a: 3–4)3. Ethos has three parts: 1) phronesis (practical wisdom, good 
sense or reason); 2) arete (good moral character, good moral values, moral 
virtue); and 3) eunoia (goodwill or emotions, the cooperative principle of ethos) 
(Rhetoric II.i.1378a: 5; see also Miller 2001: 270; 2004: 198). Arete (moral 
virtue) is central to the understanding of ethos. According to Aristotle, ‘virtues are 
productive of good things and matters of action’ (Rhetoric I.vi.1362b: 6). Virtues, 
moreover, contribute to the golden mean (Nicomachean Ethics II.vi–ix; see also 
Urmson 1973). The point that Aristotle does not explicitly bring up in his 
discussion of virtues is that deficiency and excess, the two extremes, may, in 
some situations, characterize virtues (Urmson 1973: 225). Accordingly, virtue, 
the arete part of ethos, is not necessarily the state of a character that already is in 
                                                 
 
3 In the citations referring to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the first number (e.g. I) refers to a book, the 
second one (e.g. ii) to a chapter and the third one (e.g. 1356a) to the so-called Bekker num-
bers. I use the numbers (e.g. 3–4) after the Bekker numbers to refer to specific parts of each 
chapter to be found in Kennedy’s translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1991).  
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balance; it may also involve oscillation between two extremes. Thus virtues are 
situated in action as well (see e.g. Fleckenstein 2007).  
This study explores the self-expressions of online participants of celebrity gossip 
as ‘speeches’ contributing to ethos through its parts, that is, phronesis, arete and 
eunoia. I focus on argumentation, autobiographical telling and emotional appeal 
as ways through which relationships to ‘others’ are utilized as rhetorical tactics of 
addressing the preferred audience, that is, the ‘other’. I regard phronesis as the 
distance between the rhetor and audience, arete as the rhetoric of balance and 
oscillation between distance and proximity and eunoia as the proximity between 
the rhetor and audience. These three components of ethos are seen here as means 
of persuasion. They are by no means static parts of ethos but parts that can move 
and change their relation to one another through rhetorical acts in context. The 
relationship of these three means of persuasion is essential to ethos. Note that 
what I mean by phronesis and arete as empirical concepts has to be understood in 
a more descriptive sense than what Aristotle, for the most part, argues in Rhetoric. 
When using these Greek terms, I refer to their rhetorical use as a means of 
persuasion, not the virtues of a person as such. 
Moreover, by constructing their own ethos, people try to affect the ethos of 
others, and by evaluating the ethos of other people, they themselves try to appear 
trustworthy. Thus ethos as the connection between the individual and collective is 
at the heart of the rhetorical idea of community in which the ‘self’ is positioned in 
relation to other people, as Nedra Reynolds (1993: 327–334) argues. Community, 
as a rhetorical concept, can be seen as the social construct connecting the rhetor 
(the ‘self’) and audience (the ‘other’) both intellectually and emotionally based on 
common experiences, beliefs, stories and other ways of making meanings, as 
Carolyn R. Miller (1993: 212) suggests. The rhetorical concept of ethos is 
essential for online communication because it involves the idea that our self-
expressions never exist for their own sake but rather are invitations to form a 
community.  
As mentioned above, the Aristotelian ethos is an ambiguous concept. It has both a 
normative and a descriptive meaning.4 Aristotle (Rhetoric I.ii.1356a: 4) had a 
specific ethos in mind when arguing that ‘we believe fair-minded people to a 
greater extent and more quickly [than we do others]’. This description of ethos 
goes hand in hand with Aristotle’s ethical ideal related to a person’s moral 
                                                 
 
4 I would specifically like to thank Carolyn R. Miller for helping me to see Aristotle’s ethos as a 
concept that has both normative and descriptive dimensions. 
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character. From that perspective, some means of using language are naturally 
more persuasive than others, and ethos is based on these particular means of 
persuasion. 
However, in Chapter 8 of the first book of Rhetoric, Aristotle approaches ethos as 
a wider concept when discussing the kinds of characters that are dependent on 
each form of political organization (e.g. aristocracy, democracy, tyranny) 
(Rhetoric I.viii.1366a: 6). This indicates that although Aristotle held his own 
preferences concerning what kind of character is trustworthy, his concept of ethos 
is also applicable when approaching trustworthiness in various kinds of 
communities. In line with Aristotle’s remarks that ethos may vary in accordance 
with each community in question, the present study does not limit the empirical 
analysis of ethos to any particular idea of distance and proximity. Accordingly, 
this study holds that it is possible that online celebrity gossip involves self-
expressions of conventionalism or practical morality, although emotivist morality 
can be assumed the most typical moral positioning in celebrity gossip. 
The descriptive definition of ethos is particularly relevant when analysing online 
communication, since such discourse involves the idea of ethos as the process of 
earning trust (see Miller 2001; Mitra & Watts 2002: 484, 486, 495–496; Miller 
2004; Warnick 2004). As Aristotle (Rhetoric I.ii.1356a: 4) argues, persuasion 
based on ethos ‘should result from the speech, not from a previous opinion that 
the speaker is a certain kind of person’. In online contexts, similarly, ‘it is the 
quality of the performance that counts’, as Barbara Warnick (2004: 264) stresses. 
According to Fleckenstein (2005: 331, 334; see also 2007), ethos in online, digital 
and networked spaces, which she calls cyberethos, is meaningful as a discursive 
pattern, not as the character of an individual avatar or a user. Because of the 
various performances and the diversity of potential audiences in online contexts, I 
do not see the three parts of ethos (phronesis, arete, eunoia) as limited to any 
specific normative idea of what ethos ‘should be’. Since this study is an empirical 
research, I assume that trustworthiness may vary in accordance with each 
audience. Thus trustworthiness to a Finnish-speaking online audience of national 
celebrity gossip may mean a different thing compared with English-speaking 
audience interested in American and highly commercialized celebrities. 
In this study, phronesis (logic) refers to reasoning that indicates a participant’s 
capacity to draw conclusions and create online comments legitimized by the 
community (such as ‘s/he did wrong because s/he hit her/him’). Phronesis in 
online comment sections does not necessarily have a practical nature, but it may 
serve as the logic for sharing abstract, distancing rules (such as ‘an eye for an 
eye’) or emotion-laden preferences based on cumulative interaction (such as ‘the 
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bitch deserved it!’ ‘yes she did!’ ‘LOL’). Emotion-laden preferences as comments 
posted on celebrity gossip sites can be seen as indicators of a kind of persuasion 
that is not logical in terms of a linear or hierarchical structure but rather is based 
on cumulative fragments. Such fragments, according to Jeffrey T. Grabill and 
Stacey Pigg (2012), are characteristic of the ‘messy rhetoric’ online. I regard such 
emotional sharing that takes place without careful reasoning as a sign of emotivist 
morality. 
I assume that arete (moral virtue) can be found in narratives involving 
autobiographical moralizing based on experiences that online participants tell as 
stories of their own life. Through autobiographical moralizing, online participants 
may, potentially, put themselves in the place of celebrities and thereby indicate 
their own moral character (such as ‘I feel for Rihanna. I know how it hurts if 
someone insults you when you are innocent...’). In general, autobiographical 
moralizing can be understood as a narrative genre, which, as MacIntyre (2003 
[1985]: 204–225) states, involves the potential to deal with practical aspects of 
life. Although autobiographical telling is often regarded as a prominent 
characteristic of online forums and blogs (e.g. Arpo 2005: 295–296; Östman 
2008; 2010; 2011), online discourse seems to reject the narrative structure when 
allowing ‘no ending’ and no moral explanation of media content, as Shani Orgad 
(2012: 132, 195–196) argues. The lack of closure and the absence of moral 
interpretations can also be seen as the characteristics of emotivist morality as it 
emerges through co-produced mockery attacking those categorized into the group 
of moral ‘inferiors’ in online-gossip discourse. Such rhetoric of proximity 
between interlocutors would oppose, or at least set aside, the self-reflective moral 
considerations of online participants.  
Finally yet importantly, eunoia (emotions) is here defined as the sharing of 
emotional expressions (see e.g. Miller 2004: 212–213). In emotivist morality, 
eunoia takes place as an asymmetrical form of sympathy that reinforces 
togetherness between ‘us’ at the expense of ‘others’ (‘I hate her!’, ‘Me too. The 
bitch deserved it!’). Thus eunoia is not just proximity but may create distance 
through othering as well. This study holds that emotion-laden self-expressions, 
however emotivist, are not merely expressive or arise purely unprompted from 
within; they are evaluative and informative because they have referents (Sayer 
2006: 457). According to Sara Ahmed (2004), emotions are reactions towards 
something and about something. They are not merely reactions to individuals; 
they are attached to objects as well, contributing to a certain relationship that 
makes them the shared basis of a community. Emotions may also be reactions to 
material objects, such as photographs, which occupy ‘the spaces between people 
and people and people and things’ (see Edwards 2005: 27). In accordance with 
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these remarks, I consider emotions to be reactions characterizing relationships 
between people and between people and objects. These relationships, moreover, 
come to life as evaluative uses of language (see Martin & White 2005). While 
emotions connecting people, such as online gossip participants, are signs of 
proximity, emotions as a person’s reaction to an object may also characterize 
distance. This is the case in celebrity gossip where the gossipers’ emotional 
reactions towards celebrities may work to distance these objects of evaluation 
from gossipers. Hence some emotions, such as disgust, are involved in the 
practice of disidentification. Disgust is a reaction that distances ‘us’ from 
uncomfortable proximity to otherness (Probyn 2000: 131).  Disgust, therefore, 
also represents an intimate relationship to objects: it cannot take place without 
intimacy as the first relation (ibid.). Through disgust, certain characters, such as 
working class women, are dehumanized and categorized as moral ‘inferiors’ (see 
Tyler 2008).  
I argue that eunoia and values go hand in hand. Since emotions are reactions 
towards something and about something (e.g. Ahmed 2004), they contribute to 
values as desirable goods (e.g. Sayer 2011). Thus value can be seen as the good to 
which emotion is attached. The classification of values applied to this study is 
derived from Richard Lanham’s (2006) idea of a motive spectrum (purpose, 
game, play) as combined with Shalom Schwartz’s (1992; 2007) concepts of moral 
and self-interested values. According to Lanham (2006: 166–176), purpose is the 
serious practical and moral motive of everyday life, whereas game is the 
competitive side of human nature, while play is the aesthetic and pleasure-
oriented motive that often serves a formal idea or mere style. Moreover, Lanham 
(ibid. 172, 182) argues that play and game emerge spontaneously in everyday life. 
Purpose, on the contrary, is more conscious and aims at problem solving (see ibid. 
166–176). In the categorization of values suggested by Schwartz (1992; 2007), 
purpose resonates with moral values (universalism, benevolence, conformity, 
tradition, security), game consists of values of self-interest in competition with 
other people (power, achievement) and play involves values of self-interest 
without regard to other people (self-direction, stimulation, hedonism). In 
particular, game and play as signs of spontaneity can be seen as rhetorical motives 
characterizing emotivist morality. Compared with purpose, game and play are 
more focused on reactions to objects. Such objectifying is common to 
participation in online celebrity gossip in which shared reactions to a celebrity 
object form the feeling of togetherness (e.g. Graefer 2013). 
In addition, another aspect of rhetoric in online environments is that when 
participants turn against the community’s expectations, they are judged. This 
judgement can at times take the form of removing their comment or even their 
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entire profile (e.g. Gurak 1999: 247; Reid 1999: 118–120, 130–132; Silverstone 
2003: 481; also 2007: 138; Orgad 2007: 37–38; Warnick 2010). Such discourse-
internal moral features are seen here as ways of ethos control. In online 
communication, ethos control is made possible by the interactive nature of 
togetherness of participants who continuously change their roles by turning from 
the rhetor into the audience member and vice versa. When performance matters 
(Warnick 2004: 264), such performance is also controlled by online co-
participants. Ethos sanctioned by a group entails that ethos is a communal issue 
(see Reynolds 1993: 327). The way ethos is understood in this study is illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
 
PHRONESIS:
FORMS OF MORAL 
ARGUMENTATION
ARETE:
AUTOBIO-
GRAPHICAL 
MORALIZING
EUNOIA:
EMOTIONS AND 
VALUES
 
 Figure 1. Ethos construction and ethos control. 
As can be seen in Figure 1, this study approaches ethos as the concept consisting 
of: 1) forms of moral argumentation (phronesis), 2) autobiographical moralizing 
(arete) and 3) emotions and values (eunoia). These three components are seen 
here as the means of persuasion from which ethos is constructed. Moreover, 
Figure 1 illustrates ethos control as the force that turns these cogs. Thus ethos 
control is not an additional means of persuasion; it represents the collective power 
that makes ethos construction itself a normative issue. By controlling 
autobiographical moralizing as well as values and forms of moral argumentation 
in the construction of a trustworthy ethos, participants in online celebrity gossip 
can find a shared normative ground for their togetherness.  
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Based on the idea of ethos construction and ethos control represented above, this 
study answers four specific research questions, each of which concerns one aspect 
of ethos as shown in Figure 1:  
1. What kind of moral argumentation do Finnish- and English-language online 
participants of celebrity gossip use? (phronesis as the logic or distance between 
online gossip participants); 
2. What kind of rhetorical function does autobiographical moralizing serve in 
online celebrity gossip? (arete as the self-reflection of online gossip participants 
positioning themselves in relation to other people); 
3. What kinds of values do Finnish and English-language online participants of 
celebrity gossip aim at sharing by utilizing evaluative language? (eunoia as the 
proximity between online gossip participants); 
4. What means of ethos control do online gossipers utilize to support celebrity 
mockery as the expected way of online participation? (discourse-internal 
normativity as the means of contributing to ethos). 
I assume that ethos in digital environments is a sited construction that is related to 
online participants as embodied or corporal beings (see Fleckenstein 2005; 2007). 
By this I mean that proximity and distance in online comment sections are tied to 
proximity and distance as physical and symbolic constrains and possibilities of 
participants. Comparing nationally non-limited online-gossip contexts (English-
language comment sections about celebrities who are globally well known and for 
the most part American) with a nationally and culturally more homogeneous 
group (Finnish-language online discussions about national celebrities) is 
interesting for two reasons.  
Firstly, the industrial production of celebrity culture in the American context can 
be seen as more strongly commercialized compared with the Finnish context. The 
American celebrity culture originates back to Hollywood industry of the first 
decades of the 20th century (e.g. Dyer 2006). In the early phases of Hollywood 
industry, celebrity culture took place as the worship of stars whose status was 
seen as much higher than that of an average person (ibid.). Today, the worship of 
public personalities is no longer the primary way of participating in celebrity 
culture. Because of the media coverage of personal problems of individuals sold 
in the form of celebrity gossip, celebrity culture also takes place as the evaluation 
of low-status celebrities both through serious moralizing and humorous 
participation. In the American context, celebrity images are products of 
entertainment industry the spectacular rhetoric of which is well-known by the 
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active and media-savvy online audience. Humour as the participation of such 
critical audience challenges the more ‘serious’ moral meanings given to celebrity. 
Particularly in English-language online spaces, celebrities are treated as humorous 
objects to be made fun of (see Fairclough 2008; Meyers 2010; 2013; Graefer 
2013). It is interesting from the perspective of research whether the ways of 
treating celebrities in online gossip in Finnish are more akin to the view in which 
a celebrity is still taken seriously, as a ‘real’ moral individual, compared with 
English-language discussions of American and highly commercialized celebrities. 
I assume that Finnish-language online comments on celebrity gossip are more 
focused on serious moralizing compared with English-language and more 
humorous posts.  
Secondly, it is relevant to distinguish rhetorical challenges of online 
communication in different contexts. In multicultural text-based online contexts 
in particular, credibility may be problematic because meanings are so easily 
misunderstood, both unintentionally and deliberately (DuVal Smith 1999: 156). 
This is because moral uncertainty is higher in environments distant from one’s 
own home groups and milieus (see Luckmann 2002: 27–28). As Michael Walzer 
(1994) puts it, there is more moral ‘thickness’ at home than abroad. It is 
interesting to see, therefore, whether English-language online participants deal 
with moral uncertainty by creating stronger emotional intimacy in gossip 
discourse when compared to Finnish-language participants who share Finland as 
their cultural home beyond the online context. Hence Finnish participants are 
connected to one another through national proximity. In addition, the tension 
between ‘local’ and ‘global’ has also been discussed in recent work within media 
studies. As Orgad (2012: 38–41) stresses, the strict boundaries between ‘global’ 
and ‘local’ should be challenged whenever analysing media contents. According 
to her premise, ‘global’ should not be equated with the contents of transnational 
or international media. At times, meanings made by ‘local’ groups may involve 
even more ‘global’ aspects than globally circulated media contents (ibid.). This 
study holds, therefore, that English-language online commenting on globally 
well-known celebrities is not necessarily more ‘global’ but, on the contrary, may 
be more strictly ‘local’ and more prone to emotional homogeneity than Finnish 
online discourse on national celebrities.  
1.3 Moral rhetoric and emotivist morality 
When dealing with moral communication in societies, the idea of the audience (be 
it present or imagined) is central because it characterizes the potential connection 
the ‘self’ may have to the ‘other’ (Malmberg 2012: 19). This idea goes back to 
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Adam Smith (2006 [1759]) who saw the ability to imagine ‘oneself’ in the place 
of the ‘other’ as essential for moral beings. In rhetorical terms, the ‘rhetor’ 
identifies with the ‘audience’, as Burke (1969) has famously suggested. Through 
identification, rhetors put themselves in the place of other people and by so doing 
suggest that ‘I’ am (or want to be) similar with another in this or that respect (see 
ibid. 20–21). Such identification requires ethos through which the rhetor and 
audience can trust each other. In this study, I use the term ‘moral rhetoric’ by 
which I mean persuasion based on ethos (the character regarded as good and 
trustworthy). Thus what is seen as good and trustworthy by online participants of 
celebrity gossip is the focus of this study. In this section, I will first describe in 
detail what I mean by moral rhetoric as a concept of rhetorical criticism. After 
that, I deal with emotivist morality as a specific way of positioning the ‘self’ in 
relation to the ‘other’. 
The present study approaches morality as a rhetorical issue, which involves the 
idea that one makes moral choices in communication and language use in context 
(see Kuypers & King 2009: 8). In rhetorical studies, the specific temporal and 
spatial context surrounding persuasion is called kairos (for a rhetorical definition 
of kairos, see e.g. Miller 2002; also Stephenson 2009). Kairos can be thought of 
as the perfect time and place for a text (verbal or visual) to be successfully 
persuasive. The analysis of kairos is central to understanding why emotivist 
morality flourishes in mediated contexts, especially online. However, it is also 
noteworthy to stress here that specific technologies, such as digital devices, are to 
be neither embraced nor rejected, since they are not good or bad in themselves but 
have potential for both positive and negative implications, depending on how they 
are used (see Inkinen 1999: 282–283). Thus online digital contexts become 
normative and evaluative sites with particular rhetorical effects only when they 
are made such through posting and commenting.  
It is worth noting that because of the split of emotion and reason – the 
consequences of which are to be found in the moral thinking of modern societies 
(Sayer 2011: 24) – ‘rhetoric’ has a bad reputation, for it is seen to represent the 
opposite of sincerity, truth and good intentions (Lanham 2006: 19). This 
separation of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ goes back to Plato who attacked rhetoric in general 
because he saw the ‘danger’ of emotions when they become more persuasive than 
reason (see e.g. Benardete 1991). This study holds that ‘rhetoric’ itself is to be 
seen as a neutral phenomenon for ‘[t]he art of rhetoric has never had a single 
form, nor has it ever stabilized’ (Gehrke 2009: 162). Thus the rhetoric of 
emotivist morality, in which emotions matter more than careful and open moral 
reasoning, is a specific type of rhetoric that takes place in a particular kairos, 
through specific persuasive means.  
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This study is based on a so-called new rhetorical understanding in which 
everyday communication is approached as a rhetorical phenomenon, especially 
when dealing with moral issues involving both emotion (feelings or sentiments 
attached to values) and reason (see Burke 1969; Jonsen & Toulmin 1988; 
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951; 2000 [1969]). The new rhetorical approach 
to morality is derived from Aristotle’s model in which rhetoric is ‘an ability, in 
each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion’ (see Rhetoric 
I.ii.1355a: 1). He, moreover, saw these means of persuasion as consisting of ethos 
(the moral character of the speaker), pathos (emotions) and logos (reasoning) (see 
Rhetoric I.ii.1356a: 3). Through the means of persuasion, the rhetor (the speaker 
or writer) and the audience (the person or group of people as the target of 
persuasion or those persuaded by the rhetor’s message) form a community (see 
Miller 1993: 212). In this study, community is understood as the potential of 
togetherness involved in a rhetor’s self-expression as well as the actualized 
togetherness involved in visible interaction between the rhetor and audience (see 
ibid.). In online forums, community building does not necessarily involve strong 
commitments in terms of reasoned interaction but is often based on temporary 
sharing of preferences. The characteristics of online communities are more 
thoroughly discussed in Section 2.1. 
The rhetorical approach to morality utilized in this study holds that ethos is the 
central means of persuasion. Ethos can be seen to involve both logos and pathos 
(see Miller 2004). Logos means distance between the rhetor and audience and is 
based on the idea that ‘you’ and ‘me’ are separate embodied beings and to form a 
community ‘we’ need reasoning on a shared basis. Pathos, on the contrary, is the 
sign of proximity that emotionally connects those who are building a community. 
Compared with logos-centric communities of the rhetor and audience, 
communities focusing on pathos are more strongly based on the requirement of 
sameness between these two rhetorical participants. I understand ethos as the 
combination of reason (phronesis as logos) and emotions (eunoia as pathos), with 
the arete component (moral virtue) forming the core of the character. According 
to Aristotle, phronesis and arete are virtues that have their origin in a character, 
whereas goodwill is a relativistic part of persuasion (see Rhetoric II.i.1378a: 7). 
For Aristotle, phronesis is a reasoned capacity related to moral practice (acts) 
(Nicomachean Ethics VI.i, VI.v–vii, VI.xii). Compared with phronesis, which is 
more distant, identification has a stronger function in arete and eunoia. According 
to Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics II.vi, II.ix), arete is the state of the character 
that makes a person good, while moral badness is the nature of a speaker who 
does not say what s/he really thinks (Rhetoric II.i.1378a: 6). For Aristotle, 
therefore, moral ‘badness’ is associated with rhetors who do not believe their own 
words. Arete, therefore, can be seen as a person’s capacity to act responsibly in 
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moral relationships. Eunoia, moreover, is to be found in sympathetic intimacy 
with the audience (Miller, 2001: 270; 2004: 205–213). In general, however, 
emotions also are separating people. It is because of emotions that people’s 
judgements differ from one another, as Aristotle points out (Rhetoric II.i.1378a: 
8). This study holds that eunoia as goodwill towards the audience may involve the 
risk of violence when the rhetor requires intimacy and does not give any choice to 
the audience (see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 2000 [1969]: 62). Such intimacy 
is obvious in rhetoric which contributes to community by dehumanizing ‘others’. 
To sum up, moral rhetoric consists of the abovementioned persuasive means 
(phronesis, arete, eunoia) that are utilized in a speech (i.e. written or spoken text) 
when contributing to a trustworthy ethos. Persuasion is a rhetorical practice that is 
related to acts: it aims at affecting the behaviour of people, the way they ‘ought’ 
to be and ‘ought’ to treat other human beings (see Burke 1969: 54; Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 2000 [1969]: 27–29). Moreover, rhetoric involves the idea that 
also language use and other social meaning-making practices are acts. The speech 
(a text, written or spoken) as the rhetors’ self-expression is the indicator of their 
ethos, since ‘a speaker runs the risk that the hearer will regard him [sic] as 
intimately connected with his speech’, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2000 
[1969]: 317) argue. Interestingly, the same notion is to be found in the remarks of 
Bergmann. He argues that evaluating and making judgements are risky for their 
users because judgements of people may always lead to ‘counter-moralization’ in 
which the moralizers themselves are judged (Bergmann 1998: 287–288). Thus 
self-expressions involving moral rhetoric are both targets and tools of ethos 
control. These remarks are in line with the notion that ethos is a collective issue 
sanctioned in each given community (see Reynolds 1993: 327). 
Thus far, I have discussed morality as a rhetorical phenomenon in general terms. 
Emotivist morality, to which I will now turn, is a specific rhetorical phenomenon 
in which emotions (eunoia) are highlighted. The use of evaluative language based 
on liking and disliking that aims at becoming the shared basis of a certain 
community is at the heart of emotivist morality. Moreover, emotivist morality 
operates on the borderlines of the private (understood here as closed 
communication with a limited inclusiveness) and public (understood here as 
communication with the sphere of influence beyond families, friends or 
neighbours).  
Characteristic of emotivist morality are both the second persona (Black 1970) and 
the third persona (Wander 1984). While the second persona refers to the audience 
implied in discourse as the preferred listeners (or readers), as Edwin Black (1970: 
111–112) suggests, the third persona, according to Philip Wander (1984: 209), is 
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the absent group of people that consists of the ‘audiences rejected or negated 
through the speech and/or the speaking situation’. Neither the second persona nor 
the third persona is a concrete construct; they are more or less ideological 
constructions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Wander’s idea of the third persona is close to 
Bauman’s (1993: 112–116) remarks on the Third, although they are not entirely 
the same thing. The Third refers to the existence of ‘others’ in a society while the 
‘third persona’ means the rhetorical exclusion of these ‘others’ when contributing 
to emotional togetherness. In other words, the third persona can be seen as any 
given group excluded as moral ‘inferiors’ when defining who ‘we’ (i.e. the 
community of the rhetor and the second persona) are. These notions of the moral 
rhetoric differ from the remarks of the rhetorician Celeste M. Condit who argues 
that the rhetorical construction of morality in public is more egalitarian than, and 
a more democratic alternative to, morality in small, private communities (see 
Condit 1987)5. 
Although the idea of public morality can be seen as egalitarian (see Condit 1987), 
it should not be taken as an empirical truth – as something that the moral rhetoric 
in public forums at all times and in all places necessarily is. Indeed, emotivist 
morality with oppressive tendencies is prominent in various publicly circulated 
contents that penetrate individuals’ everyday lives in persuading them to treat 
some people as ‘others’. Thus the individualistic nature of preferences, as 
MacIntyre’s  (2003 [1985]) remarks on emotivism seem to hold, no longer applies 
as such in societies that highlight the role of shared sentiments as the basis of 
morality (see Vivian 2002: 233–237). According to Bradford Vivian (2002: 236) 
the ‘modernist ideal of an autonomous individual, endowed with an essential 
capacity for reason and agency prior to his or her passage through the gates of 
society, loses its former ethos in a cultural epoch shaped by unprecedented social 
heterogeneity and interdependence’. He goes on to say, the ‘widespread 
contemporary experience of such heterogeneity and interdependence cannot be 
explained by principles of reason, utility, or citizenship, but by the function of a 
collective aesthetic, a shared sentiment’ (ibid.). Emotivist morality can flourish 
because of such shared sentiments that contribute to a dissonant ethos in which 
proximity and distance aim at splitting the rhetor. In emotivist morality, shared 
sentiments come to life through the practice of dividing people into groups and 
distancing certain people in the name of proximity to the preferred audience. 
Characteristic of these distanced ‘others’ is their ordinariness and everydayness.  
                                                 
 
5 Condit (1987) explicitly defends the rhetorical construction of public morality. According to her, 
publicly constructed morality takes place as ‘moral crafting’ that forces people from various 
social backgrounds to sacrifice self-interest and find a consensus over and over again.  
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As the doctrine of shared emotions, emotivist morality focuses especially on 
eunoia. Emotivist morality, therefore, can be seen as a morality based on 
epideictic (demonstrative) rhetoric. According to Aristotle (Rhetoric I.iii.1358b: 
3–6), epideictic rhetoric is persuasion based on praise or blame in the present 
time. As Burke (1969: 71–72) argues, epideictic rhetoric, as the rhetoric of 
‘display’, aims at winning praise in the love of words for their own sake. In the 
New Rhetoric, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2000 [1969]: 48), moreover, find 
a connection between epideictic rhetoric and aesthetics when arguing that an 
epideictic speech deals with what is beautiful or ugly. It may not aim at changing 
values as much as reinforcing those already accepted (Perelman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca 2000 [1969]: 51, 54). Epideictic rhetoric, according to Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (2000 [1969]: 47–51), is not necessarily a sign of domination, 
but it is central when arguing values in general. Epideictic rhetoric also has a 
pedagogical function for it aims at teaching values and morality to the audience, 
as in, for instance, religious settings (ibid.; see also Willén 2012: 81).  
According to Marcus Willén (2012) an epideictic speech involves characteristics 
of both public and private rhetoric. In his analysis of the rhetoric of the 
eighteenth-century Swedish statesman, Reuterholm, Willén suggests that 
Freemasonry speeches are typical examples of epideictic rhetoric in which both 
private (friendship-based and emotional) and public (political) aspects are 
involved. If epideictic rhetoric in public spaces turns into persuasion based on 
exclusion of particular ‘others’, it involves characteristics of emotivist morality. 
Rhetors of such proximity try to please the second persona (a preferred audience) 
and mock and judge the third persona in order to become socially approved in the 
eyes of the preferred audience. This is why epideictic rhetoric always potentially 
involves persuasion based on domination and power.  
Celebrity culture can be seen as a fertile terrain for epideictic rhetoric. This is 
because celebrity culture is the field of symbolic repetition producing celebrities 
for the rhythms of success and decline based on their own ‘metronome beat’, 
which emphasizes ‘an eternal present shaped in the past, already shaping the 
future to be made’, as Sean Redmond (2014: 120) argues. This argument is in line 
with the remarks of Daniel J. Boorstin (1992 [1961]: 45–76) who sees celebrities 
as human ‘pseudo-events’, that is, artificial beings made for contemporary 
preferences through a repetitive technique. The repetitive logic of celebrity 
culture can be found in the topics of celebrity gossip concerning love affairs and 
divorces, personal success and addiction, new beginnings and final collapses. 
Such individual tragedies may seem like they would be authentically confessed 
by ‘inner selves’ despite the fact that they are planned for commercial purposes 
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(see Bauman 2000: 86). Thus celebrity culture represents its own repetitive logic 
more than the ‘individuality’ of any particular celebrity. 
Moreover, participation in celebrity culture as a rhetorical practice highlights the 
role of style in community building. According to Barry Brummett (2008: 102–
103), in consumer participation surrounded by entertainment industries and 
popular culture, a shared style is legitimized as the norm that rules the 
community’s judgement and thus ties community members together. As Lanham 
(2006: 171, 221) also suggests, albeit cleverly distancing himself from the 
judging tone of his argument, in western entertainment-oriented cultures moral 
guidance is sought in a loyalty to form by transforming meanings from the field 
of ‘aesthetic’ to that of ‘moral’. Through this moral doctrine, ‘style has become 
the new basis for moral judgements’ for those unsure of their religion and 
sceptical of traditional politics (Brummett 2008: 102). In such epideictic 
togetherness, appearances and performances in the present give meaning for the 
community and for the ‘self’. Note that the criticism targeting the switched roles 
of ‘aesthetic’ and ‘moral’ in Brummett’s (2008: 102–103) remarks does not mean 
he sees ‘aesthetic’, as such, as ‘bad’ or meaningless. 
In rhetorical studies, and this is my interpretation, ‘aesthetic’ is often 
synonymously used with ‘stylistic’ and it refers to what is persuasive and 
typically emotional in rhetors’ speeches. ‘Moral’ (or ‘ethical’ because many 
rhetoricians do not make a distinction between ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’), conversely, 
is associated with the mental places or ‘topoi’ representing a community’s values 
and virtues to which self-expressions are related (see e.g. Fisher 1984; 
Fleckenstein 2007). Fleckenstein (2007) for instance, argues that there is no 
‘aesthetic’ without ‘ethical’. By this she means what is good or virtuous does not 
merely lie in appearances, such as words, gestures or pictures as expressions of 
the rhetor, but rather ethos ‘is dispersed throughout the ecology of speaker, 
audience, scene, and city-state’ (ibid.). This argument is in line with Lanham’s 
(2006) suggestion according to which oscillations between looking AT and 
looking THROUGH are central to the relationship of style (appearances) and 
substance (deeper values and purpose). However, Brummett’s (2008: 102–103) 
criticism of the shifting roles of the ‘aesthetic’ and ‘moral’ is that there is no 
oscillation between the two paradigms at all; they simply change places with each 
other. If ‘moral’ becomes ‘aesthetic’ and vice versa, there is nothing ‘deeper’ for 
the construction of a community, and moral positioning becomes an emotivist 
problem. 
Moreover, I see here a connection to Bauman’s (2000) criticism of ‘liquid 
modernity’. In liquid modernity, particularly individuals’ identities become fluid; 
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they are under constant change and recreation (ibid. 31–32). In rhetorical terms, 
characteristic of liquid modernity is a relativist ethos that is to be found in the in-
between spaces of the rhetor and audience (see Reynolds 1993). The relativist 
ethos requires proximity, even intimacy, as the relationship of the rhetor and the 
addressed audience. By ‘late’ or ‘liquid’ modernity, I refer to the era of culture 
and communication where rhetors and their audiences are faced with uncertainty 
concerning what is ‘real’ and what should be taken seriously. Thus the struggles 
and complexities of late modernity are issues of rhetorical ethos. Often ‘late 
modernity’ and ‘postmodernism’ are seen as synonyms. However, I understand 
postmodernism as a stage in which the aesthetic and superficial has overcome 
what is serious or deeper. In this study, I prefer ‘late modernity’ to 
‘postmodernism’ because the relationship between the real (or serious) and 
aesthetic is still a negotiable source of ethos in media culture, which is evident in 
online celebrity gossip. 
In the late-modern phase, mediated performance ‘here and now’ is essential. 
Participation in the online spaces of celebrity gossip can be seen as a prototype of 
mediated performance for it takes place through intimacy with objects (pictures, 
videos, texts) representing celebrities (see Graefer 2013). In such ‘aesthetic 
proximity’, the ‘other’ (the Other) becomes a faceless group representing the 
nearness of the crowd (Bauman 1993: 115; 130–132). Intimacy with objects in 
aesthetic proximity ignores all concerns of otherness. Both the addressed 
audience and the ‘others’ represented by objects get a mere material value to 
which the ‘self’ is intimately related. Thus in relation to otherness, intimacy with 
objects is a distancing phenomenon. MacIntyre’s (2003 [1985]) remarks on 
emotivism closely relate to Bauman’s concept of liquid morality and aesthetic 
proximity. According to MacIntyre (2003 [1985]: 58–59), if human beings have 
no moral essence, they are no longer functional subjects with a certain life 
purpose (see also Bauman & Donskis 2013: 37–40). Current celebrity culture 
contributes to liquidity for it ‘presents us with figures to identify with but asks us 
to see or experience these embodied ties as loose, free-floating’ (Redmond 2014: 
23–24). Accordingly, celebrity culture is a realm of intimacy at the same time as 
it also abandons personal commitments and a deeper motive to understand the 
‘other’ or ‘others’.  
In rhetorical studies, ‘liquidity’ is discussed when dealing with ‘authorless’ 
environments, and it is thus often associated with communication in digital 
contexts, particularly in comment sections and chats on the Internet (e.g. Miller 
2001; Warnick 2004; Fleckenstein 2005; 2007). In such contexts, the role of 
performance, what is expressed ‘here and now’ matters (Warnick 2004: 264). I 
will deal with these rhetorical ideas more closely in Section 2.1 with regard to 
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ordinary people’s online participation, typically more or less anonymous and 
thereby authorless.  
1.4 Articles and the structure of the dissertation  
This study consists of five articles in which the research questions are answered. 
In this thesis, the articles are arranged in chronological order, which demonstrates 
that this study was conducted as an evolving process of exploration of the self-
expressions of celebrity gossip participants in an effort to understand their 
contributions to distance and proximity. Article 1 was published first, and it deals 
with autobiographical moralizing as a way online participants of celebrity gossip 
construct their ethos by referring to the trustworthiness of their moral character 
(see Eronen 2011). The article concerns the role of arete in online celebrity 
gossip. The focus of Article 2 is on the values shared by gossip participants 
through their uses of evaluative language (see Eronen 2014a). This paper deals 
with the eunoia part of ethos, indicating what is seen as desirable by online 
participants of celebrity gossip. While Article 2 concerns eunoia as the pathos 
element of rhetoric, Article 3 involves the analysis of phronesis as forms (logic) 
of moral argumentation (see Eronen 2014b). The analysis of emotions and values 
and the study of forms of moral argumentation are combined in Article 4, which 
focuses on the most typical ways of expressing preferences when evaluating 
celebrities online (see Eronen 2013)6. In other words, Article 4 deals with the 
specific ways through which the persuasiveness of emotivist morality is 
constructed both emotionally and logically. Moreover, all four articles involve the 
comparison of ethos construction in English-language and Finnish online 
comment sections. Article 5, conversely, focuses on one specific English-
language online environment where persuasion based on emotivist morality was 
supported through ethos control (see Eronen in process). In other words, while 
Articles 1 through 4 deal with ways of constructing the ethos of the ‘self’, Article 
5 concerns ways that online participants evaluate the ethos constructions of their 
co-gossipers. The titles of these articles, the time and forum of their publication 
and the specific research questions of each article are shown in Figure 2.  
 
                                                 
 
6 Note that the publication process of Article 4 was more rapid than that of Articles 2 and 3. I 
started the analysis needed for Article 4 after starting to write Articles 2 and 3.  
30      Acta Wasaensia 
 
 
Figure 2. Research articles of the thesis. 
None of these articles alone is sufficient to explore the complexity of proximity 
and distance in online celebrity gossip, but together they make it possible. In the 
following section, I situate self-expressions typical of online comment sections in 
a specific material and temporal kairos. This specific kairos is discussed in 
Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, I describe the research material, while Section 2.3 
focuses on the way ethos is approached in this study through particular 
methodological choices. Section 2.4 deals with the ways I have explored ethos in 
online comment sections of celebrity gossip. In Chapter 3, I draw conclusions 
based on the five research articles. The five research articles are provided as 
appendices at the end of this thesis.  
ARTICLE 1 
•Title: Autobiographical moralizing in celebrity discussions on the Internet: how do 
discussion participants confess and testify in Finnish and English? 
•Published: (2011) Language Use on Net and in Networks. AFinLA yearbook 2011, n:o 69. 
•Research question(s): 2 
ARTICLE 2 
•Title: ‘It’s so wrong yet so funny’: celebrity violence, values and the Janus-faced cultural 
public sphere online 
•Published: (2014a) Celebrity Studies. 
•Research question(s): 3 
ARTICLE 3 
•Title: Moral argumentation as a rhetorical practice in popular online discourse: 
Examples from online comment sections of celebrity gossip 
•Published: (2014b) Discourse & Communication. 
•Research question(s): 1 
ARTICLE 4 
•Title: Digital enthymeme: morality, emotions, and materialism in new media 
participation 
•Published: (2013)  New media, audience and emotional connectivity. Special Issue of 
Sociedad de la Información.  
•Research question(s): 1 and 3 
ARTICLE 5 
•Title: Online celebrity gossip, moral disidentification, and ethos: exploring the rhetorical 
grounds of celebrity mockery 
•Submitted: (2014) Enculturation 
•Research question(s): 4 
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2 TOWARDS THE ANALYSIS OF ONLINE SELF-
 EXPRESSIONS  
In this section, I will first deal with the specific rhetorical context of time and 
place (kairos) that has made self-expressions of ordinary people visible in public 
spaces. After that, I will discuss the research material (online comment sections 
on celebrity gossip) and methodology (the analysis of evaluative language and 
rhetorical argumentation analysis applied to online contexts). 
2.1 Demotic turn: ‘ordinary’ people online 
Participation in contemporary mediated spaces makes the ‘self’, the ordinary, a 
central element of media discourse which tends to be overly technologized and 
commercial, as Lilie Chouliaraki (2010; 2011; 2013: 15–21) argues. According to 
her, the self-expressive culture in new media ignores normative questions relating 
to morality and otherness and highlights the emotionality of the ‘self’ 
(Chouliaraki 2013: 15–17, 20). The expressions of ordinary people (those without 
a public role) become essential contents of public participation because of the 
demotic turn (Turner 2004: 82–85; 2010). As previously discussed, the demotic 
turn is the cultural era characterized by the increasing media visibility of the 
‘ordinary’ and the ‘popular’ through new participatory media contents and 
platforms, particularly the Internet (Turner 2004: 82–85; 2010). On the one hand, 
the demotic turn refers to the media contents of entertainment industry, such as 
reality television shows, in which those not known for their merits or status 
occupy the public scene (see Turner 2004: 82–84). On the other hand, and this is 
the perspective from which the demotic turn is seen in the present study, the 
concept involves the idea of constructing cultural identities (by which I mean 
ways of constructing ethos) through topics typically categorized as ‘trivial’ and 
‘meaningless’ if compared with rational and bureaucratic public participation (see 
Turner 2004: 85). The life and opinions of ordinary people are not new topics in 
the media, but their media coverage has expanded since the nineties, largely 
because of the Internet and the increase of celebrity-related content.  
Moreover, the public site – the kairotic place – closely related to the demotic turn 
is the cultural public sphere. According to Jim McGuigan (2005: 435), cultural 
public sphere is the discursive site for ‘the articulation of politics, public and 
personal, as a contested terrain through affective (aesthetic and emotional) modes 
of communication’. One example of phenomena occurring within the cultural 
public sphere was the morality-concerned ‘life politics’ as a popular debate 
following the death of Princess Diana (see ibid. 435–436). Another, and a more 
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recent one, is the Big Brother reality television programme as a ‘modern morality 
play’ (ibid. 436), which, moreover, is a popular topic also discussed in online 
comment sections (Graham & Harju 2011). Online comment sections where 
moral meanings of celebrities and gossip are made have become central sites of 
the cultural public sphere. Because of the demotic turn as the right time and the 
cultural public sphere as the right contextual site for celebrity gossip discussions, 
the celebrity audience’s active role as gossip producers has become visible. Thus 
those who were stuck in the private sphere in their role as the audience have 
become rhetors: participants actively producing their own content in various new 
media environments. Accordingly, the demotic turn and the cultural public sphere 
together form a kairos that legitimizes the media visibility of arguments and 
opinions of those without institutional public status or social merit.  
What makes ordinary people’s media visibility a contested societal topic is its 
potential in both emancipation and oppression (e.g. Turner 2010). The demotic 
turn, therefore, should not be equated with a ‘democratic turn’ as the taken-for-
granted era of ordinary people (Turner 2010: 171–174). There are two sides of the 
same ‘demotic coin’, which I will briefly discuss in the following. On the one 
hand, as Henry Jenkins (2006: 83–87) claims, there is a real value to the gossip 
discussed on the Internet because through it people from different social and 
cultural groups can gather together to share their world views and perhaps also 
learn how different cultures see the world. For instance, those interested in reality 
television shows can meet in online discussion forums and discuss important 
morally loaded topics, such as good parenthood and the well-being of families 
(Graham & Harju 2011: 29–30). Moreover, some popular genres, such as 
celebrity gossip blogs, challenge the professional role of media institutions and 
journalists as the only legitimate producers of celebrity gossip (Meyers 2012). In 
other words, celebrity gossip, when entering online contexts and their discussion 
forums, becomes a genre in which meaning-making concerning celebrities is 
actively practiced by those whose role was previously limited to that of readers, 
or receivers, of mass-media content (Meyers 2012; see also Jerslev 2010).   
In addition, scandals relating to public figures, when discussed online, may 
involve a problem-solving function through which ordinary people can criticize 
the acts of those influential in politics (Tileagă 2012). Genres of popular culture, 
such as gossip discussed online, seem to be free of authoritarian forces that are 
present in official political debates (see e.g. Jenkins 2006: 83–84; 249–250). 
Accordingly, compared with the communication that takes place behind the doors 
of parliament, online communication welcomes stronger and more spontaneous 
uses of pathos arguments (Koskela & Vik-Tuovinen 2010). As these previous 
studies indicate, the participation of ordinary people in online spaces relates to the 
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potential of those without an authorial public status to freely express their 
opinions and criticize social inequalities in public arenas. These characteristics of 
communication in online settings derive from the online ethos as trustworthiness 
that differs from the emphasis on the source or author as the sign of credibility 
(see Warnick 2004: 263; also Fleckenstein 2005; 2007). In other words, 
participants in online contexts can rely on the discourse itself, without being 
obedient to authoritarian forces that regard societal status and merit as signs of 
credible ethos.  
On the other hand, however, there are many ethical and rhetorical challenges 
related to communication in online contexts, especially in its asynchronous7 and 
anonymous forms. Online communication is characterized by short, quick 
commenting, the temporal separation of the rhetor and audience, contextual 
ambiguousness (Jones 2004) and the establishment and interpretation of the ethos 
of the rhetor in the ‘here and now’ based on minimal textual cues (Miller 2001: 
272–273; Warnick 2007: 47–48). Consequently, communication in online 
environments produces a tension between optimizing the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ 
(see Miller 2001: 267) and switching off those participants who seem too 
challenging (see Silverstone 2003: 481; also 2007: 138). This tension can be seen 
as the problem of ethos particularly in online contexts where participation is 
anonymous or takes place from behind pseudonyms.  
Online environments can be made oppressive and strictly exclusive sites of 
togetherness. According to Miller (2004: 212–213), participants in computer-
mediated contexts seek sympathetic feelings and responses from agents who 
remain unknown but who, nevertheless, share emotions and preferences with 
them. Consequently, the rhetor’s willingness to share emotions and preferences 
with the audience may become an adequate sign of a trustworthy ethos, an ethos 
that Miller (2004) calls ‘the ethos of sympathy’8. Such ethos, according to her, is 
based on eunoia and takes place particularly in computer-mediated contexts 
where the rhetor and audience change places and their roles become mixed (ibid. 
208–213). Accordingly, the ethos of sympathy can also apply to online 
participation in celebrity gossip where the same participants act as both rhetors 
and members of the audience. As Miller (ibid. 212) argues, the ethos of sympathy 
                                                 
 
7 Asynchronous communication is discussion in which interaction is structured into turns but a 
reply may be posted months or even years after the prior turn (see Kollock & Smith 1999: 5). 
8 Note that ethos of sympathy does not necessarily aim at excluding otherness but it can also be a 
genuine concern for others as emotional equals. I thank Carolyn R. Miller for this remark. 
However, when it comes to emotivist morality, ethos of sympathy is a persuasive means of 
attacking ‘others’. 
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makes it difficult to know the rhetor because communication in online contexts 
‘continually deflects attention away from the agent and back to the audience’. 
What is lacking in such sympathetic communication is arete as a cue of the 
specific moral and personal virtues of the rhetor (ibid. 212–213). In other words, 
online communication, particularly in comment sections on the Internet, may 
contribute to insularity in which ethos is constructed on the basis of conformism. 
Such ethos, according to Laura Gurak (1999), can be called group ethos.  
Moreover, Fleckenstein (2005) provides an illustrative metaphor to describe the 
blurred boundaries of the rhetor and audience in online settings. According to her 
metaphorical description, the performance of ‘cyberethos’ comes with the 
disappearance of the ‘self’, just as Lewis Carroll’s bread-and-butter-fly becomes 
part of what it eats when its sugar cube head dissolves in the tea (ibid.). For 
Fleckenstein, this metaphor represents online participants who consume digital 
contents for their own empowerment and at the same time lose their own 
autonomy and become part of the contents they consume. This metaphor of liquid 
participation relates to violence as a rhetorical phenomenon discussed at the very 
beginning of this thesis. The self-expression of the bread-and-butter-fly involves a 
tension between individual empowerment and forced sameness. When it 
expresses itself as consuming liquid (tea), it becomes part of the liquid. Thus the 
metaphor illustrates a rhetorical situation in which the ignorance of otherness 
challenges the idea of the ‘self’ as a fixed subject. Graefer (2013) deals with the 
same issue in her study focusing on representations on celebrity gossip blogs. 
According to her, participation on celebrity gossip blogs involves the active role 
of individuals as well as highlights the agency given to online celebrity 
representations (ibid. 222–223). Such participation involves an interesting 
rhetorical phenomenon: online participants form intimacy with material objects 
representing celebrity at the same time when distancing otherness represented by 
these objects. When consuming digital material for self-empowerment, rhetors 
give their relationship to pictures, videos or other contextual contents the power 
of ethos. Finally, in online contexts, such consuming for self-empowerment may 
become a social issue representing what Gurak (1999) calls group ethos. 
It is worth noting that intimacy in online contexts may characterize ordinary 
people’s digital media participation in particular. Conversely, the ethos 
construction on politicians’ blogs is based on their political expertise and status, 
reinforcing their distance from ordinary people, as Lotta Lehti’s (2013) study of 
French politicians’ blogs suggests. According to Lehti (2013: 530), politicians do 
not ‘lower’ themselves to the level of ordinary people, which can be seen for 
instance in the lack of interaction between politicians and blog readers, making 
politicians’ blogs channels of their authorial monologue despite the dialogic 
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possibilities of the Internet. Thus insularity in digital spaces may be surrounded 
by the use of elite power that provokes the ‘ordinary’ to participate in collective 
action. 
Moreover, when self-expressions are the criteria for inclusion of the ‘same’, they, 
by the same token, may serve as starting points for excluding the ‘different’ (see 
Silverstone 2003: 481; also 2007: 138)9. As Silverstone (2007: 138) argues, ‘the 
strengths of such on-line spaces, their ease of access, speed and intensity of 
connection, are also their weaknesses’. A stranger in these contexts is always 
vulnerable to the exclusion that ‘comes with the click of a mouse or the instant 
judgements of a web-master’ (ibid.). Note that this view of online participation is 
contrary to that of Jenkins (2006: 84–85) who argues that gossip discussed in 
online contexts is important because it may help to learn values from different 
social groups. For Jenkins, communication in online environments is togetherness 
welcoming ‘difference’, while Silverstone, on the contrary, sees it as togetherness 
based on ‘sameness’. Rather than regarding these two perspectives as contrary, 
they both can be seen as involved in online communication in which issues of 
‘local’ (those based on specific locations or interests) and ‘global’ (those enabling 
heterogeneity and multicultural participation) are ambiguous.  
Although online communication may potentially be ‘global’ because of the 
participants’ heterogeneous social and cultural backgrounds, such communication 
may still emerge as ‘local’ as it is restricted to the particular interests of the 
participants (Wellman & Gulia 1999: 186–187). The highlighted role of specific 
interests in online communication may derive from the need for intimacy and 
reciprocity because of the physical distance between online participants, as 
Silverstone (2003) suggests. Accordingly, the new media technology enables the 
development of global networks but actual online participation may involve even 
more limited interests than face-to-face communication. By the same token, it is 
possible that potentially ‘global’ online environments are the sites of intense 
proximity based on aggressive exclusion in the name of intimacy, while those 
discussion forums connecting people around ‘local’ topics, such as nationally 
limited issues, are more characteristically based on an argumentative relationship 
between online participants.  
Moreover, the strength of proximity tends to vary in accordance with each 
comment section or forum where online communication takes place. Comment 
                                                 
 
9 This is in line with Aristotle’s remarks on the rhetorical role of emotions in contributing to disa-
greement (see Rhetoric II.i.1378a: 8) 
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sections of online newspapers are sites that do not require a login or strong 
commitment to shared online cultures. Particularly sites of tabloid newspapers are 
environments that participants leave after they have expressed their own 
preferences (see Richardson & Stanyer 2011). Unlike online comment sections of 
newspapers, online environments meant for closed discussions of registered users 
often make it possible for participants to start new discussion threads with their 
own posts. Such closed discussion groups involve strong intimacy between 
participants (e.g. Arpo 2005; Meyers 2010). Compared with the comment 
sections in online newspapers, sites meant only for registered users seem more 
likely to build a community. However, community in online contexts should not 
be understood as a fixed entity that either exists or does not exist. As discussed at 
the beginning of this thesis, all self-expressions, that is, all subjective posts in 
online environments, even those that do not succeed in creating intimacy between 
the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, are invitations to form a community. According to Jan 
Fernback (2007), communities in online spaces are not fixed or stable constructs 
but rather can be defined as processes of evolving togetherness between 
participants in cyberspace. As she argues (Fernback 2007: 65),  
[c]ommunity is not always about consensus or intimacy. It is about 
understanding that humans are bound together by a need to perpetuate 
society and culture. That need compels humans to work together and to 
communicate in a continual process of social maintenance or social change. 
This process is not always efficient or palpable; it can be chaotic and 
oppositional. 
The idea of community as an evolving process of togetherness matches the 
rhetorical understanding of community as the site of togetherness ‘defining a 
horizon of possibilities for any given audience that realizes it’ (see Miller 1993: 
212). However weak the obvious signs of interaction are, all self-expressions in 
online environments aim at sharing perceptions of what is trustworthy and 
expected. These perceptions are supported or challenged as the community 
evolves through new contents, new self-expressions, sent by new participants. 
Characteristic of communities interested in celebrities is the participants’ 
affective, particularly humorous, relationship to objects such as pictures or videos 
of celebrities (see Graefer 2013: 189). In online spaces of celebrity gossip, as 
Graefer suggests, community is based on participants’ interaction with objects. 
Such community, therefore, involves the idea of network in which participants are 
organized around a shared artefact, such as a picture representing celebrity. Thus 
relationships in such community have a deeply material basis: reasoned 
interaction between participants is not the prerequisite for the community to exist 
and evolve. In particular, Graefer (2013) discusses affect-focused participation on 
online celebrity blogs by utilizing Susanna Paasonen’s (2011) remarks on affect 
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in digital culture. According to Paasonen (ibid.), affect means sensation and 
intensities of feeling that become visible through the circulation of objects (such 
as pictures or videos) in digital spaces. Thus affect is a material relationship to 
objects and, through a networked circulation, it becomes a social phenomenon. 
Affect has to do with intimacy, not only in relation to media objects, but also in 
the interaction of those acting in a digital space (see ibid. 232–236). 
Intimacy that wipes out problems of otherness between the rhetor and audience 
may be a solution to build a community in online environments where 
participants are globally spread-out. This is because ethos of self-expressions may 
be particularly challenging in text-based, multicultural online communication 
where there is an absence of nonverbal cues and ‘where meaning is so easily 
inaccurately conveyed and misconstrued, both unintentionally and deliberately’ 
(DuVal Smith 1999: 156). The ease of misconstruction of meaning in online 
contexts can be seen as relating to the lack of responsibility. Reciprocity, as 
Silverstone (2007: 173) points out, should not be confused with responsibility. 
This is because responsibility requires more effort and commitment than mere 
expressions of liking or disliking in the present. Reciprocity as a substitute of 
responsibility is enabled by technological communication platforms and spaces, 
such as the Internet with its comment sections. Such reciprocity is related to 
intimacy that wipes out distance. According to Darin Barney (2004: 32), online 
togetherness – free of moral concerns – is ‘a perfect technological solution to the 
problem of community in a liberal, market society’. Barney’s criticism of 
communities in online spaces is close to Bauman’s (2000: 96–98) critical remarks 
on social spaces that are public but non-civil. According to Bauman (2000: 97): 
‘[s]haring physical space with other actors engaged in a similar activity adds 
importance to the action, stamps it with ‘the approval of numbers’ and so 
corroborates its sense, justifies it without the need to argue.’  
Communities in online spaces, and particularly those dedicated to global celebrity 
gossip, are close to the public but non-civil spaces described by Bauman (2000: 
96–98). The practice of consuming objects is a globally flexible form of 
participation because it welcomes and tolerates various individual interests, 
despite how perverse or oppressive they are. Because consuming is free of 
particular social norms it can be seen as an emotivist practice. On the Internet, 
there are a variety of spaces from which an individual can choose the one that 
matches her or his own taste. When the choice is made, emotivism may turn into 
emotivist morality. That happens if the exclusion of particular ‘others’ is socially 
approved in the online space. Exclusion, instead of moral responsibility, becomes 
the tool to solve the problem of otherness. In the idea of moral irresponsibility of 
communities in online spaces underlies the notion that the demotic turn is not 
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necessarily democratic but may actually involve practices through which the 
freedom of ordinary people can be effectively used in support of the market (see 
Turner 2010: 171–174). For instance, sites dedicated to popular culture (such as 
sport, science fiction, fantasy or superheroes) are normative environments 
through which fandom is domesticated and fans are treated as consumers (Stanfill 
2014). As also Graefer (2013: 223) points out, ‘celebrity gossip blogs can be seen 
as part of an economy which modulates affect for the sake of profit’. The 
affective economy in online spaces of popular culture can effectively exploit 
individual users if they regard a certain relationship to objects as the basis of 
ethos.  
One could argue that online communities are just utopian and not real sites of 
togetherness because participants on the Internet lack the moral responsibility to 
deal with conflicting desires and values that have to be negotiated in face-to-face 
communities. The idea of online communication as anti-normative (e.g. Kiesler et 
al. 1984; Siegel et al. 1986; Sproull & Kiesler 1986) was typical of research into 
online contexts in the 1980s when CMC-related studies took their initial steps. In 
accordance with these early studies in the field, one could ask why quickly typed 
online comments sent by anonymous participants even matter if ‘real’ life is lived 
elsewhere. No one, however, has claimed that cyberspace is any utopian ‘no 
place’; online communication is always surrounded and affected by specific 
structures of place (Mitra & Watts 2002: 485). Thus self-expressions, even in the 
‘darkest room’ (Arpo 2005: 282–283), are always preceded by the idea of a social 
being who is related to other beings through distance and proximity. This tension 
between the individual and social participation makes online environments norm-
governed. As Charles Ess (2010) also argues, the era of dualisms according to 
which ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ or ‘offline’ and ‘online’ are radically separate is over; 
the ‘self’ in digital networks is fundamentally relational and embodied.  
Accordingly, even though participation in online contexts may potentially be self-
empowering (Chouliaraki 2013: 17–20) and welcome creative personal stories 
and various identity plays (see e.g. Arpo 2005: 295–296; Paasonen 2007; Östman 
2008; 2010; 2011), it is always regulated by the complexities and power relations 
of the community as long as communication involves human beings.10 That is to 
say, online contexts are not free of hierarchies or welcome all forms of 
individualistic creativity. Digital contexts have been described as highly norm-
                                                 
 
10 This also relates closely to Silverstone’s (1999) way to criticize the idea of ‘novelty’ concerning 
the new media. According to him, communication in highly technologized settings, such as on 
the Internet, is not free of ideologies and issues of power: ‘[t]he new media, indeed, affect and 
involve us fully as social and political as well as economic beings’ (ibid. 12). 
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governed and ‘deindividuated’ sites of communication that are ‘real’ spaces in 
terms of social structures and hierarchies (Lea & Spears 1991; Lea et al. 2001; 
Stromer-Galley & Martey 2009). The idea of deindividuation relates to the 
tension of self-expression through which individuals show their own choices but 
do not argue why they have made such choices. Although that sort of 
participation is based on the freedom of choice on an individual level, on a social 
level it does not welcome any discussion about otherness. Performance (Warnick 
2004: 264) and the ability to share emotional involvement, such as humour 
(Hübler & Bell 2003; Graefer 2013), are at the heart of constructing a trustworthy 
ethos in online contexts. In other words, participation in online environments may 
highlight the necessity to play a certain expected role that challenges the idea of 
trust and credibility as the sincerity of the ‘self’ (Gardner 2011: 99–106). 
According to Ess (2010), the idea of the online self as a disembodied and 
networking participant risks abandoning the skills and habits of literacy as well as 
virtues and by so doing attacks the ideals of liberal individualism. His criticism of 
the fluidity of online expression fits with rhetorical criticism of online ethos (see 
e.g. Miller 2004; Gurak 1999). If participation is highly repetitive, and hence 
restricting, it attacks individual freedom as the precondition sometimes associated 
with communication in the new media.  
As already discussed above, the tension between the local and global is essential 
for understanding the difference between emotivism and emotivist morality in 
community building online. Emotivism involves an ethical idea which tolerates 
‘placelessness’. No human communities, however, legitimize all preferences. 
That is not to argue that there is not a specific kairos for such a doctrine as 
emotivism, since emotivism has found its persuasiveness in a particular time- and 
place-bound context of western culture which has attacked values and norms as 
practical or ‘lived’ issues (see MacIntyre 2003 [1985]). However, whenever 
emotivism is actualized in human communication, it is not the doctrine of 
‘anything goes’ but rather a doctrine that legitimizes only certain preferences. It is 
through this doctrine that certain groups are seen as ‘others’ to be mocked and 
moralized. Emotivist morality, therefore, is always restricted to a certain place; it 
involves inclusions and exclusions dependent on each audience and its choice of 
who the ‘others’ are. When communicating in a particular online context, such as 
in a comment section dedicated to celebrity gossip, anything is not rhetorically 
persuasive. What is persuasive in online celebrity gossip is up to its participants 
and their specific preferences.   
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2.2 Research material and ethical considerations 
The research material of the present study consists of 1800 asynchronous online 
comments here understood as self-expressions and treated as units of analysis. 
Half of these self-expressions are in English, the other half in Finnish. The 
comments were collected from the comment sections of popular global (Just 
Jared, YouTube, LiveJournal, USA Today, Huffington Post) and national 
(Seiska.fi, Kaksplus.fi, Suomi24, HS.fi, Mtv3.fi) online environments in which 
anonymous participants (or pseudonym users) commented on celebrity-concerned 
issues. A typical comment in the material was a short verbal judgement (less than 
ten words) posted in response to a gossip story or video concerning celebrities. 
Some of the comments involved evaluation of visual media elements, particularly 
pictures of celebrities, but a few comments included pictures posted by online 
participants themselves. All comments in the research material were publicly 
visible, and the websites I chose for this study did not require the reader to log in 
to read or save comments, although some of the sites required users to log in 
before posting a comment.  
The comments in the research material concern four cases of celebrity gossip: 1) 
domestic violence involving the pop singers Rihanna and Chris Brown (450 
comments); 2) domestic violence involving a Finnish former ski jumper Matti 
Nykänen and his ex-wife Mervi (450 comments); 3) a fight on a TV show 
involving the media personality Sharon Osbourne and a reality television 
contestant Megan Hauserman (450 comments); and 4) a fight in a bar involving 
Finnish entertainment celebrities Martina Aitolehti and Anne-Mari Berg (450 
comments). These four cases were chosen for the study because the celebrities are 
represented as ‘tragic’ and ‘dramatic’ characters close to ordinary people having 
problems in their love relationships or suffering from addictions – themes that 
make the non-autonomous role of the individual a public issue. These cases, 
therefore, match the interests of the present study focusing on the tension of self-
expressions as comments that involve both individualist and socially dependent 
elements.  
Rihanna and Chris Brown are young, American celebrities not only known for 
their pop or hip hop music but also for their stormy relationship and rumours 
concerning their possible addictions. The Finnish former ski jumper and his ex-
wife are often represented as heavy alcohol-drinkers and thus seen as 
representatives of addicted people without a respected socioeconomic status. Note 
that although Nykänen’s celebrity character is a sport hero and is therefore 
associated with the Finnish national identity, his character constructed for 
commercial purposes of gossip media is seen as separate from his merits in sport. 
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In gossip concerning the former ski jumper, the comparison of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is 
not based on a national identity in the same way as in sport-related popular 
culture in general (see Dahlén 2008: 446). ‘We’ may also be the group of 
gossipers who look down on the celebrity, seeing him as a representative of 
‘others’.  
Moreover, Sharon Osbourne and Megan Hauserman, as well as the Finnish 
celebrities Martina Aitolehti and Anne-Mari Berg, are female celebrities often 
associated with a low-class lifestyle and undeserved fame. Megan Hauserman, 
Martina Aitolehti and Anne-Mari Berg are all relatively young, white, 
‘entertainment’ celebrities who are often represented as sexual objects in media 
representations. Megan Hauserman is a media personality of American reality 
television. She became a celebrity through her appearance in Playboy. Both 
Martina Aitolehti and Anne-Mari Berg are Finnish celebrities who became well 
known in Finland because of their ‘secret’ love affairs. Aitolehti was evaluated as 
the ‘secret lover’ (salarakas) of a Finnish-Russian soccer player, while Berg was 
represented as a character having a ‘secret’ relationship with a former minister of 
Finland who was reported to have sent her text messages with sexual (sexist) 
implications. Sharon Osbourne, the wife of heavy-metal singer and songwriter 
Ozzy Osbourne, is older than the other three female celebrities mentioned above 
and her character provokes a lot of discussion about whether her fame is self-
deserved or whether it was Ozzy who made her famous. Despite their wealth, the 
lifestyle of the Osbournes is seen as a marker of their ordinariness and working-
class lifestyle (Dhoest 2005). Thus Sharon Osbourne is also seen as a character 
with problems often associated with people without an elite status. 
The reason to concentrate on particular topics of celebrity gossip – instead of 
focusing on various gossip topics within a specific online genre (such as celebrity 
gossip blogs) – stems from the tradition of rhetorical criticism as a qualitative 
approach focusing on one or several rhetorical ‘cases’. In rhetorical criticism, the 
persuasiveness of texts is uncovered by first becoming familiar with each case in 
relation to which the texts have been produced. Consequently, in order to do such 
a case-bound analysis, I familiarized myself with the general cultural meanings 
relating to the eight particular celebrities. The case-based analysis is essential 
when exploring persuasiveness of emotivist morality as a context-sensitive 
phenomenon and not as something that is based on unexplainable and irrational 
emotions of those interested in celebrities (see Hills 2007).  
Moreover, the websites from where the comments of the study were collected 
differ from one another in the strength of commitment and intimacy between 
participants as well as in terms of user activity. I have divided the forums into 
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media-generated and user-generated. The first group includes Just Jared (an 
English-language website dedicated to celebrity gossip), USATODAY.com, HS.fi 
(a Finnish online newspaper), the Huffington Post, Mtv3.fi (the website of a 
Finnish television channel) and Seiska.fi (the website of a Finnish gossip 
magazine) – gossip sites that are controlled by media corporations. The online 
comments collected from these forums are reactions to contents produced and 
posted to the gossip site by the media industry. It also is presumable that these 
sites are either pre- or post-moderated by media industries. Thus media-generated 
sites can be seen as more systematically hierarchical compared to what I call user-
generated sites, that is, YouTube, Kaksplus.fi (the online forum provided by a 
Finnish ‘baby magazine’), Suomi24 (a general Finnish discussion forum) and the 
LiveJournal community (Oh No They Didn’t (ONTD). By user-generated sites, I 
mean gossip forums where online participants had the possibility to start new 
discussion threads by posting digital contents (pictures, videos, texts). Although 
Kaksplus.fi is a website of a Finnish magazine, the discussion forum enables its 
users to start new discussion threads by posting celebrity-related contents, such as 
pictures or videos first published elsewhere. The LiveJournal community and 
Kaksplus.fi displayed prominent signs of interaction, while participants on Just 
Jared, Seiska.fi and especially Mtv3.fi seemed to be ignoring their co-gossipers 
rather than explicitly replying to them. Although the main focus of this study is 
not to compare the gossip sites, the notion of media-generated and user-generated 
sites is important when taking the contextual role of rhetoric of self-expressions 
into account. In general, the ties of participants on user-generated sites were 
performed as stronger compared with media-generated sites. 
Of the gossip spaces analysed in this study, ONTD is meant for the most niche 
market and it involves relatively strict criteria for membership. For instance, my 
test profile that did not involve anything specific was not accepted. The 
explanation for the rejection sent to my email was the emptiness of my profile. 
ONTD expects its members to somehow perform their intimate relations to 
objects already in their profile, and most of the profiles, therefore, involve 
humorous pictures of celebrities or other characters of popular culture. The 
previous research into online celebrity gossip focuses on more or less niche 
forums (see e.g. Meyers 2010; Graefer 2013). I wanted to take into consideration 
forums that are well-known, such as comment sections provided by online 
newspapers, because they resonate with the interest of the present study in 
ordinary and everyday online participation. Celebrity gossip, particularly online, 
touches those who do not necessarily have any specific cultural criticism in mind. 
However, I also wanted to have ONTD as a case of a more niche celebrity 
culture, since it involved a lot more explicit ethos control compared with the other 
gossip sites. Of the forums selected for this study, ONTD involved the strongest 
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forms of intimacy connecting, but also separating, its participants from one 
another. The research material of this study is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Research material. 
THE TOPICS OF CELEBRITY GOSSIP 
  
ASYNCHRONOUS 
DISCUSSION COMMENTS (total 1800) 
Pop singers Rihanna & Chris Brown (domestic violence) Just Jared, an English-language website dedicated to 
celebrity gossip (150) 
USATODAY.com, a U.S. online newspaper (150) 
YouTube, a global, user-generated website for video 
sharing and commenting  (150) 
A Finnish ex-ski jumper Matti Nykänen & his (ex-)wife 
Mervi Tapola (domestic violence) 
HS.fi, a Finnish online newspaper (150) 
Kaksplus.fi, the website of a Finnish ‘baby magazine’ 
including a lot of gossip (150) 
Suomi24, a general Finnish discussion forum with a 
heavy interest in celebrity gossip (150) 
Entertainment celebrities Sharon Osbourne & Megan 
Hauserman (fight on a TV show) 
The Huffington Post, a U.S. online newspaper (150)  
LiveJournal (Oh No They Didn’t), an English-
language community dedicated to celebrity gossip 
(150) 
YouTube (150) 
Finnish entertainment celebrities Martina Aitolehti & 
Anne-Mari Berg (fight in a bar) 
Mtv3.fi, the website of a Finnish television channel 
(150)  
Seiska.fi, the website of a Finnish gossip magazine 
(150)  
Suomi24 (150) 
One of the most important criteria for choosing gossip sites for the study was that 
they had to provide at least 150 comments on one of the analysed cases. Thus I 
collected 150 comments per case from one website. In general, if the most 
commented thread on each site involved more than 300 comments, 75 comments 
were collected at the beginning and 75 at the end or in the middle of the thread. 
This is because the timing of posting an online comment may affect the ways 
celebrities are evaluated. As Meyers (2010: 266) points out, online participants 
whose opinions cannot be the first ones to appear in a comment section may try to 
attract attention by commenting on celebrities in more aggressive terms. The need 
to stand out as an individual participant seems to become stronger towards the 
end of a thread. However, if a thread involved less than 300 comments, 150 
comments at the beginning of it were collected. Some gossip sites involved 
threads with less than 150 comments. From those sites, comments in several 
threads were collected until the total number of comments was 150. The Live 
Journal site (ONTD) was an exception. I collected comments from two separate 
threads (75 from each) on ONTD because each thread tends to connect only a few 
participants. This establishes more intimate relationships between participants 
than is seen on other sites. Moreover, comments posted as mere spams (such as 
advertisements) were excluded from the research material. All comments were 
collected from January to October 2010. Table 2 shows a detailed classification of 
the research material. 
44      Acta Wasaensia 
 
Table 2. Research material and URL addresses. 
The cases of 
celebrity 
gossip 
Websites Titles of threads and number of 
comments collected per total 
number of comments in a 
thread  
URLs and the dates of saving comments 
Rihanna and 
Chris Brown 
(domestic 
violence) 
YouTube Rihanna ABC Interview -Chris Brown 
Beating (1) (150/ 1594) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7bASRxNRJkk 
 (October 5th, 2010) 
Rihanna and 
Chris Brown 
(domestic 
violence) 
Just Jared Rihanna’s Bruised Face Revealed 
(150/ 756) 
http://www.justjared.com/2009/02/19/rihannas-
bruised-face-revealed/ 
(May 11th, 2010) 
Rihanna and 
Chris Brown 
(domestic 
violence) 
USA 
Today 
Chris Brown speaks, says he’s 
regretful for what ‘transpired’ (150/ 
226) 
http://www.usatoday.com/life/people/2009-02-15-
brown-main_N.htm 
(October 5th, 2010) 
Matti Nykänen 
and Mervi 
Tapola (domestic 
violence) 
Helsingin 
Sanomat 
Matti Nykäsen epäillään puukottaneen 
joulupäivänä vaimoaan (150/ 167) 
http://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/artikkeli/Matti+Nyk%C3%A4
sen+ep%C3%A4ill%C3%A4%C3%A4n+puukottaneen
+joulup%C3%A4iv%C3%A4n%C3%A4+vaimoaan/11
35251734479 (January 7th, 2010) 
 
Matti Nykänen 
and Mervi 
Tapola (domestic 
violence) 
Kaksplus a) Matti Nykänen yritti tappaa Mervin 
– huitoi veitsellä ja kuristi (50/ 50) 
b) Mervi Tapola ruhjottuna oikeudessa 
(40/ 40) 
c) No Masahan se on taas repäissyt 
(24/24) 
d) Matti pääsi vapaaksi (36/47) 
a) http://kaksplus.fi/keskustelu/plussalaiset/mitas-
nyt/1606397-matti-nykanen-yritti-tappaa-mervin-
huitoi-veitsella-ja-kuristi/ (October 5th, 2010) 
b) http://kaksplus.fi/keskustelu/plussalaiset/mitas-
nyt/1610386-mervi-tapola-ruhjottuna-oikeudessa-
katso-kuva/#post18680243 (October 5th, 2010) 
c) http://kaksplus.fi/keskustelu/plussalaiset/mitas-
nyt/1606775-no-masahan-se-taas-repassy-perinteiset-
joulun-kunniaksi/#post18624974 (October 5th, 2010) 
d) http://kaksplus.fi/keskustelu/plussalaiset/mitas-
nyt/1607213-matti-paasi-vapaaksi/ (October 5th, 2010) 
Matti Nykänen 
and Mervi 
Tapola (domestic 
violence) 
Suomi24 Nykäsen Masa se vaan jaksaa (150/ 
155) 
http://keskustelu.suomi24.fi/node/8723180 (January 
7th, 2010) 
 
Sharon Osbourne 
and Megan 
Hauserman (fight 
on a TV show) 
Huffington 
Post 
Sharon Osbourne Lashes Out At 
Reality Show Contestant Megan 
Hauserman (VIDEO) (150/ 341) 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/05/sharon-
osbourne-lashes-ou_n_155203.html (October 5th, 
2010) 
Sharon Osbourne 
and Megan 
Hauserman (fight 
on a TV show) 
LiveJourn
al (ONTD) 
a) Megan shows her head after attack 
by Sharon Osbourne, remains 
butterface while doing so (75/ 407) 
b) Sharon O. attacked me! (75/ 335) 
a) http://ohnotheydidnt.livejournal.com/30692807.html 
(May 11th, 2010) 
b) http://ohnotheydidnt.livejournal.com/30638970.html 
(July 19th, 2010) 
 
Sharon Osbourne 
and Megan 
Hauserman (fight 
on a TV show) 
YouTube Rock of Love  Charm School 
REUNION FIGHT (Megan vs Sharon) 
(150/ 534) 
http://youtube.com/watch?v=3xCAR57x7Xw (October 
5th, 2010) 
 
Martina Aitolehti 
and Anne-Mari 
Berg (fight in a 
bar) 
MTV3 a)Anne-Mari ja Martina oikeudessa: 
Väite: repi hiuksista ja raapi niskasta 
(54/ 54) 
b) Martina, Esko ja Anne-Mari 
käräjille: Käsittelyssä pahoinpitely 
(96/ 121) 
 
a) 
http://www.mtv3.fi/viihde/uutiset/muut.shtml/1058854/a
nne-mari-ja-martina-oikeudessa-vaite-repi-hiuksista-
ja-raapi-niskasta  (May 11th, 2010) 
b) 
http://www.mtv3.fi/viihde/uutiset/muut.shtml/1058342/
martina-esko-ja-anne-mari-karajille-kasittelyssa-
pahoinpitely (May 11th, 2010) 
Martina Aitolehti 
and Anne-Mari 
Berg (fight in a 
bar) 
Seiska a) Martina ja Anne-Mari käräjille: 
Hiuslisäke varasti shown (31/ 31) 
b) Kohukaunottaret käräjillä juuri nyt 
– sähellystä jo alkuun (54/ 54) 
c) Kohukaunotarten kissatappelu 
jatkuu: Martina ja Anne-Mari taas 
käräjille (65/ 72) 
 
 
 
 
a) 
http://www.seiska.fi/viihdeuutiset/_a107571/martina+j
a+annemari+karajilla+hiuslisake+varasti+shown/ 
(May 11th, 2010) 
b) 
http://www.seiska.fi/viihdeuutiset/_a107505/kohukauno
ttaret+karajilla+juuri+nyt++sahellysta+jo+alkuun/ 
(May 11th, 2010) 
c) 
http://www.seiska.fi/viihdeuutiset/_a106963/kohukauno
tarten+kissatappelu+jatkuu+martina+ja+annemari+t
aas+karajille/ (May 11th, 2010) 
Martina Aitolehti 
and Anne-Mari 
Berg (fight in a 
bar) 
Suomi24 a) Martina kävi Bergin kimppuun 
(107/ 107) 
b) Martinalle ja Eskolle vuoden 
mittainen lähestymiskielto (43/ 58) 
a) http://keskustelu.suomi24.fi/node/6404066 (May 
11th, 2010) 
b) http://keskustelu.suomi24.fi/node/6506900 (June 
21st, 2010) 
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As can be seen in Table 2, the research material consists of comments from 
several different threads. Some discussion threads I had chosen for the study were 
removed from the Internet a few years after they were collected, which means that 
some of the URLs shown in the table may not work anymore.  
When analysing the research material and dealing with the study’s criteria for 
ethical research, I was faced with the problem of what to do with those comments 
that had been omitted for moral reasons. Can they be cited if they involve 
language use that is hostile and aggressive towards a particular identifiable 
celebrity? Finally, for ethical reasons, I decided not to cite the most hostile, albeit 
playful, comments that involved a competition of who can find the most creative 
way to kill a celebrity. Despite not citing those comments, they were nevertheless 
included in the analysis. However, I did not find any reason to protect the 
reputation of any particular media corporation by concealing all traces of harsh 
language used in the comment sections they provide to online participants. On the 
contrary, I considered it wrong in terms of rhetorical criticism to censor the 
material. Rhetorical texts, such as online comments, should be analysed as 
persuasive artefacts produced in actual situations. In other words, citing the 
comments with all the expletives and derisive tones included is essential for 
rhetorical criticism. 
The most difficult issue I faced when pondering research ethics related to the 
contradictory roles of copyright and privacy protection. The philosophy behind 
the emphasis on copyright relates to the view that discourse itself is an individual 
property that can be copyrighted. Someone ‘owns’ the words. On the contrary, the 
emphasis on privacy protection relates to the view that online communication is a 
more or less communal property. This aspect involves two perspectives. On the 
one hand, online communication is practiced by people with private identities in 
private communities of which pseudonyms as identity markers may give an 
unsolicited hint. Another, contrary premise behind the motive to omit the 
pseudonyms of the participants from citations is the possibility that a researcher, 
in revealing the username of a participant, may somehow interfere with the group 
dynamics and community of the online participants. Such a premise, interestingly, 
follows from the idea that the online ‘self’ is no less real than the self in face-to-
face settings (e.g. Turkle 2011: 16) and thereby nicknames or pseudonyms would 
need protection in the same way as real names. I finally decided to stress the 
copyright and reveal the pseudonyms or usernames of each commenter whose 
post is cited in this study. This decision is based on the way of understanding 
ethos construction as self-expression that openly evaluates celebrities but 
conceals the identity of an individual. Only a pseudonym or nickname can be seen 
as the marker of the individual’s signature.  
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During the process of doing this research, my way of dealing with online 
gossipers changed. At the beginning, I was overcautious and sent a message to the 
online threads included in the material of this study, and whenever that was not 
possible, I contacted the moderator or the online media behind each gossip site to 
ask a permission to cite the comments and let online participants know of my 
research. I was particularly overcautious with comments I treated as 
autobiographical moralizing because I saw them as more personal or sensitive 
than others. In later phases of the process, I realized that this was unnecessary 
because self-expressions are rhetorical and although they are made by individuals, 
they are not private at all. Thus the authenticity of these self-expressions is more 
or less questionable. Interestingly, the questionable authenticity can be seen as a 
symbolic connection between online gossipers and celebrities. Celebrity culture 
highlights individualism as much as it masks the actual individuals behind self-
expression.  
In those rare cases in which online participants revealed their autobiographical 
experiences concerning domestic violence or alcoholism – whether such things 
really happened or were discursively created – did I see it as appropriate to 
conceal the pseudonyms or usernames of participants. As part of online celebrity 
gossip, autobiographical narratives were told as serious stories showing specific 
trust in some particular co-participant(s) and some of these comments were 
‘signed’ with personal indicators, such as a full name that could even be the real 
name of a participant.  
2.3 Methodological considerations 
This Section (2.3) concerns the methodological considerations of the study. By 
methodological considerations, I mean the philosophy of the methods and the 
synthesis of research tools utilized in the analysis. A more detailed and concrete 
description of each method is to be found in the research articles 1–5. In 
methodological terms, my study is based on two methods: argumentation analysis 
of moral rhetoric (e.g. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951; 2000 [1969]; Jonsen 
& Toulmin 1988) and the analysis of evaluative language (particularly Martin & 
White 2005), which has its roots in the appraisal theory of systemic-functional 
linguistics. Systemic-functional linguistics is a branch of language studies that 
considers language use with its social purposes (see e.g. Halliday 1973). This 
approach, therefore, goes beyond the linguistic vacuum of words and grammar. 
The argumentation analysis of moral rhetoric suggested by Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca has been criticized because it tries to generalize and does not 
recognize the importance of exploring how moral argumentation works in specific 
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contexts and cases (Leff 2009). Within rhetorical studies, social perceptions that 
serve as shared conceptual ‘places’ in communication are called topoi or ‘topics’ 
(literally ‘places’) (e.g. Miller 2000; Leff 1983; 2006). According to Miller 
(1987), the focus on rhetoric as a universalised theory of argumentation is 
connected to the ‘academicizing of rhetoric’ that ignores the special (specific) 
topoi of rhetoric as the persuasive materials of specific communities and cases 
(about specific topoi, see e.g. Grimaldi 1972: 124–133). The analysis of 
evaluative language, on the contrary, ignores such ‘universalism’ and focuses on 
words and phrases as specific persuasive materials in contexts. The difference 
between evaluative and argumentative rhetoric can be understood as follows: 
while evaluation concerns the choice made by the rhetor, argumentation deals 
with the linguistic practices through which the rhetor takes into account that the 
audience may potentially make a choice that differs from her or his own. I argue 
that these aspects should be seen as points of view from which proximity and 
distance in self-expressions can be fruitfully explored. In this study, therefore, 
each self-expression is analysed from the perspectives of both evaluative and 
argumentative language. 
Of the three means of persuasion, argumentation analysis focuses on phronesis 
(logic) in moral argumentation but leaves out the more specific realizations of 
arete (moral virtue) and eunoia (emotions). I explored ways of contributing to 
arete and eunoia with the help of the linguistic analysis of evaluative language 
that operates on the micro level of language where semantic meanings of words 
and word combinations and their relation to objects can be found. Recently, social 
scientists, also inspired by linguistic approaches to communication, have shown 
interest in the study of words in moral rhetoric, particularly as a computational 
method of studying text (e.g. Sagi & Dehghani 2014). The analysis of similarity 
(and thus proximity) of two words in a corpus leaves out distance in the rhetoric 
of self-expressions. I therefore maintain that neither the analysis of evaluative 
language nor the analysis of forms of moral argumentation alone is sufficient 
when exploring the rhetoric of proximity and distance in public and mediated 
contexts. Both methods are needed when approaching self-expressions as 
rhetorical acts of community building. The combining of these methods is in line 
with the idea of rhetoric as the art of persuasive acts in which aesthetic (by which 
I mean the choices of evaluative words in my material) and argumentative 
(logical) practices are intertwined with each other (see e.g. Fisher 1984). 
The ways rhetorical and linguistic theories of language differ from each other 
have been discussed by Jeanne Fahnestock (2011: 12–13). She argues that 
rhetorical theory has focused on functional uses of language as specific choices 
based on general resources, whereas observations on how language ‘works’ in 
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general and the analysis of words’ origins and their distributions in functional 
categories have traditionally been the interest of linguists (Fahnestock 2011: 12–
13). What Fahnestock is claiming becomes obvious when comparing the analysis 
of evaluative language with rhetorical argumentation analysis. The analysis of 
evaluative language starts with specific categories of attitudinal words and their 
relations (see Martin & White 2005; also White 2003), whereas rhetorical 
argumentation analysis of moral rhetoric focuses on arguments as rhetorical units 
(e.g. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951). Roughly put, the analysis of evaluative 
language focuses on proximity as the emotional togetherness of the rhetor and 
audience, while rhetorical argumentation analysis concerns distance between the 
rhetor and audience, and comes to life in forms of moral argumentation. In 
rhetorical criticism focused on communication as action, both of these methods 
are relevant.  
Although argumentation-focused and systemic-functional approaches to language 
traditionally deal with different aspects, they do not contradict each other in a 
philosophical sense because they both focus on interpersonal (social) meanings 
shared in specific contexts. They both deal with human relationships in language 
and communication within a particular context. Particularly in studies conducted 
by European scholars of language, rhetorical and linguistic approaches are often 
combined (e.g. Reisigl & Wodak 2001; Virsu 2007; 2012; Volmari 2009). 
Recently, linguists using critical discourse analysis have shown interest in 
argumentation analysis as a method to approach evidentials of knowledge, that is, 
textual markers by which language users indicate how they have come to know 
what they are claiming to be true (e.g. Bednarek 2006; Hart 2011; Oswald 2011). 
For instance, the critical discourse analyst Paul Chilton (2011) stresses the 
importance of moral logic as the starting point of criticism in linguistic studies. 
Accordingly, the argumentation analysis of moral rhetoric fills this gap because it 
focuses on the logical practices through which the ‘self’ (the rhetor) forms a 
relationship to the ‘other’ (the audience). In this study, the rhetorical and 
linguistic approaches supplement each other. The analysis of evaluative language, 
particularly in new media settings and digital spaces, is necessary because 
language use in online comment sections is not argumentative in a traditional 
sense, but it often highlights words and their meanings as choices creating 
intimacy as an instant form of proximity to both digital objects and the addressed 
audience. It is sometimes hard to track the grounds of someone’s self-expressions 
online because of the lack of articulated reasoning (see e.g. Grabill & Pigg 2012). 
One online comment may be one evaluative word (such as ‘LOL’, ‘OMG’, 
‘bitch’) without any rational form of distance from the audience.  
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While Articles 1 and 2 are based on the analysis of evaluative language and 
Article 3 on argumentation analysis, these methods are combined in Article 4, 
which approaches the rhetoric of emotivist morality as the union of specific forms 
of argumentation and emotional utterances. Compared with the other four articles, 
Article 5 involves a more holistic approach to ethos in the online self-expressions 
of celebrity gossip participants. I will first discuss the analysis of evaluative 
language (see Sub-section 2.3.1) because I started my analysis of self-expressions 
in online comment sections using this method. After that, I will discuss 
argumentation analysis of moral rhetoric (see Sub-section 2.3.2). 
2.3.1 The analysis of evaluative language: words and their meanings 
In this dissertation, the analysis of evaluative language is used to explore arete 
and eunoia as components of ethos. According to Jim R. Martin and Peter R. R. 
White (2005: 1), the appraisal theory of language concerns ‘the construction by 
texts of communities of shared feelings and values, and with the linguistic 
mechanisms for the sharing of emotions, tastes and normative assessments’. The 
language of evaluation, moreover, has been of ‘longstanding interest for 
functionally and semiotically oriented approaches and for those whose concern is 
with discourse, rhetoric and communicative effect’ (Martin & White 2005: 1). I 
found this approach particularly applicable when considering the idea of emotions 
as relations to objects (see Ahmed 2004) and as evaluative expressions that 
indicate what is seen or not seen as valuable (see Sayer 2006: 457).  
In the analysis of evaluative language, emotions are treated as socially meaningful 
sentiments. According to Martin and White (2005), evaluative expressions are 
meanings of attitude that can be categorized into three groups: affect (positive or 
negative feelings in general), judgement (attitudes towards the behaviour and 
moral character of people) and appreciation (evaluation of things and 
phenomena). The starting point of the analysis of evaluative language is the idea 
that evaluative expressions always have a target. Thus evaluative expressions are 
ways of positioning oneself in relation to something or someone. When using the 
analysis of evaluative language, I took into account those expressions in which 
online gossip participants described human beings as either moral agents or 
‘things’ whose moral worth was denied. Note that for Martin and White (2005), 
‘affect’ is a general group of evaluative expressions and does not focus on bodily 
reactions in particular (cf. Paasonen 2011: 22–23, 54–55, 232–236; also Graefer 
2013). From the viewpoint of this linguistic categorisation, I characterized 
reactions to ‘things’ (such as voyeuristic pleasure as a reaction to a celebrity’s 
picture) as ‘appreciation’. From the viewpoint of previous research into online 
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celebrity gossip, ‘affect’ is close to what Martin and White call appreciation. As 
Graefer (2013: 60) suggests, affect is aesthetic evaluation that it is freely attached 
to objects and therefore may change the meaning of what is seen as ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ over time.  In online celebrity gossip, affect as a freely-moving content 
finally becomes a social phenomenon – a shared way to react – which makes it 
part of collective norms, particularly those relating to consumption and 
commercialism (Graefer 2013). This is line with Martin’s and White’s (2005: 45) 
notion that there is no such thing as ‘pure’ affect: it is always related to social 
systems of evaluation. 
In the analysis of arete, I focused on celebrity gossip participants’ 
autobiographical moralizing in which they described themselves and private 
people around them as moral beings. Of the three categories of attitude suggested 
by Martin and White (2005), the analysis of autobiographical moralizing 
concerned the category of judgement. Since the objective to present oneself in a 
better light often goes hand in hand with the evaluation of other people as 
immoral actors (Bergmann 1993: 128), I also took into account the ways that 
online gossip participants evaluated people in their everyday lives. Moreover, 
presenting oneself in a better light may also take place through critical self-
reflection in which language users narrate their learning process, which indicates 
that ‘now I know better’. In rhetorical terms, rhetors who tell autobiographical 
experiences may position the ‘self’ in the place of other people and thereby aim at 
constructing a virtuous impression of their own moral character. Bearing this in 
mind, I made a distinction between confessions and testimonies as types of 
autobiographical telling. While confessions are autobiographical stories (or 
fragments of stories) targeting the moral character of the ‘self’ (see Foucault 1990 
[1978]: 53–73), testimonies deal with the moral character of private individuals 
whose acts the rhetors describe as personally witnessed (see Foucault 1990 
[1978]: 59; Felman & Laub 1992).  
The analysis of evaluative language can be seen as an applicable method to 
explore emotions (eunoia) as a rhetorical issue. It concerns ‘shared feelings and 
values’, as Martin and White (2005: 1) describe. The combination of emotion and 
its target indicates values. Values, moreover, represent goals serving as guiding 
principles in life, both individually and socially (Schwartz 1992). Values are often 
more abstract and hidden than concrete evaluations (Sayer 2011: 25–28). This is 
because their meaning is based on the combination of the evaluative expression 
and its target (referent). In other words, evaluative language has a rhetorical 
function beyond a literal understanding, since it reflects the goals of evaluators 
and their community (Thompson & Hunston 2000: 6, 13, 21). These goals as 
values of communities can be, moreover, seen as specific (special) topoi. In the 
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theory of rhetoric, specific topoi are often regarded as material contents of 
argumentation that indicate time, place, circumstances and emotional involvement 
(see Grimaldi 1972: 124–133; also Miller 1987). Specific topoi refer to what 
matters to rhetors and their audience(s) in a particular kairos.  
Of the categories of evaluative language suggested by Martin and White (2005), 
affect (such as ‘I like her’) is at the heart of evaluative language and it can be seen 
as central in the language of children who are learning to express what they want 
and desire (see Painter 2003). In everyday language of adults and young people, 
however, affect is transformed into ‘institutionalized feelings’ of judgement or 
those of appreciation, as Martin and White (2005: 45) argue. Thus ‘pure’ affect, 
as they seem to suggest, is rare in the language use of adults or young people (see 
ibid.; see also Martin 2000; Painter 2003). The categories of judgement and 
appreciation are particularly interesting in terms of values and power because 
they take place on the level of communities as ‘institutions’ of evaluation in 
which desires are transformed into social meanings.  
I see the idea of ‘institutionalized feelings’ suggested by Martin and White (2005: 
45) to fit in with Lanham’s (2006: 166–176) ‘motive spectrum’. Judgement as the 
linguistic realisation of moral norms resonates with the idea of a socially shared 
moral purpose, whereas appreciation as the evaluation of things, such as a picture 
of a celebrity, can be seen as the sign of play in which evaluation is motivated by 
the pleasure of things. The third category, namely game (see Lanham 2006: 166–
176), may be involved in both purpose and play because both of them can be used 
in persuasion. Bearing these ambiguities in mind, this study holds that there are 
two basic ways of using evaluative language that contribute to emotivist morality. 
Firstly, those persons considered ‘others’ are described by choosing words from 
the category of judgement to disguise game (power) with purpose. Common to 
sexism, ageism, racism, anti-Semitism, classism, etc. is that game comes in the 
guise of moral purpose expressed in the form of categorical, present-tense claims 
in which moral ‘badness’ is associated with people seen as representatives of a 
certain group (see Dijk 1993; Reisigl & Wodak 2001; Pälli 2003: 218, 220; 
Enberg 2011).  
Because sexist domination is prominent in celebrity gossip discourses online (see 
Fairclough 2008; Meyers 2010; 2013), I take it here as an example of emotivist 
morality. For instance, saying that ‘women provoke men to violence’ is an 
example of evaluative use of language in which the idea that women should be 
obedient to moral norms (purpose) is utilized to reinforce sexist preferences 
(game) in the guise of the vocabulary of judgement. On the contrary, a self-
expression according to which ‘she looks like an ugly, fat pig’ is a way of 
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contributing to sexist domination (game) according to which women are aesthetic 
objects to be judged in the guise of a playful, appreciation-based evaluation 
(play). In appreciation, people are considered entities, not agents who behave (see 
White 1998: 36). Figure 3 illustrates the categories of evaluative language (affect, 
judgement, appreciation, see Martin & White 2005) and their relation to values 
classified in three rhetorical motives (for more on game, play, purpose, see 
Lanham 2006: 166–176). 
 
Figure 3. Evaluative language (see Martin & White 2005: 45). 
As Figure 3 shows, evaluation of human beings is transformed into either 
meanings of judgement or appreciation. Although the category of judgement may 
seem more natural than appreciation for the making of moral meanings, this study 
holds that the evaluation of human beings as material things is emotivist morality 
in its most extreme form because it explicitly aims at denying the functional role 
of certain human beings (for more on evaluating human beings as mere objects, 
see MacIntyre 2003 [1985]: 58–59; Ahmed 2004: 195; Bauman & Donskis 2013: 
37–40). Especially where celebrities are concerned, their worth is often equated 
with their physical appearance. This is evident when treating young female 
celebrities belonging to certain ethnic groups as stereotypical ‘others’ to be 
sexualized. For instance, the pop singer Shakira is treated as the cultural object of 
sexual desire in various media contents through which the stereotype of Latina 
identity as overly sexual is supported (Orgad 2012: 112–113, 115). In such media 
contents, Shakira is dehumanized by using the vocabulary of appreciation in 
which game comes in the guise of play. In rhetorical terms, the evaluation of 
Shakira as a sexualized object is an example of eunoia connecting the rhetor and 
audience on the basis of shared sentiments which contribute to a sexist and racist 
characterization of the ‘third persona’ (see Wander 1984).  
•evaluation of human 
beings as moral 
agents 
•potential values: 
purpose or game in 
the guise of purpose 
•examples: good, bad, 
moral, immoral, 
sincere, corrupt 
JUDGEMENT 
•evaluation based on 
positive or negative 
emotions (affect) 
•potential values: 
game, play, purpose 
•examples: love, hate, 
happy, sad, like, 
dislike 
evaluation of 
human beings 
•evaluation of human 
beings as things 
•potential values: play 
or game in the guise 
of play 
•examples: beautiful, 
ugly, real, fake,  
interesting, boring 
APPRECIATION 
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2.3.2 Rhetorical argumentation analysis: the logic of act and person 
This section deals with logic as distance in which the relation between the 
evaluation of the act and that of the person is central (Perelman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1951; 2000 [1969]: 293–321; Leff 1983: 24–25). According to Michael C. 
Leff (1983: 24; 2006: 205), the topoi of act and person is one of the most essential 
topical systems in the theory of argumentation. Moreover, the evaluation of acts 
and person (or a group of people) doing these acts can be seen as the pairing of 
claim and reason that forms an enthymeme, that is, a rhetorical figure in which an 
idea is connected with reasons for believing it (see Walker 1994). According to 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1951; 2000 [1969]: 293–321), there are three 
different techniques of act and person in argument; namely, separation technique 
(either act or person), curbing technique and act-person interaction (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Forms of moral argumentation (cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 
1951). 
As Figure 411 illustrates, separation technique12 concerns two types of act-person 
separation: 1) either acts are evaluated deductively only in relation to abstract 
                                                 
 
11 Note that I have made up the examples of Barbie and Ken to demonstrate what I mean by the 
forms of moral argumentation in this study. 
12 In A Treatise on Argumentation, separation technique relates to ‘dissociation of concepts’ (see 
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 2000 [1969]: 411–459). 
ACT-PERSON 
INTERACTION 
"Barbie knew that 
Ken gets violent 
after he drinks. 
Nevertheless, he 
should've controlled 
himself..." 
 
ACT 
"Eye for an eye. If 
Ken hit Barbie, 
then he should 
be hit, too!" 
CURBING 
TECHNIQUE 
"Women provoke 
men"  
"Men are violent" 
PERSON 
"Barbie is ugly" 
 "Ken is a bad 
person" 
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moral norms (e.g. ‘Eye for an eye. If Ken hit Barbie, then he should be hit, too!’) 
(see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951: 264) or 2) people are evaluated 
independently of their acts and moral norms (see ibid. 256) (‘Barbie is ugly’, 
‘Ken is a bad person’). In the first type of separation, acts are evaluated outside of 
context. This fits in with the idea of conventionalism as rationalized moral 
reasoning (Sayer 2011: 24, 33). For conventionalism as a rational, context-
external moral doctrine, the idea of rhetoric focusing on personal issues forms a 
dangerous threat. In the conventionalist form of argumentation, reasoning is 
theoretical and equated with mathematical calculation in which a rule is not 
applied in a context (see Jonsen & Toulmin 1988: 34). However, when 
conventionalism claims to be a non-rhetorical moral positioning, it merely 
highlights its own rhetorical power to judge. Conventionalism involved in the 
separation technique resonates with Walter Fisher’s (1984: 4–6) remarks on ‘the 
rational world paradigm’ which he criticizes as a worldview that is based on self-
evident propositions and rational proofs. Such a paradigm can be seen to provoke 
moral argumentation as moralistic judgements (ibid. 12), such as ‘eye for an eye’ 
in Figure 4. In the example, the rhetor positioning oneself above other people 
criticizes their behaviour and indicates that rules should be obeyed just because 
they are rules and because of the fear of punishments.  
Interestingly, the separation of act and person in argument, as Leff (1983) argues, 
started already in the late Roman era that stressed the topic of the act, but ignored 
the role of person and specific circumstances in moral reasoning. According to 
Leff (1983: 42), such a treatise of argumentation ‘tends to slight the special, 
material circumstances that surround issues of public debate, and unless tightly 
controlled, it gravitates toward a logical formalism wholly alien to practical 
argumentation’. This separation, moreover, was prominent in the end of the 
seventeenth century when textbooks of argumentation represented arguments as 
deductive forms (Jonsen & Toulmin 1988: 278). Thus arguments focusing on acts 
without any notion of person or circumstances as their explanations can be seen 
as products of the Enlightenment project in which the rhetor utilizes the power to 
judge. All in all, the way of focusing on acts instead of the person makes the 
argument rationalistic (see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951: 264; also Leff 
1983). Accordingly, whenever concrete circumstances and the role of people 
involved in these circumstances are ignored, moral argumentation becomes the 
form of mere distancing in which the demonstration of formalistic rules matters.  
Emotivist morality, on the contrary, stresses the evaluation of people. Here we 
have two techniques to deal with: 1) separation focusing on the person (people) 
and 2) curbing technique. The separation technique focusing on people without 
any notion of their acts is a way of treating people as objects who are considered 
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not morally responsible. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2000 
[1969]: 293–294), the focus on mere people tends to expand the category of 
people to the material and static world of things. Even though mistakenly 
indicating that western culture is to be seen as the opposite of primitive otherness, 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2000 [1969]: 293–294) aptly argue that the 
physical world of bodies, their shadows and artefacts, as attached to the concept 
of person, contributes to a ‘thinglike’ perception of the object of evaluation:  
The argumentation of primitive people would use a much wider concept of 
the person than ours. They would doubtless include in it all its 
appurtenances, such as shadow, totem, name, and detached fragments of 
the body...[T]his stability of the person, which makes him [sic] somewhat 
resemble an object with his properties fixed once and for all, is opposed to 
his freedom, to his spontaneity, to the possibility of his changing. 
This kind of separation technique, therefore, can be seen as the form of 
argumentation playing a central role when contributing to emotivist morality in 
which ‘moral inferiors’ are those who are dehumanized and not seen as functional 
beings, but as static objects, mere things (see MacIntyre 2003 [1985]: 58–59; 
Bauman & Donskis 2013: 37–40). Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s remarks 
above indicate that the argumentative practices of moral rhetoric, such as 
separation technique, concern the whole issue of ethos. Thus separation technique 
treating human beings as ‘thinglike’ objects characterizes intimacy with the 
material world of artefacts through which otherness is excluded. In online 
celebrity gossip, this materialistic relationship becomes obvious when participants 
address the audience through their own relationship to pictures or other 
representations of those celebrities whom they are mocking. The object of such 
mockery is a specific construct of third persona dependent on the preferences of 
each audience and community. Although Graefer’s (2013) research reveals that 
objects mocked through humorous posts are celebrities seen as representatives of 
privileged people, it is perhaps more common that those treated as mere 
materialistic objects are ‘others’ seen as ‘swayed by their emotions’ (Ahmed 
2004: 195). Othering occurring through the construction of thinglike human 
objects is evident for example in the Shakira case discussed in the previous 
section (see Orgad 2012: 112–113, 115). 
The other form of moral argumentation essential for emotivist morality is the 
curbing technique. This form concerns people’s manners (e.g. ‘Women provoke 
men’, ‘Men are violent’) and links the evaluation of acts and the person together 
in a mechanical and unchangeable fashion ‘as if our person had been arrested at a 
certain stage of its development’ (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951: 266). The 
curbing technique, albeit associative, can be seen as an artificial way of gluing 
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two separated pieces of the broken whole of the act-person topos together. In 
other words, the curbing technique would not be possible unless act and person in 
enthymeme were not separated from each other.  
Both the separation technique, focusing on the evaluation of people, and the 
curbing technique, as a form of evaluating people through their manners, can be 
effective ways of contributing to social domination, such as sexism, ageism, 
racism or classism. In these techniques, certain characteristics of people (such as 
gender, skin colour or clothing style) are ‘triggers’ provoking certain reactions. 
Note, moreover, that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1951; 2000 [1969]) do not 
explicitly discuss the domination of specific social groups when dealing with 
separation and curbing techniques. They suggest, however, that the connection 
between persons and their acts can be regarded as a prototype of a series of links 
that give rise to other, similar types of argumentation, such as those involving the 
relationship between a group and its members (see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 
1951: 268; 2000 [1969]: 321–322). Associating the separation and curbing 
techniques with rhetoric that attacks certain groups is a contribution of the present 
study. 
Finally yet importantly, act-person interaction is one of the connections of 
coexistence belonging to the structures of reality or ‘commonplaces’ (Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951: 253). In act-person interaction, both people and their acts 
are evaluated in enthymeme (e.g. ‘Barbie knew that Ken gets violent after he 
drinks. Nevertheless, he should’ve controlled himself...’). The act-person 
interaction enables the negotiation of moral issues in which ‘[s]uccessive 
evocation of the act and the person, then of the person and the act, does not leave 
the mind at the point at which it started’ (ibid. 261). Such moral argumentation 
resonates with the idea of practical reasoning as the way of solving contextual 
moral dilemmas by applying moral norms to the particularities of each case 
(Jonsen & Toulmin 1988: 35). Act-person interaction, moreover, is the form of 
argumentation I assumed to find also in autobiographical moralizing in which 
people deal with their experiences through confessions and testimonies, thereby 
evaluating themselves as moral beings who act in certain contexts.  
To sum up, act-person separation (exclusively focusing on either the act or the 
person), curbing technique and act-person interaction represent different logical 
forms of moral argumentation through which the ‘self’ contributes to a 
community. Although the study of argumentation suggested by Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca has been criticized because it is regarded as an abstract, 
decontextualized classification of argumentation techniques (e.g. Leff 2009), I see 
their remarks on act and person in argumentation particularly useful because they 
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deal with the diversity of logic in moral rhetoric. In other words, the strength of 
this rhetorical approach is its descriptive understanding of moral reasoning that is 
not normatively limited to mathematical, deductive reasoning as the only 
noteworthy form of logic. Because Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1951) include 
the seemingly non-argumentative or irrational person arguments in the theory of 
moral argumentation, their theory resonates with the idea of ‘ultimate’ concepts 
according to which a concept includes its apparent opposite as a special case (see 
Burke 1969: 19–20). Accordingly, the form of separation technique focusing on 
person without any notion of acts is a special case of distance between the rhetor 
and audience. By applying the analysis of act and person in argument to the study 
of online comments, I was able to analyse self-expressions of celebrity gossip 
participants as specific ways of contributing to moral logic in rhetorical action. 
2.4 The analysis of ethos online  
In this study, ethos refers to the construction of trustworthiness of the ‘self’ 
(rhetor) in a community to which the ‘self’ contributes. Community in this study 
is understood as a rhetorical construct based on the togetherness of the rhetor and 
audience (see Miller 1993: 212). Ethos as the locus of togetherness is an essential 
persuasive means in any community. I have analysed online comments on 
celebrity gossip sites as self-expressions in which ethos is both individual and 
collective at the same time. Such understanding of self-expressions, as argued at 
the very beginning of this thesis, goes back to Aristotle’s Rhetoric (see also 
Fleckenstein 2005; 2007).  
Unlike radical approaches to constructivism, rhetorical criticism does not 
emphasize that communal belief systems are constructed out of nothing by mere 
appearances, such as words or symbols, in human communication. Nor should 
the idea of topical thinking central in rhetoric be seen as the opposite of invention; 
on the contrary, it is the practice of finding something that may be surprising and 
can be put to novel use even though it is not completely unexpected (Miller 2000: 
143). Consequently, ethos construction does not, even in ‘new media’ contexts 
such as on celebrity gossip sites, create something completely new; instead it may 
be constructed based on surprising choices of already existing resources and 
restrictions in terms of trustworthiness. In the methodology of this study, I have 
considered the idea that both proximity and distance are involved in self-
expressions in online celebrity gossip. In rhetorical terms, the ethos of the rhetor 
in online contexts does not merely lie in persuasive speeches but relates to values 
and norms beyond the screen, beyond rhetoric online. This means that in 
rhetorical criticism applied to new media contexts, classical concepts (such as 
58      Acta Wasaensia 
 
phronesis, arete and eunoia) should not be replaced with entirely new ones but 
rather should be given the possibility to surprise with novel uses.  
As Warnick (2001) suggests, those who analyse online discourse cannot take 
traditional concepts of rhetoric and rhetorical criticism, such as ethos or text, for 
granted, but rather they need to apply these concepts to new media environments 
by taking into account the specific interactional and multimediated context of 
persuasion.13 This study holds that not only online participants are faced with the 
problem of limited cues; researchers of online communication must also deal with 
this problem. The key problem of online participants, as well as of researchers 
who explore online participation ‘stems from the fact that we often only have 
access to fragments of discourse related to the identities of those we study’ 
(Grabill & Pigg 2012: 105). We rarely have access to individuals’ reputations, 
motivations or their particular cultures outside of these fragments (ibid.). As 
researchers, we are left alone with the ‘messy rhetoric’ of online participants 
whose ethos can be analysed only based on what they have revealed in those 
fragments (see Grabill & Pigg 2012).  
Moreover, an essential aspect of rhetoric online is the interplay between verbal 
(written or spoken texts) and visual elements (pictures and videos), as well as 
hyperlinks, in persuasion (e.g. Warnick 2007). Thus self-expressions are not 
speeches consisting of mere words; they may also include visual elements or 
hyperlinks. The verbal contents of self-expressions were the core interest of this 
study, but I also took into consideration the visual elements and hyperlinks they 
involved. I explored these non-verbal elements as referents to which verbal self-
expressions related. For me as a researcher, pictures, videos and hyperlinks 
provided useful contextual material in the analysis of self-expressions. Thus it 
was relevant in this study to take into consideration, for instance, which celebrity 
was in a photograph that was evaluated with humorous and mocking tones. A 
detailed study of visual rhetoric with specific methods of visual analysis was, 
however, beyond the scope of this project. 
In online digital settings, it is obvious that ethos is intertwined with the idea of 
community (see Fleckenstein 2007). According to Fleckenstein (2007), ‘the 
digital author position is distributed not merely across lexia or lex-icons, but 
                                                 
 
13 Rhetorical approach to texts and interaction in new media environments is also called digital 
rhetoric, particularly in the U.S. (e.g. Zappen 2005; Losh 2009: 47–95). However, I prefer 
calling the approach of my study simply rhetorical criticism because by self-expressions I 
refer to expressions of embodied beings who do not construct their online ethos in a digital 
vacuum.  
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across the system of interlocking loops that constitute cyberspace communities’. 
Bearing the idea of ‘messy rhetoric’ in mind, I dealt with one online comment as 
one text, as one self-expression, and thus as a cue of an online participant’s ethos. 
However, I also took into consideration that these texts become meaningful only 
when seen in relation to other comments on each given site and to the particular 
time- and place-bound settings surrounding communication in comment sections. 
Picture 1 shows what I mean by self-expressions as collective expressions. The 
comments in Picture 1 come from the Just Jared online comment section 
following the gossip news story ‘Rihanna’s Bruised Face Revealed’.  
 
 
Picture 1. Examples of self-expressions. 
There are five self-expressions in Picture 1. These self-expressions relate to the 
gossip topic concerning domestic violence involving the pop singers Rihanna and 
Chris Brown. Each self-expression (such as ‘I hope Chris Brown spends time in 
jail...but I have a feeling he won’t’) can be seen as the cue of the rhetor’s ethos 
involving evaluative language (see Martin and White 2005) and forms of moral 
argumentation (see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951). In terms of evaluative 
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language, these comments involve both judgement (e.g. Shame on, put in jail, 
monster) and affect (e.g. omg, Poor Rihanna, Oh my gosh). Affect in these self-
expressions, moreover, is transformed into meanings of appreciation as the 
reactions of ‘shock’ and dismay to Rihanna’s picture on the site also indicate 
voyeuristic pleasure. As forms of moral argumentation, these comments are based 
on act-person separation: they focus on explicit judging of Chris Brown without 
distance from the audience. In this example, judging Chris Brown in harsh terms 
is the sign of trust, which is collectively supported.  
As can be seen in Picture 1, self-expressions are typically signed with a male or 
female first name. However, like pictures of celebrities, also online participants’ 
signatures provided a useful background material for this study, rather than being 
the focus of it. When citing online comments as examples, I have discussed the 
female or male signatures or usernames and pseudonyms of participants whenever 
they played an essential role in online participants’ ethos construction, especially 
when they were not just names, but involved language of evaluation. Moreover, 
when such signatures were part of Finnish comments, I translated them into 
English. 
Despite the ‘messy rhetoric’, online comments are fruitful targets of rhetorical 
criticism because these fragments can be seen as obvious and authentic indicators 
of what is considered persuasive in addressing the audience in celebrity gossip. In 
this sense, ethos is to be found between the rhetor and audience (see e.g. 
Reynolds 1993; about group ethos in online contexts, see Gurak 1999). Since the 
online rhetors and their audiences constantly change places with each other, the 
persuasiveness of particular ways of constructing ethos is easily observable. An 
online comment, therefore, has a double role: it is both a persuasive self-
expression by the rhetor, and at the same time, it is a response from the audience 
to other rhetors and their self-expressions. When the ways of constructing ethos 
are shared by rhetors and their audiences, it indicates that online gossipers 
contribute to the common idea of trust. Consequently, in addition to the 
qualitative analysis of ethos, I have also paid attention to quantitative measures, 
especially numbers and percentages, to explore the popularity of each type of 
evaluation and forms of moral argumentation as persuasive ways of contributing 
to ethos in online celebrity gossip.  
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3 DISCUSSION  
The results of this study indicate that the rhetoric of celebrity gossip participants 
in online comment sections contributed to emotivist morality in which self-
interested relationships to distanced ‘others’ became the basis of rhetorical ethos. 
Firstly, self-expressions rarely included autobiographical moralizing, and if they 
did, gossipers avoided critical self-reflections (arete) (see Article 1). Secondly, 
online celebrity gossip was heavily based on the eunoia component of ethos, 
which emerged as a contribution to preferences for power and domination in the 
guise of play and purpose (see Article 2). In other words, online participants of 
celebrity gossip aimed at addressing ‘the second persona’ (Black 1970) by 
evaluating ‘the third persona’ (Wander 1984), a selected group of ordinary 
‘others’, as moral inferiors. Although celebrities were the common targets of 
mockery and moralizing, the participants occasionally attacked one another as 
well. Thus self-expressions in online celebrity gossip were not merely ‘friendly’ 
ways of creating intimacy with all online gossipers on the site. Thirdly, the most 
common argumentative ways in online celebrity gossip were act-person 
separation as the logic of what I call digital enthymeme (see Articles 3 and 4) and 
the curbing technique as an argument called categorical enthymeme in Article 3 
(for techniques of moral argumentation, see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951). 
While digital enthymemes were expressions that took place as shared, ‘crowding’ 
preferences evaluating celebrities without any notion of their acts (such as ‘she 
deserved it!’, ‘what an ugly, fat pig’), categorical enthymemes were arguments 
stressing that a certain group of people is known for certain manners (such as 
‘women should be blamed because they provoke men to violence’). Fourthly, the 
undermining of arete and the sharing of preferred sentiments as emotivist means 
of persuasion were also supported through ethos control (see Article 5). By such 
ethos control, I mean types of normativity through which online gossip 
participants criticized self-expressions involving moral identification with 
celebrities. This last case study was motivated by the other four case studies, 
which made it relevant to focus on one specific forum (ONTD) only.   
Despite the prominence of mockery and condemnation contributing to the 
emotivist morality, online gossip participants also showed moments of resistance. 
The ways participants created and resisted self-expressions of emotivist morality 
are discussed in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, I discuss contextual differences, 
particularly those relating to the language and cultural background of the celebrity 
gossip participants. Section 3.3 deals with the contributions this study makes and 
discusses the opportunities this study leaves for further research. Finally, Section 
3.4 is a brief conclusion on emotional self-expressions as rhetorical practices in 
online contexts. 
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3.1 Ethos in online celebrity gossip 
In this section, the results concerning each research question are discussed. I have 
classified the following sub-sections in the same order as the research articles so 
that the first sub-section (3.1.1) deals with autobiographical moralizing 
(understood here as the potential rhetoric involving arete), the second one (3.1.2) 
emotions and values (eunoia), the third one (3.1.3) moral argumentation 
(phronesis) and the last one (3.1.4) ethos control. The findings of Article 4 are 
discussed in Sub-section 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, since the paper deals with both eunoia 
and phronesis of emotivist morality. I have summarized the findings in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Articles and the research findings.  
ARTICLE 1 
• Title: Autobiographical moralizing in celebrity discussions on the Internet: how do discussion participants confess 
and testify in Finnish and English? 
•Published: (2011) Language Use on Net and in Networks. AFinLA yearbook 2011, n:o 69.  
• Findings: Autobiographical moralizing was utilized to create a virtuous impression of the rhetor. In many 
comments, the 'sincerity' of the rhetor was a rhetorical means of justifying mockery and condemnation of other 
people. In general, autobiographical moralizing, both in English and Finnish, was rare.   
ARTICLE 2 
• Title: ‘It’s so wrong yet so funny’: celebrity violence, values and the Janus-faced cultural public sphere online 
•Published: (2014a) Celebrity Studies. 
• Findings: By sharing evaluative expressions, online participants contributed to values of game in the guise of play 
and purpose. Playful self-expressions were more characteristic of English-language celebrity gossip than celebrity 
gossip in Finnish, which, in turn, involved more serious comments focused on moralizing. 
ARTICLE 3 
• Title: Moral argumentation as a rhetorical practice in popular online discourse: examples from online comment 
sections of celebrity gossip 
•Published: (2014b) Discourse & Communication. 
• Findings: The separation technique (digital enthymeme) focusing on the evaluation of people without reasoning 
and the curbing technique (categorical enthymeme) explicitly attacking groups were characteristic of online 
celebrity gossip, both English and Finnish. English-language gossip was more intimately emotional, whereas 
celebrity gossip in Finnish, compared with English, involved more explicitly argumentative and hierarchical forms. 
ARTICLE 4 
• Title: Digital enthymeme: morality, emotions, and materialism in new media participation 
•Published: (2013)  New media, audience and emotional connectivity. Special Issue of Sociedad de la Información.  
• Findings: There were two types of digital enthymemes, namely, moralistic (serious) and amoralistic (playful). The 
amoralistic ones were characteristic of English-language celebrity gossip, which involved more digital enthymemes 
in general than online celebrity gossip in Finnish. 
ARTICLE 5 
• Title: Online celebrity gossip, moral disidentification, and ethos: exploring the rhetorical grounds of celebrity 
mockery 
• Submitted: (2014) Enculturation 
• Findings: Ways of treating celebrities as moral beings were criticized because of the naiveity of such identification 
(arete). Celebrity mockery, paradoxically, was a way of showing one's phronesis, which was linked to media-savvy 
readings of gossipers arguing that they are aware of the artificial and media-made nature of celebrities. The means 
of ethos control found in the material were virtual, voyeuristic, playful, disparate and aesthetic normativity. 
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As can be seen in Figure 5, the findings of the research articles are interrelated 
with one another. In other words, the rejection of arete as critical self-reflection 
and the use of eunoia, phronesis and ethos control as rhetoric attacking ‘others’ 
work together in contributing to emotivist morality, which involves both 
proximity and distance. Despite the popularity of emotivist morality, some 
moments of resistance were also involved in online celebrity gossip. Typical of 
such resistance was its ambiguous nature (see also Meyers 2010: 228, 309, 320). 
The findings of each article are discussed in detail in what follows. 
3.1.1 Autobiographical moralizing 
In the comments involving autobiographical moralizing, online participants of 
celebrity gossip implicitly constructed the idea of the ‘good me’ and thereby 
aimed at presenting themselves as morally ‘virtuous’ (Eronen 2011). In general, 
online comments involving autobiographical telling were not common in the 
research material of this study. Of the Finnish comments, 3.2 % contained 
autobiographical moralizing, while the percent of autobiographical comments in 
the English-language material was 4.3 %. These findings support the idea that 
arete as the articulated moral virtue of the rhetor is the lacking or undermined 
component of ethos online (see Miller 2004: 212–213). The lack of arete is in line 
with the idea of ‘deindividuation’ (Lea & Spears 1991; Stromer-Galley & Martey 
2009) and ethos performance (Warnick 2004: 264). Moreover, the undermined 
role of autobiographical moralizing also reinforces Orgad’s (2012: 132, 195–196) 
argument that online discourse rejects a narrative structure when it allows ‘no 
ending’ and no moral explanations. In online contexts, the role of the individual 
rhetor is secondary to the group ethos (see Gurak 1999; also Warnick 2001: 63). 
What was striking in the comments involving autobiographical moralizing is that 
although these comments involved private-life considerations, these 
considerations, particularly those in English, tended to be intertwined with the 
online participants’ construction of ‘the third persona’ (Wander 1984). In other 
words, although some comments analysed in the study involved personalized 
stories concerning relatively sensitive issues, such as domestic violence, these 
stories contributed to the rhetoric of othering. This relates to Orgad’s (2012: 170) 
remarks on how ideological and thus collective meaning making frames 
autobiographical online discourse and serves as the context of stories told as 
personal. For instance, a participant in Example 1 (see Eronen 2011: 49) 
compared the morally virtuous ‘me’ or ‘us’ (‘Here things are sorted out in our 
own way, no authorities are needed for that’) with the ‘immoral’ female 
celebrities who are wasting taxpayers’ money in court. In comparison with the 
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‘virtuous me’, the female celebrities are represented as ‘others’ and thus evaluated 
as the third persona (‘(I) am so ashamed for all these women, these are what 
women are today, mere decorations’). Interestingly, the participant uses a female 
pseudonym (A Woman with big W!!!), which indicates that in this case such 
rhetoric of emotivist morality can be associated with a female ethos. By the same 
token, representatives of ‘taxpayers’ and thus members of a social class above the 
particular female celebrities were represented as moral ‘superiors’. The upper 
social class, therefore, was seen to be in a legitimized position from which 
condemning judgements could be made.  
Example 6 (see Eronen 2011: 53) was an even more striking case characterizing 
how the seemingly personal may turn out to be a way of contributing to emotivist 
morality. In this example, an online participant shared his14 personal experiences 
of domestic violence by telling how his girlfriend tried to provoke him to act 
violently (‘she just went on and on in the car. nonstop, trying to provoke me’). 
Later in the same story, the participant associated the experiences he told as his 
own with the domestic violence involving Rihanna and Chris Brown (‘when she 
finally realized she would not get me to engage her [which is why Rihanna kept 
yapping] in any discussion [which is why she would not shut the fuck up]’). In 
other words, the participant situated the experiences he told as his own in an 
ideological agenda. When being overcautious at the beginning of this study 
project, I also contacted this particular online participant through YouTube to ask 
the permission to cite this autobiographical comment. The reply was striking: the 
participant did not seem to remember (or did not want to say) that the particular 
comment was his. I consider the YouTube participant’s reply as significant for 
this study. This case illustrates something deeper, namely, the absence of the 
morally-concerned ‘self’ in online celebrity gossip seems to go hand in hand with 
othering. When contributing to emotivist morality, the participant aimed at 
making domestic violence against (black) women seem natural and accepted, 
somehow ‘objective’ and thus impersonal if seen from the viewpoint of individual 
responsibility.  
Although self-reflection as a way of identifying with celebrities was not common 
in online celebrity gossip, it was found in a few comments showing resistance to 
the idea of distancing certain ‘others’. Example 4 in Article 1, for instance, 
narrates a rhetor’s learning process (see Eronen 2011: 50–51). By pointing out 
through his self-experience discourse that alcoholism is not a moral issue but 
rather an illness, the online participant of Example 4 indicates his readiness to 
                                                 
 
14 I associated the ethos of the participant with a male identity. 
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identify with those having problems of alcohol use. Moreover, the gossip 
participant of Example 5 in Article 1 identified with the Finnish female celebrity 
by encouraging her to leave her violent husband (see Eronen 2011: 53). However, 
the same comment also contributes to othering of men who have problems with 
alcohol, which makes the self-expression emotivist. The fact that online gossip 
participants can never personally know celebrities appearing as media-made 
commodities makes identification with them similar to identification with faceless 
groups. Such faceless groups may become targets of preferences in terms of 
sexism, racism and classism. 
3.1.2 Emotions and values  
The results of Article 2 (eunoia and values) and Article 4 (digital enthymeme as a 
particular, extensively emotional form of moral argumentation) indicate that 
online celebrity gossip is based on preferences in evaluating ‘others’ among ‘us’ 
and like ‘us’. In Article 2, I found that the serious moral purpose of stressing 
obedience to communal rules and the playful mockery as humorous self-
expression share the common goal of contributing to self-interested, often sexist, 
meanings. In such rhetoric, game comes in the guise of purpose or play (for more 
on game, play and purpose, see Lanham 2006: 166–176). While I associated 
purpose with evaluations based on the vocabulary of ‘judgement’, play involved 
evaluations of celebrities in terms of ‘appreciation’ (see Martin & White 2005). 
My reason for evaluating the cultural public sphere surrounding online celebrity 
gossip as Janus-faced in Article 2 comes from the notion that play and purpose as 
concepts seemingly oppositional to each other were utilized as rhetorical tools to 
legitimize the domination of particular groups.  
In terms of othering, women as victims of domestic violence were seen as moral 
‘inferiors’ who deserved their victimhood. Some participants also saw these 
celebrities as representatives of race or class in addition to gender. While for 
some participants Rihanna represented racial otherness, Mervi Tapola was seen as 
a representative of ‘others’ in terms of class. Although Tapola is a millionaire 
heir, in online comment sections she was described as an alcoholic and thereby 
was given a certain class identity, often indicating that the celebrity is not seen as 
a representative of ‘classy’ women. In Finland, alcoholics are typically seen as 
idle people characterized by their exclusion from productive working life. By 
evaluating alcoholics through celebrity gossip, online participants made classist 
judgements. Part of such evaluation was that rich women using a lot of alcohol 
were seen as deviant cases of upper class people who are not behaving in the 
‘classy’ way that they are expected to.  
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Particularly striking in the online gossip comments justifying violence as a 
response to provocation was that domestic violence was seen as a natural problem 
of certain groups. In other words, although othering attacked female celebrities in 
particular, it also attacked particular groups of men as moral ‘inferiors’. By doing 
so, participants implied that it is natural for a black man (Chris Brown) and a man 
with an inferior socioeconomic status (Matti Nykänen) to use violence against 
their spouse. Through such self-expressions, online gossip participants 
contributed to social domination in terms of racist and classist domination. 
Central to these comments was wrapping the discourse of game (power) inside 
the rhetorical cover of purpose (moralizing). 
Not all comments on domestic violence involving celebrities contributed to 
obvious stereotypes. Both English-language and Finnish material of this study 
also involved comments in which domestic violence against women was 
condemned by demanding that men should be punished, such as when saying that 
‘I hope CB spends time in jail’, ‘He is a monster…’  (Picture 3 in Article 4, see 
Eronen 2013: 47). On the one hand, such comments can be seen to resist the 
oppression of women involved in many other comments concerning online 
celebrity gossip. On the other hand, however, the lack of contextual moral 
reasoning in the comments may leave room for the audience to interpret these 
self-expressions as contributions to sexism, as if men would be naturally evil. The 
rhetorical way of dehumanizing men into monsters may contribute to a discourse 
according to which ‘sex is power’ and which makes sexism, in general, seem 
natural (see Höglund 2009). 
Another ambiguous way of evaluating celebrities took place when commenting 
on the beaten face of a female celebrity, Rihanna (see Examples 7–10 in Article 2, 
see Eronen 2014a: 167). On the one hand, posts indicating the emotional reaction 
of shock from seeing the injuries were not obviously sexist. Such posts did not 
aim at justifying domestic violence against women. On the other hand, however, 
these self-expressions evaluated the female celebrity as an object of voyeurism. 
Value discourse of voyeurism, as discussed in Article 2, can be seen as online 
participation based on motives of self-interest. In such online participation, a 
female celebrity was dehumanized, that is, she was seen as a mere thing to be 
looked at and evaluated in online comment sections. 
Compared to celebrity gossip regarding domestic violence, in discourse 
concerning fighting between female celebrities, the evaluation of women as 
amoral objects was even more common. In such evaluation, fighting female 
celebrities were seen as funny and entertaining, often sarcastically erotic. Such 
evaluation came to life in humorous rhetoric in which online gossip participants 
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ridiculed the celebrities. The humorous and openly mocking self-expressions 
were concrete ways of reinforcing intimacy between gossipers. Such derisive 
rhetoric contributed to ‘affective stickiness’ of interlocutors who shared their 
reactions as a means of social interaction (see Paasonen & Pajala 2010; Paasonen 
2011: 232–236; Graefer 2013). By using Martin’s and White’s (2005) 
terminology, celebrity mockery involved affect that was transformed into 
appreciation targeting human beings as things. In contrast to the rhetoric of 
obedience, the rhetoric of mockery was a way of contributing to domination in 
comments that seemed innocent and harmless. In these comments, game was 
disguised as play. On the one hand, the playful comments were ways to resist the 
serious meaning of gossip (see also Hermes 1995: 121, 133; Meyers 2010: 31, 53, 
309). On the other hand, the playful mocking of celebrities, despite its potential to 
resist serious interpretations, still contributes to emotivist morality with 
oppressive tendencies (see also Meyers 2010: 317).  
What made the fights of the female celebrities meaningful was the fact that they 
were seen as frivolous. This is in line with the findings that celebrities, 
particularly young, white females are not seen as morally responsible human 
beings but rather represent moral ‘inferiors’ whose ‘bad’ habits make them 
‘things’ to be laughed at (see Tyler 2008; Williamson 2010; on the working class 
woman as a moral ‘inferior’, see Skeggs 2005). Accordingly, online gossip 
participants, both English-speaking and Finnish, gave such female celebrities 
(particularly Hauserman, Aitolehti and Berg) derisive titles, such as ‘attention 
whore’, ‘bitch’ or ‘bimbo’ indicating a humorous and playful tone of 
commenting.  
Particularly the sharing of intense bodily reactions of disgust, shock or pleasure 
can be seen as ways of strengthening intimacy between online participants (see 
also Paasonen 2011: 232–236). In online forums of commenting and sharing, self-
interest (such as voyeurism), which may satisfy merely individualistic goals 
somewhere else, becomes a socially shared and supported phenomenon. Hence, 
the reactions that indicated the celebrities were seen as dehumanized and ‘thing-
like’ were obvious ways of contributing to emotivist morality in online celebrity 
gossip, particularly on English-language gossip sites where participants overcame 
the assumed geographical and social distance by contributing to a discursively 
created proximity. Such an extreme form of intimacy contributed to ‘moral 
blindness’ in which the positioning of the ‘self’ in relation to those being gossiped 
about was characterized by amoral curiosity and pleasure, not a moral concern 
(see Bauman & Donskis 2013). In accordance with the logic of ‘ultimate’ 
concepts (see Burke 1969: 19–20), moral blindness as a rhetorical practice is to be 
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seen as a special case of moral positioning in which values of self-interest become 
rhetorically tempting ways of addressing the audience. 
Accordingly, what is striking in the findings of Article 4 is that most of the 
comments I have characterized as ‘digital enthymemes’ involved values of 
achievement and individual power. These comments, despite the expressions of 
individual power, formed clusters of comments, which indicated gossipers’ 
proximity to one another. Each participant commented from behind his/her 
personal digital device with the objective of sharing his/her likes and dislikes. As 
Turkle (2011) has famously argued, participation in and through digital media is a 
way of being ‘alone together’. In the offline, physical world, conversely, people 
also need to share material resources, such as food, shelter or money. The sharing 
of these material resources requires a sacrifice of self-interest for the common 
good. In digital contexts, sharing content has a different meaning. It is a means to 
a convenient togetherness (Fernback 2007) that does not entail any sacrifice of 
self-interest, since in the endless reproduction of content ‘we can eat our cake, 
still have it, and give it away too’ (Lanham 2006: 12). Digital enthymemes have 
the potential to be social and anti-social arguments at the same time (Eronen 
2012: 166). Such rhetoric of collective self-interest was particularly prominent in 
persuasion through which celebrities were treated as public commodities to be 
consumed and collectively mocked. Since the comments that mocked celebrities 
were provocative and relatively short, they also contributed to the profitability of 
the media industry which depends on the number of clicks and comments on their 
site. These findings reinforce Graefer’s (2013: 223) remarks on the commercial 
benefit of object-focused participation in online celebrity gossip.  
In terms of rhetorical criticism, evaluation in online celebrity gossip highlighted 
the eunoia part of ethos as trustworthiness emerging from the intimacy between 
the rhetor and audience (see Miller 2001; 2004: 205–212). Intimacy, as 
Silverstone (2007: 123) argues, is a central means of contributing to trust in 
contemporary mediated spaces of appearances, which he calls the mediapolis (see 
Silverstone 2007). Perhaps the need for intimacy in online comment sections is so 
strong that distance as the idea of one’s difference from the addressed audience 
would seem dishonest. Emotional reactions to violence such as LOL! OMG! 
dayuum, were performed, not reasoned, making them effective ways of 
contributing to intimacy with co-participants of online gossip. In online celebrity 
gossip, the intimacy between the rhetor and audience was so intense that it was 
hard to tell the difference between these two rhetorical roles. This relates to 
Miller’s (2004: 212; see also 2001) remarks that in online communication, 
participants contribute to the ethos of sympathy that ‘continually deflects 
attention away from the agent and back to the audience’. Because of such online 
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rhetoric that calls for a continuous response from the audience, the boundaries of 
the rhetor and audience become blurred and these two traditionally distinct roles 
in rhetorical practices become one. 
Meanings of gender and class were so deeply involved in online discussions about 
celebrity violence that counting how many comments involved gender or class 
domination turned out to be too complicated a task. In the quantitative part of 
Article 2, only those comments that involved more or less explicit evaluation of 
class and gender were included in the analysis. This means that the quantitative 
results did not include those comments in which classist and sexist connotations 
were to be found in the subtext, not on the level of the words or phrases. 
3.1.3 Forms of moral argumentation   
In this study, I approached forms of moral argumentation in online comment 
sections through the topoi of act and person in argument (see Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951). In rhetorical terms, the relationship between the 
meanings of two separate concepts, such as ‘act’ and ‘person’, forms an 
enthymeme (see Walker 1994). This relationship, moreover, is based on logic and 
it indicates ways that distance between the rhetor and audience is included in 
rhetoric. Four enthymemes based on different act-person relationships were found 
in the analysis: theoretical (comments focusing on acts through deductive 
reasoning), practical (comments involving act-person interactions through 
practical reasoning), categorical (comments based on curbing technique and 
highlighting acts as manners of a person or group) and digital (comments 
focusing on the evaluation of people without any consideration of their acts). I 
treated both categorical and digital enthymeme as obvious ways of contributing to 
emotivist morality in which proximity is created at the expense of those 
considered moral ‘inferiors’. In accordance with the idea of ‘ultimate dialectic’ 
(see Burke 1969: 19–20, 189), I saw proximity involved in these two enthymemes 
as a special case of distance. 
As the results in Article 3 indicated, digital enthymeme was the most common 
form of moral argumentation in online celebrity gossip, regardless of the 
language, topic or website considered. Digital enthymemes that highlighted the 
evaluation of people without any notion of their acts can be seen as effective ways 
of creating intimacy as an instant form of proximity to the addressed audience. 
One explanation for the lack of discussion concerning celebrities’ behaviour is 
that celebrity gossipers indicated that they ‘know’ celebrities so well that 
reminding others of celebrities’ behaviour would be redundant. Thus those 
evaluating celebrities without any notion of their acts show that they are well-
70      Acta Wasaensia 
 
aware of the latest gossip. For instance, everybody is expected to know what 
Chris did to Rihanna. Such unreasoned self-expressions, therefore, also derive 
from intimacy with media objects such as pictures of celebrities or gossip stories. 
Digital enthymeming in its most extreme and intimate form, which I have 
evaluated as ‘amoralistic’, was gossip participants’ way to treat celebrities, 
particularly females, as merely sexual or funny objects, as the findings of Article 
4 suggest. As already discussed in Section 3.1.2, the way of sharing emotional 
reactions, such as sexual or voyeuristic pleasures or reactions of excitement, 
effectively contributes to intimacy between online participants of gossip. The 
reason I describe digital enthymeme as ‘crowding’ behaviour is that its logic does 
not lie in the online participants’ independent capacity to reason; rather it is 
cumulative and manifests itself in the way comments relate to one another as 
consecutive posts, such as in Examples 13, 14 and 15 in Article 3 (see Eronen 
2014b: 289–290). Typically such ‘crowding’ occurred as shared reactions to 
visual contents, such as photographs or videos of celebrities. Visual objects can 
be seen as relational, since they function as common ground for online 
participants. A photograph that everybody is assumed to see occupies the ‘space’ 
between people (Edwards 2005: 27), and thus reinforces the intimacy between 
online participants. Because of this aesthetic focus, digital enthymemes have a lot 
in common with what Robert Hariman (1992; 1995: 51–94) calls ‘courtly style’. 
According to him, courtly style is a persuasive form of discourse that highlights 
inequalities through public spectacles focusing on the human body and body parts 
(see ibid.). Courtly style, moreover, resonates with the stability of rhetoric which 
is exclusively based on the person and its ‘appurtenances’ (see Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 2000 [1969]: 293–294). As a rhetorical form, digital 
enthymeme does not include critical reasoning, but is closer to aesthetic 
performances and spontaneous reactions typical of courtly style. Although digital 
enthymeme lacks careful reasoning, particularly the ‘amoralistic’ type of it may 
be a sign of a critical audience aware of the artificiality of celebrity. I will discuss 
this topic more thoroughly in the next section. 
Moreover, the reason I call digital enthymeme ‘digital’ relates to Lanham’s 
(2006: 12) remarks that digital contexts enable the never-ending sharing of self-
interest through repetitive consumption. Although not all digital enthymemes 
contributed in an obvious way to power, those that did were in particular the 
online comments that mocked celebrities out of self-interest. One could of course 
argue that mockery, as a collective phenomenon, was not born in digital contexts. 
For instance, school bullying is an example of collective mockery that, at least in 
its traditional form, takes place in limited face-to-face contexts. Compared with 
mockery through digital enthymemes, bullying as a face-to-face phenomenon is 
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temporally and spatially a more restricted phenomenon and often considered more 
serious. It involves a directly physical threat of violence: it is clearly a threat 
against one’s body. Conversely, mockery in online contexts is easily ‘copied’ and 
may get more visibility and involve more participants than in face-to-face 
settings. The ‘lightness’ of violence in such rhetorical practices may be the reason 
why mockery in online contexts is not considered serious. As a researcher using 
rhetorical criticism as my approach, I see mocking self-expressions as serious and 
real because they are expressions made by embodied beings who struggle to find 
their own place by positioning themselves in relation to other agents.  
Although most digital enthymemes were comments evaluating female celebrities 
as mere objects or things, some comments categorized as digital enthymemes 
involved encouraging a particular celebrity (such as ‘Go Martina! Try to beat that 
fucking annoying person’ in Example 15 of Article 3, see Eronen 2014b: 290). 
Such comments othered one celebrity at the expense of another as if the preferred 
celebrity herself would be participating in online gossip discourse. Despite the 
para-social interest in celebrity, these comments, however, were also ways of 
contributing to emotivist morality, since they were ways of creating proximity at 
the expense of distanced ‘others’. Moreover, the picture of Rihanna’s injured 
face, in particular, provoked many comments that were sympathetic to Rihanna. 
However, these, too, created proximity between gossipers at the expense of 
‘others’, since the participants were in fact contributing to rhetoric distancing 
Chris Brown who, in some other posts, was seen as a prototype of a black rapper 
prone to violent behaviour. Thus digital enthymemes that involved intimacy with 
media objects, such as with pictures of Rihanna, have a connection to categorical 
enthymemes based on stereotyping. This is because categorical enthymemes also 
are based on the separation of act and person in argument. Categorical 
enthymemes would not be possible without such separation to occur in the first 
place.  
Accordingly, categorical enthymeme was another frequently utilized way of 
participating in online celebrity gossip. In contrast to digital enthymeme, in 
categorical enthymeme the group of moral ‘inferiors’ was made more obvious, for 
example by contributing to racism by listing crimes committed by black male 
rappers (Example 9 in Article 3, see Eronen 2014b: 288), by expressing classist 
opinions when describing the ‘violent’ and ‘dishonest’ nature of alcoholics 
(Example 10 in Article 3, ibid.) or by expressing sexist stereotypes according to 
which young women are superficial and annoying (Examples 11 and 12 in Article 
3, ibid.). In these comments, proximity was created at the expense of ‘others’, the 
‘inferior’ groups that celebrities were seen to epitomize. Characteristic of these 
comments was that moral argumentation was utilized as a means of oppressing a 
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particular group, the third persona, by sharing emotions with co-gossipers. 
Categorical enthymeme, like the digital one, is based on intimate reactions to 
media objects. Unlike digital enthymeme, categorical enthymeme involves 
moralizing as a quasi-rational rhetorical practice. Thus the object-focused 
relationship of self-expressions based on categorical enthymeming is rhetorically 
hidden under the guise of moral argumentation. Moreover, categorical 
enthymeme found in online celebrity gossip is an explicit – and easily observable 
– rhetorical indicator that celebrity culture is a field in which meanings that 
concern groups are made. Compared with the audience of digital enthymemes, the 
audience of categorical enthymemes was more prominently an ideological 
construct, the second persona chosen by the rhetor (see Black 1970). This is 
because the sexist ideology of digital enthymemes was not so obviously involved 
in any individual comment but rather was collectively constructed in the crowd of 
online participants.   
In online celebrity gossip, the rhetorical function of theoretical enthymeme was to 
defend rationalism and discipline, demonstrate that violence is wrong and call for 
social sanctions. For Article 3, I chose to uncover only the most typical and 
obvious examples of theoretical enthymeme, because of the limited space. In the 
following, I will both summarize and revise my previous remarks on theoretical 
enthymemes. In general, theoretical enthymemes were used for the criticism of 
those who were seen disobeying norms (such as ‘provoking is wrong’ or 
‘violence is wrong’). Often the rhetoric of such enthymemes, despite their 
seemingly universalistic condemnation of violence, legitimized violent revenge 
and these enthymemes, therefore, were more or less hypocritical in their 
persuasive means. In online celebrity gossip, there were just a few comments in 
which conventionalism was a way of condemning violence in general. Theoretical 
enthymemes were by no means objective ways of contributing to justice; rather 
they were utilized to legitimize the condemnation of particular celebrities as 
moral ‘inferiors’. Accordingly, the moralizing function typical of conventionalism 
may also become a way of emotivist moral positioning. Often this form of 
argumentation took place as comments calling for social sanctioning based on the 
logic of reciprocity, which indicated that a celebrity has broken a rule and should 
therefore be punished (such as ‘eye for an eye’). In such examples, online 
gossipers took the voice of the state as the judge holding the right to sentence. In 
other cases, theoretical enthymemes were voices of highly media-critical 
gossipers who argued that they want something more from celebrity culture than 
gossip about staged fights or domestic violence (see also Meyers 2010: 320). 
Such theoretical enthymemes also involved judgements of celebrities or gossip 
participants who were criticized for their lack of knowledge and media criticism. 
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This type of theoretical enthymeming highlighted that the ‘self’ has the power to 
teach the ‘other’.  
Accordingly, there were three types of theoretical enthymemes in online celebrity 
gossip. In the first type, violence was condemned on a universalistic basis. Such 
universalistic comments, however, were rare in online celebrity gossip and when 
they were used, they indicated, more or less explicitly, condemnation of a 
celebrity who was considered behaving immorally (such as ‘Abuse is abuse. Chris 
Brown cannot justify the abuse he caused’, a comment by ChokiePanda on 
YouTube). In the second type, the togetherness of ‘us’ as ‘legitimate’ judges was 
more explicitly created at the expense of celebrities by calling them names or 
making other harsh judgements. This second type was the most typical theoretical 
enthymeme in my material, and for that reason I chose Examples 1–4 for Article 
3 (see Eronen 2014b: 285–286). In the third type, rhetors were arguing that they 
know better and are concerned of the moral decline of society for which they 
blamed celebrity culture. Thus the third type of theoretical enthymeme involved 
‘media-savvy’ interpretations which gave a free hand to the mockery of 
celebrities (see Article 5). Interestingly, therefore, the emphasis on distance in the 
moral tones of theoretical enthymemes was a way into the playful (aesthetic) 
proximity of digital enthymemes involving mockery of celebrities as artificial 
products. This process-like nature of distance and proximity shows how close to 
each other these two relational concepts are in the rhetoric of self-expressions.  
To sum up, the first type contributed to conventionalism on a more practical basis 
(when indicating that violence in general produces ill-being), while the second 
type was emotivist morality in the guise of conventionalism. The third type, on 
the contrary, was a more direct form of conventionalism in which the power of 
the rhetor who ‘knows better’ was central. Such type, as discussed above, also 
was hypocritically rational when legitimizing the mockery of celebrities, a topic I 
will discuss in more detail in Section 3.1.4. Overall, theoretical enthymemes 
emphasized the idea of the authority and thus reinforced, more or less 
hypocritically, the ‘rational’ aspect of self-expression. Like categorical 
enthymemes, also the most theoretical enthymemes were based on the rhetoric of 
moralizing when blaming ‘others’ for their ‘immoral’ or ‘stupid’ behaviour. The 
difference between these two forms was that categorical enthymemes involved 
emotional togetherness based on explicit stereotyping of some groups, while 
theoretical enthymemes were more focused on demonstrating rules of behaviour 
as the message of self-expression.  
Practical enthymemes, conversely, involved resisting the derisive and moralizing 
function of emotivist morality, albeit many of them with more or less ambiguity. 
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For instance, Example 5 in Article 3 involved a ‘forgiving’ function (‘His 
publicist certainly could have done a better job at making him at least sound 
remorseful [...] This story is just a reminder that despite being a celebrity, at this 
age controlling one’s emotion takes maturity he obviously hasn’t yet acquired. 
Praying for you, Chris and Rihanna!’) (see Eronen 2014b: 286). The reason why I 
saw this example as a practical enthymeme was based on rhetorical criticism: the 
rhetor articulates subjective moral considerations by providing the audience with 
several contextual perspectives, not just one ‘right’ way of dealing with the case. 
Practical enthymemes are not infallible or neutral but compared with digital or 
categorical enthymemes they are more open to criticism. For that reason, practical 
enthymemes also were relatively long comments. Although practical enthymemes 
were not fixed narratives, they can be seen to involve some kind of narrative 
evaluation in discussing the moral character of celebrities. This example also 
shows that practical and categorical enthymemes form a continuum. Also 
practical enthymemes concerning celebrities deal with the behaviour of groups. 
Although practical enthymemes were not as relativist as digital or categorical 
ones, also they were highly dependent on each audience and its ways of 
interpreting self-expression. 
I hypothesised that reasoning based on norms and social hierarchies would be less 
obvious on English-language gossip sites when compared with Finnish-language 
ones, as on the English-language sites participants from different social and 
cultural backgrounds are able to meet. According to my findings, digital 
enthymemes were more typical of English-language sites, while Finnish 
participants used more categorical and theoretical enthymemes. The use of 
practical enthymemes was almost equal for both groups. The comparison between 
English-language and Finnish sites is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.  
Moreover, I divided the research material into user-generated and media-
generated websites, based on the possibilities of online gossipers as producers of 
content. By user-generated websites, I mean online gossip sites where individuals 
had the power to choose the topic, start new discussion threads and perhaps also 
post pictures or videos. By media-generated websites, I refer to sites that were 
likely to be controlled by an agent representing a media corporation and where 
online comments were responses to a story or video produced by the (celebrity) 
media industry which often had the copyright to the website’s content. Compared 
with media-generated websites, user-generated sites were less likely to be pre- or 
post-moderated by the media industry. A good example of a user-generated 
website is the LiveJournal gossip community ONTD that is characterized by the 
active role of online gossipers as producers of content and as moderators of 
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gossip discussions. The comment sections of online newspapers, such as USA 
Today or Helsingin Sanomat, are examples of media-generated websites.  
According to my findings, digital and categorical enthymemes were more typical 
of user-generated than media-generated websites. Because of the derisive tones 
typical of digital and categorical enthymemes, this may indicate that digital and 
categorical enthymemes posted on media-generated websites, particularly USA 
Today and Helsingin Sanomat representing ‘serious’ broadsheet papers, were 
more likely to be pre- or post-moderated than comments posted for example on 
YouTube. Moderation practices were not analysed in detail in Article 3, but 
according to a previous study, there are more post-moderated comments on racial 
and religious topics on the websites of broadsheets than on entertainment-focused 
sites (see Richardson & Stanyer 2011: 993–994). One explanation for the 
prominence digital enthymemes on user-generated sites, such as on ONTD, is that 
self-expressions based on emotional contribution without theoretical or practical 
reasoning indicate that participants want to feel more intimate togetherness by 
sharing opinions and attitudes intensively. In other words, those interested in 
user-generated content are focused on intensive engagement in expressive and 
performative forms of participation instead of more theoretical discussion of 
social and political issues (see also Östman 2012: 1018). Thus user-generated 
websites, in particular, may be attractive to those who are interested in posting 
their emotional reactions as self-expressions. 
In addition, the topic of celebrity gossip can also be seen to affect the form of 
moral argumentation through which online participants evaluated celebrities. 
Digital enthymeme was more common in gossip concerning female celebrities’ 
fights than in comments on domestic violence. Female celebrities’ were typically 
seen as funny and entertaining, not as morally responsible. In digital enthymemes, 
the worth of female celebrities as mere objects of entertainment industry was 
obvious. This object-focused relationship was based on intimacy with the digital 
context involving visual and verbal representations of these female celebrities at 
the same time when distancing these celebrities as ‘inferior others’. Accordingly, 
when celebrity gossip concerned a female celebrities’ fight, and thus a discussion 
topic that did not involve an obvious juxtaposition between men and women, 
sexist discourse was still common in the comments. Reacting more seriously to 
domestic violence than to staged fights involving female celebrities can also be 
seen as a sign of online gossipers’ phronesis. In that case, online participants 
would have used their media criticism as practical thinking when posting their 
self-expressions on gossip sites. That is to say, they made a distinction between 
topics they considered ‘serious’ and ‘frivolous’. The mocking reactions involved 
in the amoralistic digital enthymemes in particular can be seen as ways through 
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which online gossipers both resisted and reinforced the idea of celebrity culture 
participants as emotivists (see Hills 2007). Celebrity gossipers are well-aware of 
the persuasion of celebrity industry. Ironically, however, gossipers mocking 
celebrity culture took the voice of emotivists, which was somehow ‘given’ to 
them through the frivolous topic of gossip. Accordingly, gossipers contributed to 
emotivist morality because they were given the ‘right’ to treat celebrities as their 
fair game. 
To sum up, the comparison of different contextual variables in the distribution of 
the forms of moral argumentation indicated that digital enthymeme was the most 
frequent form in contexts I saw as ‘non-hierarchical’. By non-hierarchical 
contexts, I mean English-language, user-generated websites where violence 
involving female celebrities was the topic of gossip. In these contexts, the 
individual subject was freely contributing to contents in the digital space but at 
the same time facing social pressure to post only contents that perform a strong 
affective relationship to digital objects, such as pictures or videos representing 
celebrities as well as digital interactions concerning these celebrities. The findings 
of Articles 3 and 4 indicate that although obvious signs of hierarchy are missing 
on celebrity gossip sites, online gossip participants may actively reinforce their 
own role as mere consumers of gossip provided for them by the mass-media 
industry (see also Meyers 2012: 1024, 1028; Graefer 2013: 223). In the next and 
final section summarizing the research results, I focus on the online gossip site 
ONTD as a seemingly non-hierarchical gossip environment, which, however, 
demonstrated explicit means of ethos control as signs of domination targeting 
both gossipers on the site and the young female celebrity representing the (lower) 
middle class. 
3.1.4 Ethos control  
Article 5 focused on one specific gossip site, namely ONTD. On that site, 
participants utilized normative means of control, attacking specifically those who 
identified with celebrities. This article was the last case study in my project and 
when analysing online comments for this case study, I already knew that 
emotivist morality is the most typical way of moral positioning in online celebrity 
gossip. I wanted to focus on the rhetorical struggle between serious and frivolous 
participation in gossip based on the remarks of previous research into (online) 
celebrity gossip. These two ways of reading celebrity gossip were found by 
Hermes (1995) whose study concerned gossip magazines’ readers and their 
reading habits. I took as a starting point that the serious and frivolous ways of 
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reading and interpreting celebrity gossip would provoke rhetorical struggles in 
online celebrity gossip.  
As analysed in Article 5, self-expression as a means of criticizing serious 
participation contributed to the idea of frivolous gossip. The frivolous gossip 
represents the meaning making practice of a critical audience that resists taking 
celebrity-related phenomena seriously (see Hermes 1995: 121, 133; Meyers 2010: 
31, 53, 309). Thus such ethos control could be seen as the resistance of the 
moralizing function of gossip that also took place in that specific forum. In the 
frivolous readings, gossipers resisted the focus on celebrities as representatives of 
moral individuals (cf. Hinerman 2006: 456–458). Like the gossip participant in 
Example 11 argues, ‘it’s a paycheck and publicity and we watch them bitching at 
each other for entertainment’. Such self-expressions show that online participants 
reject the ‘artificial’ celebrity ethos. Interesting in this rejection is the intimacy 
with the media objects showing celebrities ‘bitching at each other’.  
Because of the intimacy with media objects representing celebrities, the object-
focused participation on ONTD favours group ethos (see Gurak 1999) in treating 
not only celebrities but also online participants as ‘amoral’ individuals to be not 
identified with. In such comments, shared emotions (eunoia), instead of the 
sincerity of the self, is the sign of trust among online gossip participants. These 
results are in line with Miller’s (2004: 205–212) remarks according to which arete 
is the lacking or undermined component of online ethos. In addition to these 
notions, my findings in Article 5 indicated that arete was not just the lacking or 
undermined component in online celebrity gossip, but rather the part of ethos that 
was actively rejected by co-participants in gossip discourse. When rejecting the 
serious self-expressions of co-participants, online gossipers supported voyeuristic 
pleasure or Schadenfreude as the enjoyment of watching the escapades of ‘stupid’ 
female celebrities. This way of positioning the ‘self’ in relation to the ‘other’ 
involved the critical audience aware of the media-made nature of celebrities, 
particularly that of (lower) middle class females who were seen as moral 
‘inferiors’ to be made fun of (see also Tyler 2008; Paasonen & Pajala 2010; 
Williamson 2010). Thus the rhetorical grounds of celebrity mockery can be found 
in the contradictory relationship of phronesis and arete. 
In frivolous gossip readings, it becomes obvious that participants reject 
identification with individuals but identify with ethos that involves intimacy with 
media objects. Such rhetoric encourages the mockery of celebrities whose worth 
is directly associated with media objects (such as pictures or gossip stories). 
When that shameless intimacy with objects was challenged by online co-
participants, individual reactions turned into a more explicitly interactive mode 
78      Acta Wasaensia 
 
(direct accuses) with the purpose of defending the pleasure of consuming 
‘frivolous’ contents. These findings both reinforce and challenge Bauman’s 
(2000: 97) notions of public spaces as environments based on consumer action 
but ignoring interaction. ONTD is a public space based on consumer action and 
that action is rhetorically supported through interaction as the participants control 
one another’s ethos. Thus interaction involved in ethos control is a central mode 
of online celebrity gossip that maintains object-oriented rhetorical action as a 
collective phenomenon. Such interaction shows that relationships to contents 
representing celebrities are relationships with co-participants in a digital space. 
To go back to Meyers’ (2012: 1023) argument that online gossip sites, such as 
celebrity gossip blogs, make visible the role of the active audience, the findings in 
Article 5 indicated that content produced by online participants of celebrity gossip 
may also reinforce their role as members of a passive audience. As Meyers (2012: 
1024, 1028) also argues, the idea of an active audience does not necessarily mean 
the autonomy of celebrity gossip fans; it may also concern participation that 
reinforces the power of the celebrity media industry in the production and 
circulation of meanings (see also Graefer 2013: 223). Through ethos control 
involving virtual, voyeuristic, playful, disparate and aesthetic normativity (see 
Article 5), online gossip participants actively accepted their own role as a passive 
audience that consumes female celebrities and sees them as mere targets of 
mockery.  
Overall, the findings in Article 5 are in line with the remarks discussed in the 
other four research articles of this study. Firstly, ethos control undermined the 
role of arete through the rejection of autobiographical moralizing. Secondly, it 
contributed to voyeurism and sexist domination as eunoia connecting 
interlocutors in gossip. Thirdly, it reinforced the persuasiveness of ‘crowding’ 
behaviour as the particular logic of online gossip participants who are joined 
together to consume media contents.  
3.2 Comparison between English-language and Finnish 
sites  
In this section, I will briefly go through and explain the differences and 
similarities in self-expressions of English-speaking and Finnish participants of 
celebrity gossip. Comparisons of these two corpora were made in Articles 1–4, 
whereas Article 5 focused on only one English-language forum (ONTD). I will 
first summarize the main findings based on the comparison of English-language 
and Finnish gossip sites. After that I will explain the differences and similarities. 
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The reason why the comparison of English-language and Finnish comment 
sections of celebrity gossip is relevant lies in the fact that celebrity gossip in 
English welcomes participants from a variety of cultural and national 
backgrounds; whereas Finnish gossip sites limit the potential participants to those 
who share Finland as their national or cultural home. Thus Finnish-language 
participants were connected to one another through a stronger sense of offline 
proximity based on their shared national background. National background is a 
symbolic form of togetherness as well but it is somehow more ‘fixed’ compared 
with the contextual ‘liquidity’ of online communication. English-language 
participants, accordingly, had a stronger need to create their proximity to co-
participants rhetorically in and for the closed online environment. The majority of 
these English-language participants were most likely Americans (because the 
celebrities were Americans) and therefore members of a collective where 
different cultural and national backgrounds are joined together. Moreover, the 
English-language gossip sites may potentially welcome participants from other 
parts of the globe because of English as the lingua franca on the Internet and the 
global well-knownness of American celebrities. I regarded the English-language 
gossip sites as environments involving more global and heterogeneous 
potentiality when compared to the Finnish-language sites. In line with what was 
assumed at the beginning, this did not mean that English-language gossip sites 
would be more global than Finnish ones in terms of heterogeneity, since 
discursively created proximity in the English-language material also was 
fundamentally exclusive. 
Firstly, findings of Article 1 indicated that autobiographical moralizing in general 
is very marginal in online celebrity gossip, both in Finnish and English. Self-
expressions involving autobiographical moralizing, however, were slightly more 
common to English-language gossip sites than to Finnish ones. Many of these 
comments, as discussed in Section 3.1.1, were self-expressions that contributed to 
the oppression of those represented as moral ‘inferiors’. Thus autobiographical 
moralizing as both confessions and testimonies can also be seen as the rhetoric of 
emotivist morality. Many English-language self-expressions categorized as 
autobiographical moralizing came from a YouTube comment section related to a 
video in which the pop singer Rihanna tells about her experiences as a victim of 
domestic violence. Although autobiographical moralizing was more common to 
English-language sites, this did not mean that arete as the self-reflective 
component of ethos was more characteristic of online gossip in English than in 
Finnish. Autobiographical moralizing on YouTube, in particular, was a way to 
contribute to the object-focused relationships characteristic of emotivist morality. 
YouTube, in general, is unmoderated and ‘welcomes’ self-expressions with 
highly oppressive motives. 
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According to the findings of Article 2, comments contributing to moral values 
were more common on Finnish gossip sites than English-language sites. In other 
words, obedience to certain norms of society or culture was frequently brought up 
in Finnish comments on celebrities. Thus self-expressions of Finnish participants 
were closer to the moral project of Enlightenment highlighting strictly normative 
moral positioning (see Chouliaraki 2013: 15–21). This also indicates that Finnish 
participants took distance from one another through their norm-based evaluation, 
while English-language participants contributed to stronger feelings of intimacy 
in their online gossip discourse. For instance, hedonistic values characterizing 
playful togetherness between online gossip participants were slightly more typical 
of English-language gossip sites than Finnish ones. When commenting on 
violence involving female celebrities, English-language participants criticized 
celebrities as characters of a ‘frivolous’ reality television show, while Finnish 
participants criticized celebrities for their fame-seeking behaviour. Particularly 
ways of referring to a norm according to which women should be humble and not 
strive for personal success were prominent in Finnish online celebrity gossip. 
There were both similarities and differences in the construction of ‘others’ in 
English-language and Finnish comment sections. In both contexts, women were 
seen as moral ‘inferiors’ to be mocked or moralized. These findings are in line 
with those of Meyers (2010; also 2013), whose study uncovers sexist 
contributions to online celebrity gossip.  
Considering the specific groups that were oppressed, there were also differences 
between Finnish- and English-language corpora. While the ‘others’ to the Finnish 
participants were more obvious representatives of non-wealthy people, English-
language participants saw ‘others’ more frequently as a certain racial group. 
These results cannot be generalized, however, because all the Finnish celebrities 
involved in the gossip topics were white. The results might have been different if 
the Finnish celebrities were seen as ‘others’ because of their ethnic background. 
This indicates that online celebrity gossip is ‘framed’ in accordance with each 
topic of gossip, and the construction of ‘others’ may vary along the given topic 
and celebrities involved in it. Consequently, self-expression in online celebrity 
gossip is a highly contextual phenomenon.  
In terms of comparison, the findings of Article 3 are in line with the findings of 
Article 2. Comments representing digital enthymemes were more common to the 
English-language gossip sites: in the research material of this study, there were 
464 English-language comments and 344 Finnish-language comments that I 
categorized into digital enthymemes. This means that comments without 
articulated moral reasoning were more typical of sites whose participants were 
not necessarily connected to one another through their national background. Thus 
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also the findings of ‘phronesis’ indicate that in English-language comment 
sections, proximity was more concrete and more intensively emotional, created in 
and for online communication. Theoretical and categorical enthymemes strictly 
referring to moral norms were more prevalent in Finnish celebrity gossip. Thus 
ways of referring to shared norms connected Finnish participants to one another. 
In terms of ‘ultimate dialectic’ (Burke 1969: 189), therefore, rules as forms of 
distance became forms of proximity for Finnish online gossip participants. 
Consequently, a specific national culture, such as that of Finland, serves as the 
common ground for online gossip participants who can be assumed to have a 
certain ethos beyond their online self-expressions.  
In general, English-language gossip participants contributed to a more ‘liquid’ 
rhetoric compared with Finnish participants for whom the shared national and 
cultural background served as the serious, ‘rationalistic’ framework within which 
they evaluated celebrities and their behaviour. In terms of this seriousness, a 
Finnish woman, for instance, ‘should’ be humble and pursue selfless goals. 
Conversely, playfulness, particularly in English-language celebrity gossip, is a 
way of reducing distance between gossipers and challenging the seriousness of 
celebrity ethos. According to Silverstone (2007: 125), ‘what counts in play is 
essentially a betrayal of the rules’. On the other hand, as Silverstone (ibid. 126) 
also suggests, media consumption can be seen as a way of playing a game in 
which the players trust one another to play in accordance with certain rules but do 
not take responsibility for the game itself. Such playful communication 
contributes to intimacy without any burden of moral reasoning. Play takes place 
‘here and now’ by creating its own norms that the players are expected to obey. 
Thus play as a rhetorical motive is ‘light’: it focuses on creating new rules in new 
contexts by calling for new individuals to participate. Play distinguishes itself 
from all ‘heavy’ concerns and ignores, therefore, moral problems relating to 
physical violence. Through playfulness, online gossip participants showed their 
lack of moral concern. The highly contextual nature of play became evident when 
celebrity gossipers participated in word plays and competed with one another in 
‘making the most inflammatory comment’ (see Meyers 2010: 266). Playfulness as 
a rhetorical motive fits with online spaces that are individualist but still rely on 
global consuming, for playfulness (not a particular play with its specific rules) is 
always flexible to the interests of individuals coming from various cultural 
backgrounds. The apparent flexibility to individuals’ interests may explain why 
playful rhetoric was so common to English-language, more global, online spaces 
involving gossip about celebrities well-known all over the world. 
Accordingly, the ethos of Finnish gossip participants was more explicitly 
associated with an ideological construction of proximity through moralizing, 
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while the ethos of English-language participants highlighted playful online 
discourse as the sign of trustworthiness and contributed to a more instant form of 
proximity between gossipers. By ideological construction of proximity, I mean 
the construction of the second persona (the preferred audience, see Black 1970) 
versus the third persona (the excluded others, see Wander 1984) as the audience 
representing ‘others’. While English-language participants contributed to the 
ethos of online performance as a light-modern construct, the ethos of Finnish 
participants, deriving from their national identity, was closer to a heavy-modern 
idea of discourse-external authority, such as the state and its right to sentence its 
individuals by limiting their physical freedom (for more about the two phases of 
modernity, see Bauman 2000). Thus the ideological construction of gossip 
explicitly involved in categorical enthymemes was more typical of Finnish 
comments, while the English-language ones contributed to sexism through the 
crowding behaviour that is characteristic of digital and less obviously hierarchical 
enthymemes. Despite the interest in emphasizing the role of the state in the 
treatment of individuals, the categorical enthymemes of Finnish-language 
participants also had their individualist side. Such comments were still object-
focused self-expressions characterizing individuals’ choices of liking and 
disliking. In the Finnish context, however, individual intimacy with objects was 
considered a rhetorically shameful relationship and moralizing, as a rhetorical 
guise, played a persuasive role. 
Overall, there were many similarities between the two corpora. Both English-
speaking and Finnish celebrity gossip participants contributed to emotivist 
morality in their self-expressions. Thus togetherness was created at the expense of 
distanced ‘others’, groups represented by the celebrities. Typical ‘others’ in both 
language groups were women who represented moral ‘inferiors’ to gossipers. 
Accordingly, what seems to be ‘global’ in online comments on celebrity gossip is 
not any particular type of self-expression but the tension in which distance from 
‘others’ is simultaneous with proximity not simply connecting the ‘self’ to the 
‘other’ but building that rhetorical relationship through intimacy with objects 
representing celebrities. Such proximity objectifies, that is, materializes, otherness 
in general. This explains why practical enthymemes as self-expressions based on 
moral problem-solving (see Jonsen & Toulmin 1988: 35) were rare in both 
English-language and Finnish online celebrity gossip. Practical enthymemes 
involving means of identification are ways of treating distant ‘others’ as acting 
beings, not as dehumanized objects. The general contributions, as well as the 
limitations, of this study will be discussed in a more detailed way in the following 
section. 
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3.3 Contributions, limitations and suggestions  
The aim of this study was to better understand how the rhetoric of self-
expressions in online celebrity gossip characterizes proximity and distance. While 
proximity can be defined as a relationship of sameness and identification, distance 
stands for difference and disidentification. Moreover, in accordance with 
‘ultimate dialectic’ as a philosophical principle of rhetorical studies (see Burke 
1969: 1969: 19–20, 184–189), I understood proximity and distance as flexibly 
polar concepts that are not either-or ways of positioning but are simultaneously 
present in self-expressions. Thus proximity can be a way into distance and 
distance can be a way into proximity.  Moreover, I distinguished intimacy as a 
specific type of proximity in which an embodied closeness to objects, such as to 
pictures, videos or texts representing celebrities, is essential (for more on 
intimacy in online celebrity gossip, see Graefer 2013). I hypothesised that 
intimacy with objects complicates the relationship of proximity and distance in 
online celebrity gossip. Thus, potentially, a self-expression may create intimacy 
with an object representing celebrities at the same time when distancing or even 
completely excluding otherness that the object represents.  
I took rhetorical ethos, the trustworthiness of character, as the core concept to 
deal with self-expressions as rhetorical ‘speeches’ which online participants had 
posted in comment sections of gossip sites. The starting point of this study was to 
understand ethos as a fundamentally relational concept: it is a means of 
persuasion based on a character’s relation to the addressed audience as well as to 
‘others’, often distant or distanced. I was particularly interested in the tension 
between individual and social aspects of online self-expressions that represent the 
individual interest of participants and at the same time are invitations to form a 
community with the addressed audience.  Such a tension can be found in acts of 
rhetorical violence that are self-expressions of individuals aggressively producing 
more and more sameness. Although violence as a rhetorical and hence a freely 
chosen option of participation seems like a paradox (see Perelman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca 2000 [1969]: 54–59, 62), it represents the extreme end of rhetoric that 
becomes persuasive in the era of ‘liquid’ modernity in which individual 
relationships to objects become collective practices aiming at distancing or even 
completely excluding otherness. Unlike ‘heavy’ or ‘solid’ violence that directly 
attacks the human physical body, violence in its ‘light’ or ‘liquid’ form seems 
socially persuasive because it comes in the guise of individual freedom. I focused 
on online comments on physical violence involving celebrities because violence 
as a theme of celebrity culture brings to the surface issues of power and 
domination of groups (see Fiske 1989: 127–130). Thus media representations of 
physical violence may persuade the audience of celebrity gossip to post self-
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expressions that involve rhetorical violence justifying physical violence against 
particular ‘others’.  
By focusing on ethos construction and ethos control, the study has systematically 
explored the rhetoric of self-expressions in online celebrity gossip. The findings 
suggest that self-expressions in online celebrity gossip do not take place in a 
vacuum; they are expressions of social positioning in which individuals invite 
their audience to form a community with them. Thus online comments, however 
individualistic they may seem, always have a social dimension. Moreover, I have 
uncovered the means of persuasion of ‘ordinary’ people, that is, those who do not 
refer to their authorial social status but rather are characterized by their anonymity 
(or pseudonyms) in public spaces. Although the present study explored self-
expressions from the viewpoint of rhetorical criticism, the findings can also be 
seen as a contribution to media studies and the study of digital culture interested 
in the role of online participants in contemporary media culture.  
The findings can be regarded as empirical proof that proximity to the addressed 
audience is highly important for establishing trust in self-expressions online. In 
online celebrity gossip, ethos was an emotionally exclusive construct because the 
rhetoric of proximity took place at the expense of distanced ‘others’. 
Characteristic of such relationships was intimacy with mediated objects through 
which online participants treated certain celebrities as examples of ‘inferior’ 
beings. Thus the intimate object-oriented relationship to pictures, videos and texts 
representing celebrities became the central locus of ethos in a digital space. This 
means that relationships to objects became a rhetorical phenomenon – a way of 
positioning oneself in relation to the ‘other’.  
Accordingly, the findings show that moral positioning based on personal 
preferences is not merely an individualistic issue of emotivism (cf. MacIntyre 
2003 [1985]: 6–35; also Sayer 2011: 24, 32–35); in online celebrity gossip, 
preferences become collectively shared. In this study, rhetorical practices of moral 
positioning based on individual preferences for objects were seen as ways of 
contributing to emotivist morality. Emotivist morality is what happens to 
emotivism when individual preferences for objects legitimize othering and 
become the core of ethos. That is to say, emotivist morality was not only based on 
collective liking or disliking as reactions targeting certain celebrities; it also was a 
sign of ideological proximity. In rhetorical terms, both the second persona (see 
Black 1970) and the third persona (see Wander 1984) were involved in the 
rhetoric of self-expressions. This is because online celebrity gossip concerns 
groups and their struggles (see Meyers 2010; 2013; Graefer 2013). Moreover, 
online celebrity gossip does not only concern struggles of social groups but it 
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takes place as a struggle of finding one’s own place in the complex relationships 
of proximity and distance. Self-expressions in online celebrity gossip are voices 
of those who use rhetoric for the purposes of social mobility for them and for the 
group they identify with. In such rhetorical practices, the tension of proximity and 
distance is central. 
The rhetorical struggles of proximity and distance took place on two levels of 
emotivist morality: 1) either celebrities were treated as symbols of the ideological 
meanings a gossip participant promotes through moralizing 2) or the authenticity 
of celebrity as a moral individual was denied and celebrity gossip discourse itself 
was seen as the main goal of gossip. On the first level of emotivist morality, 
moral positioning was serious and took place as moralizing in the form of 
categorical and theoretical enthymemes and autobiographical moralizing. Thus 
what seems to be an example of conventionalism or practical morality in online 
celebrity gossip may be utilized as a rhetorical means of emotivist morality. In the 
serious gossip, both the discourse of the seemingly sincere ‘self’ and that of a 
rationalistic moralizer were used for the proximity of ‘us’ at the expense of 
‘others’. In such rhetoric, therefore, moralizing was persuasive and online 
gossipers treated moral values and reasoning as rhetorically attractive. Rhetorical 
practices based on categorical and theoretical enthymemes were more common to 
Finnish than English-language self-expressions. In addition to female celebrities 
often treated as representatives of class and race, moralizing attacked male 
celebrities and also co-occurred with classist categorization and racist 
stereotyping. Autobiographical moralizing, slightly more common to the English-
language gossip than to the Finnish one, tended to be a sexist discourse in which 
the ‘sincerity’ of the rhetor was put in a rhetorical use. Such rhetoric, by 
stereotyping women or men, reinforced the discourse in which ‘sex is power’ (see 
Höglund 2009). Despite the seemingly serious moral concerns, moralizing in 
online self-expressions of celebrity-gossip participants was a rhetorical way to 
hide intimate relationships to mediated objects. Moralizing was only seemingly 
focused on acts for its main purpose was to evaluate ‘others’ as morally static and 
unable to change. Moralizing, therefore, was a rhetorical sign of object 
relationships that were hidden under the guise of morality-concerned evaluation.  
Compared with the first level, emotivist morality on the second level was more 
spontaneous and shamelessly intimate and did not involve ways of hiding the 
object relationship under the rhetoric of moralizing. Moral positioning on the 
second level, therefore, becomes mere mockery, which abandons all moral 
concerns. The targets of such mockery were almost exclusively (lower) middle 
class women who are known as low-status celebrities having no cultural or social 
capital related to higher education and profession. Such female celebrities were 
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dehumanized into sexual and frivolous objects. This type of emotivist morality 
was involved in amoralistic digital enthymemes and it was more common to 
English-language gossip compared with that in Finnish, although it was used by 
Finnish participants as well. For Finnish participants, some celebrities represented 
national figures and the gossip about them provoked moral considerations of 
being a good citizen. As discussed above, this may indicate that evaluating 
celebrities in moral terms is seen as more persuasive in nationally limited online 
contexts than in online contexts with more multicultural potentialities. One 
particular Finnish celebrity seen as a national moral figure was the former 
sportsman Matti Nykänen. Although Nykänen was othered in gossip discourse, he 
was clearly seen to belong to the moral community of Finns. These findings 
support the view that celebrities associated with sport are seen as national figures 
that are part of ‘our tribe’ and its responsibility (see Dahlén 2008: 446). 
One explanation for the popularity of playful celebrity mockery, which was 
particularly typical of English-language online gossip, lies in the contradiction of 
arete and phronesis, a topic which I have discussed in Article 5. Because online 
gossipers want to present themselves as media-savvy participants, they refuse 
identification with celebrities whom they see as highly artificial and media-made. 
Accordingly, mockery may function as a way of challenging the construction of 
mass-media audience as passive recipients of mediated monologues, albeit doing 
it at the expense of certain celebrities and groups. Such ‘clever’ celebrity criticism 
typical of online celebrity gossip (see Graefer 2013) is not exclusively a 
characteristic of online celebrity gossip but can be seen as a general phenomenon 
in contemporary celebrity culture (see e.g. Ahva et al. 2014: 194–195). The 
specific characteristic of online celebrity gossip is that celebrity mockery as a sign 
of media criticism is a collective discourse of rhetors who are faceless and 
mediated to one another. In celebrity mockery, the rhetor’s shameless intimacy 
with a picture, video or text representing celebrities becomes the basis of a 
trustworthy ethos that is utilized as a rhetorical choice to attack all morally 
serious interpretations. Such participation is characteristic of social spaces that are 
publicly visible but non-civil and highlight participants’ action, not a reasoned 
form of interaction (see Bauman 2000: 97). At the latest when the object-centric 
ethos of celebrity culture loses its rhetorical shame, proximity in the interaction of 
gossipers reveals its nature as a relationship that is possible only through 
mediated objects. Moreover, the intimate object-focused relationship may be an 
obstacle to a direct social relationship that would encourage interlocutors to 
understand one another. This also shows that proximity in its most intimate form 
may lead to distance and exclusion of otherness. 
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By focusing on ethos as a rhetorical character through which an individual 
becomes part of a community, this study has contributed to the research into 
community building of online participants. I took as a starting point that 
community in an online space should not be seen as distinct from offline 
togetherness, since all self-expressions, however ‘alone’ they seem to be, are 
always invitations to build a community. Thus online comments, even as 
seemingly separated, individualistic expressions, carry with themselves the idea 
of social relationships. As already discussed above, the type of community that 
can be found in online celebrity gossip is not that of mutual understanding or 
moral commitments but a form of togetherness that highlights proximity to the 
faceless audience as the ‘nearness of the crowd’ (Bauman 1993: 130). In other 
words, such a community consists of participants whose individuality is ignored. 
Consequently, the findings of this study are in line with the idea that online 
communities favour a group ethos instead of an ethos based on individual 
freedom (e.g. Gurak 1999). This also resonates with the remarks that online 
participants play a certain role and their role expectations become a substitute for 
their sincerity (see Gardner 2011: 99–106).  
What I consider the most important finding of this study is that the highlighted 
role of individualism as the rhetoric of online celebrity gossip calls into question 
the very idea of ‘free’ individual. What is personal or self-expressive may also be 
impersonal and self-attacking. In accordance with the logic of ‘ultimate’ or 
transformative dialectic (see Burke 1969: 189), self-exclusion may be the end 
point of self-empowerment. I have discussed this rhetorical tension in relation to 
the bread-and-butter-fly metaphor. The metaphor characterizes the ethos of 
participants in digital networks who consume for their own self-interest, but as 
they consume they themselves become part of digital contents, like the bread-and-
butter-fly whose sugar-cube head dissolved in the tea it was drinking (see 
Fleckenstein 2005). The bread-and-butter-fly effect characterizes intimacy with 
the material the ‘self’ is consuming and it is prominent in online participants’ 
self-expressions contributing to emotivist morality.  
Firstly, such intimacy excludes all concerns of otherness, since media objects are 
consumed only for self-empowerment. Only those rhetorical practices are 
welcomed that do not cause any challenge or risk to the intimate relationship to 
objects. Secondly, bearing in mind that gossip may always turn against the 
gossipers themselves because of the tendency for gossipers to trade places with 
the targets of their gossip (see Bergmann 1993: 45–70), celebrity gossip may also 
attack its participants. Because celebrities as ‘others’ are proximate, like ‘us’, 
their otherness is constantly exaggerated in rhetorical struggles. Compared with 
private-sphere gossip, which, despite its accusing tones, also involves negotiation 
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of morality as situated meanings (see Bergmann 1993: 130–134), online celebrity 
gossip is a more explicitly condemning and excluding moral genre. By distancing 
and excluding celebrities as ‘others’ like ‘us’, and doing it for the sake of 
intimacy of ‘us’, celebrity gossipers may ironically distance and exclude 
themselves. These findings, accordingly, reinforce the notion that because of the 
urgent need for intimacy, togetherness constructed in online comments may 
contribute to ‘deindividuation’ (see also Lea & Spears 1991; Stromer-Galley & 
Martey 2009). Such rhetorical acts can be seen as practices of ‘light’ or ‘liquid’ 
violence that attack the very idea of being an in-dividual. Unlike violence in 
physical attacks, violence in its ‘light’ form cannot directly hurt the body of the 
‘other’. By individual rhetorical choices, rhetors question their own freedom and 
surrender to the power of context. Accordingly, the self-harming effect of self-
expressions analysed in this study challenges the idea of the rhetor’s 
independence.  
The findings of the present study, however, cannot be generalized without taking 
into account the limitations. Firstly, I focused on four topics of celebrity gossip 
that were well known mostly in American and Finnish cultures. Although I 
assumed that English-language comment sections are spaces where participants 
from different cultural and national backgrounds are able to make meanings 
together, it is likely that these online environments were more or less limited to 
the American culture and its conception of celebrities. Overall, both corpora 
analysed in this study represented western celebrity culture in which the public 
visibility of an individual is part of the everyday media content. The shared 
western culture may explain why English-language and Finnish online celebrity 
gossip had so much in common. As Marshall argues (2006: 6–7), celebrity culture 
tends to represent a form of ideological colonization through which western 
culture is made global. It would be fruitful to compare English-language online 
comments on celebrities with online comments that represent the reception and 
interpretation of celebrity culture beyond the west.  
Secondly, since online comments on celebrities were highly ambiguous, the 
categories into which I have classified them tended to overlap. This is because of 
the ‘messy rhetoric’ in online contexts where self-expressions of online 
participants are fragments of speech whose meaning lies in interaction (see also 
Grabill & Pigg 2012). This means that the quantitative findings of this study, 
particularly those concerning evaluative language and values, are highly complex 
and can be interpreted differently from different perspectives. For instance, many 
of the comments I saw as individualistic self-interest in Article 2 were, in fact, 
ways of contributing to sexist and classist domination, as the findings of Article 4 
more clearly indicated. A digital text, such as a comment in a discussion forum, 
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often does not have its own origin but rather is part of a network of texts (e.g. 
Fleckenstein 2007). Thus the repetitive and ‘crowding’ online participation I 
called digital enthymeming may contribute to particular meanings that are not 
explicitly present in each comment as an individual post. It is worth noting, 
however, that the asymmetry between those gossiping and those gossiped about 
played a role in favouring digital enthymeming that judges and mocks ‘others’. 
The findings on digital enthymemes may be different in online contexts that are 
not so strongly based on ways of distancing ‘others’, but would favour more 
symmetrical means of emotional participation.  
Thirdly, a deeper contextual understanding of self-expression in different kinds of 
online spaces where participants contribute to celebrity gossip is a gap to be 
filled. It would be particularly interesting to more closely focus on the 
technological and social potentials of different types of forums in relation to the 
tense function of self-expression. Accordingly, in the future it would be relevant 
to explore what kinds of circumstances in online forums are the most fruitful for 
the bread-and-butter-fly effect. It would be particularly interesting to more 
thoroughly compare forums that are based on the circulation of pictures or videos 
with forums that are more focused on merely written expression. Such a study 
would be illuminating from the point of view of rhetorical criticism because 
particularly a visual object, such as a photograph, holds a strong aesthetic power 
in serving as proof that is taken as self-evident (see Finnegan 2001). Relating to a 
better contextual understanding of online self-expression, the means of persuasion 
contributing to proximity and distance in the rhetoric of the media or journalists is 
also worth studying more closely. As Silverstone’s (2007: 25–55) concept of 
‘mediapolis’ suggests, online participants are not alone; rather they are acting 
with media corporations and journalists, those in charge of media-generated 
content in the shared social and public space. In this study, I did not analyse the 
rhetorical content of mass-media texts (such as gossip stories or videos from the 
entertainment industry). In the future, it would be fruitful to analyse in what ways 
positioning based on proximity and distance is shared between online participants 
and the mainstream media also creating content online.  
Generally speaking, because this study was a collection of articles that were also 
independent pieces of research, each article necessarily simplified the 
complexities of online celebrity gossip. However, I needed the case studies in 
order to focus on each aspect of ethos (autobiographical moralizing, emotions and 
values, reasoning, ethos control) and to form a holistic picture of proximity and 
distance in self-expressions of gossipers. Also, letting the research material speak 
for itself was an essential part of this project. This study, therefore, has a 
methodological contribution to rhetorical and communication studies whose 
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common interest lies in questions of otherness in language use and in other 
symbolical practices (see e.g. Gehrke 2009: 153; also Orgad 2012: 15–51). In 
order to approach such issues as ‘who gets to speak’ and ‘what options are 
available for living and relating within our communities’, rhetoricians and 
communication scholars need to see beyond mere forms of persuasion (see 
Gehrke 2009: 165). I responded to this call by combining the linguistic analysis of 
evaluative language with argumentation-analytical approaches to communication. 
This combination of the two methods was useful because online communication 
is highly emotional, but it also has a relation to forms of argumentation in a more 
general sense. Rhetoric of self-expressions becomes meaningful through the 
analysis of both evaluation and argumentation. 
Applying highly abstract concepts, particularly distance, proximity and ethos, to 
the empirical analysis of online rhetoric enabled the holistic study of self-
expressions. The richness of the concept of ethos utilized in this study lies in its 
inclusiveness of both distance (difference) and proximity (sameness) understood 
as ways that self-expressions contribute to social meanings. I argue that the idea 
of ethos as both an emotional and a logical construct of character is a useful and 
relevant approach whenever exploring self-expressions online. However, making 
something abstract more concrete, as I have done with ‘distance’, ‘proximity’ and 
‘ethos’ in this study, involved a lot of simplifications, edits and overlaps. Thus 
these concepts in this study are deductively derived from neither Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric nor Bauman’s Postmodern Ethics. The way of combining the rhetorical 
idea of ethos with Bauman’s ethical theory is, from Aristotle’s and Bauman’s 
perspective, an application rather than a theoretically faithful deduction.  
The most complex component of ethos to be empirically analysed was arete or 
moral virtue. Phronesis and eunoia can be more easily applied to the level of 
empirical analysis than arete. This is because both (argumentative) distance and 
(emotional) proximity are obviously relational concepts in human 
communication, also in mediated contexts (see Silverstone 2007). Because of the 
linguistic signs of relationality, rhetoricians have a direct access to reasoning and 
emotions through the self-expressions of language users. Arete is a much more 
complex target of empirical studies than phronesis or eunoia, because good 
characters that act based on their goodwill and self-controlled characters that act 
against their will may both act in the same way (see Urmson 1973: 223). This 
means that virtues, if understood as merely internal states of a ‘good’ character, 
cannot be accessed on the level of rhetorical practices. In rhetorical studies, 
conversely, arete is a concept related to action (see e.g. Fleckenstein 2007). I saw 
autobiographical telling as the potential discourse of arete because it involved 
self-expressions based on rhetors’ thoughts of themselves as moral beings who 
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act in relation to other people. These expressions included confessions and 
testimonies in which rhetors ‘narrating’ their own character referred to their 
experiences. Some of the online gossipers expressed self-reflections through 
autobiographical moralizing, with the purpose of identifying with disdained 
celebrities. As the comments analysed in this study indicated, however, 
autobiographical moralizing also can be used as a rhetorical means of emotivist 
morality. This was obvious in the highly sexist type of autobiographical 
moralizing in which women were represented as provocative. Such rhetoric 
implied that men’s violence as a response to women’s provocation would be a 
‘natural’ reaction. Moreover, as Article 5 indicates, arete as a ‘sincere’ self-
expression contradicts with phronesis as the sign of ‘media-savvy’ gossipers. As 
already discussed, some gossipers regarded as naive those celebrity-culture 
participants who identified with celebrities by treating them as moral individuals. 
Such participants were seen as gossipers who lack media criticism concerning the 
fact that celebrities are made for the purposes of media industry.  
In the future, making sense of the rejected arete in online celebrity gossip could 
be theoretically improved by deepening the focus on Jean Baudrillard’s (1994) 
concepts of the second and third order of simulacra15, which I have briefly 
discussed in Article 5. Central in the serious readings of celebrity gossip is online 
gossipers’ identification with their favourite celebrity, which can be seen to take 
place as the second order of simulacra in which the celebrity is seen as a 
representation of a moral person. In the frivolous readings of gossip, on the 
contrary, the relationship of celebrity and a real person is no more seen as 
meaningful. The frivolous participation contributes to the third order of simulacra 
in which ethos is constructed in repetitive online performances without a moral 
concern. The third-order simulacrum, as critically analysed, might be a useful 
starting point for future studies approaching ethos in online celebrity gossip as 
rhetorically created intimacy that takes place as the playful mockery, and hence 
distancing, of ‘others’.  
However, in contemporary media and communication studies, the idea of 
completely virtual media participation has been challenged by the view according 
to which participants are embodied selves (e.g. Ess 2010; also Silverstone 2007: 
                                                 
 
15 The second and the third order of simulacra characterize relationships between reality and its 
representations (see Baudrillard 1994). In the second-order simulacrum, copies try to mimic 
reality, such as celebrity images that represent the individual living in western society. In the 
third-order simulacrum, the relationship between reality and symbols is no longer seen as rel-
evant. What is aesthetic or performed is regarded as the only reality. According to the third 
order, it would be irrelevant whether celebrities are morally good or bad as individuals.  
92      Acta Wasaensia 
 
5). In accordance with the approach to the embodied self, a self-expression is a 
moral positioning and a contribution to the ethos of rhetor even when it is playful 
and does not involve any moral concern for other people. This is because the 
rhetor of self-expression is a particular mind-body combination of history and 
memories that also has the ability to make choices. Rather than believing that a 
completely virtual reality is possible, I suggest that the third order could be seen 
as media participation based on playful mockery and continuous interaction of 
embodied beings that choose to deny their own authenticity. Considering that 
English-language celebrity gossip is an older type of mass-media text than 
celebrity gossip in the Finnish context, one may ask whether the openly ‘liquid’ 
and mocking participation is a growing trend in celebrity culture. Interestingly, 
recent celebrity studies suggest that the ‘liquid’ celebrity that interacts with fans 
has become a new trend in celebrity culture where the second order has been 
challenged (e.g. Redmond 2014; see also Holmes and Redmond 2014: 224). It 
would be fruitful to explore whether the ‘liquid’ celebrity and the mockery of 
celebrities may be aspects of the same rhetorical and cultural trend that highlights 
intimacy with the addressed audience and abandons the persuasiveness of 
‘authority’ in communication.  
3.4 Conclusion 
Distance as the cornerstone of the modern public space has been challenged by 
the persuasive call of proximity, that is, the rhetoric in which emotional 
expressions are at the heart of persuasion. In rhetorical terms, epideictic rhetoric 
as the persuasion ‘here and now’ has found its kairos in the ‘demotic turn’ (see 
Turner 2004: 82–85; 2010) that highlights the active role of ordinary people in 
mediated, public spaces. In this era, ethos is constructed and controlled in 
continuous self-expressions of individuals willing to form a community. These 
self-expressions highlight rhetoric itself, not the name or status of a participant, as 
the sign of trust. It is the ‘speech’ itself that matters, not the reputation of the 
‘speaker’, to refer to Aristotle’s descriptive idea of ethos (Rhetoric I.ii.1356a: 4). 
By the same token, it is the meaning-making practices around celebrities – not the 
status of celebrities or media participants – which play the biggest role in online 
gossip.   
Asynchronous and anonymous communication in online comment sections is a 
particularly telling example in which the characteristics of the demotic turn 
become visible. Firstly, because there is a time delay between posting and reading 
an online comment, the sense of presence is never obvious but it is created in and 
through continuous self-expressions. Secondly, online participants are spread-out 
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in terms of their physical, geographical and social locations. In order to contribute 
to togetherness they try to overcome distance by constructing emotional intimacy. 
This era of emotional participation is a manifestation against the rules of distance, 
rules that used to separate the rhetor and audience in public rhetoric. The 
emotional style of new media participation revealing spontaneous reactions 
instead of articulated reasoning may seem emancipatory because it resists the 
rationalistic rules of writing and communicating as the locus of power and 
authority (see e.g. Soffer 2012). In a wider sense, emotional participation also 
contributes to the cultural public sphere that challenges the monopoly of political 
and authoritarian public participation as the only legitimate form of public 
discourse (McGuigan 2005).  
The sharing of emotional reactions, however, should not be seen as liberating just 
because of the desire to overcome distance between the rhetor and audience. As 
also Turner (2010: 171–174) argues, ‘the demotic turn’ does not automatically 
mean ‘the democratic turn’ as the triumph of ordinary people. By the same token, 
the mere possibility to post contents on websites should not be associated with the 
idea that the ordinary people, such as celebrity-gossip participants, make 
meanings independently from the hegemony of gossip media industry (see 
Meyers 2012: 1024, 1028; Graefer 2013: 223). Proximity as the flagship of the 
demotic turn may also take place at the expense of those sharing the digital space 
of expression. Participation in online celebrity gossip and other digital genres and 
forums of self-expression may involve the problem of closed worlds requiring 
trust in interlocutors who remain unknown and never reveal themselves (see 
Miller 2004: 212–213). Accordingly, sharing self-expression with the ‘other’ 
whose otherness is actively hidden contributes to individuals’ immersion in a 
faceless crowd (see Bauman 1993: 115; 130–131; 155). The cost of shameless, 
uncritical sharing of intimacy is that individuals become part of what they do not 
and cannot know in person. A relationship in which the shameless intimacy with 
objects is the sign of a trustworthy ethos finally attacks the rhetor as an agent 
whose existence is dependent on the relation to the audience representing the 
‘other’. 
Moreover, celebrity gossip analysed in this study makes visible something deeper 
in the current media culture, namely, the re-layered role of ethos. By the re-
layered role of ethos I mean that characters produced by the media industry 
become objects of re-interpretation and re-persuasion by audience members who 
contribute to the idea of a trustworthy character. Gossip as a genre of 
communication that is continuously modified can be regarded as the prototype of 
rhetorical re-layering through which the ‘authentic’ or ‘original’ is made more 
and more questionable each time when new layers are added. In online celebrity 
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gossip, media contents are covered with new self-expressions of individuals who 
find new ways of covering everything that would be the sign of their own 
personality. In the rhetorical re-layering, impersonal and unauthentic reactions to 
impersonal and unauthentic media characters become the sign of a trustworthy 
self-expression. 
The rhetorical re-layering described above can be seen as a means of 
empowerment of the ‘self’ who is in a reciprocal relationship with the 
surrounding context. In such reciprocity, celebrities are represented as ‘fair 
game’, from which follows that they become ‘fair game’ over and over again. 
Celebrities are not individuals whom gossipers could personally know; rather they 
are objects made for the purposes of the gossip media industry. To express 
themselves as media-savvy participants, online celebrity gossipers do not identify 
with celebrities as moral individuals, but rather show intimacy with media objects 
representing celebrities. In such rhetoric, everybody is playing a role for their own 
self-empowerment. Thus role-playing becomes the sign of a trustworthy online 
ethos, since the ethos of online co-participants with which the ‘self’ forms a 
community may not be more authentic or personal than the media-made 
characters as targets of playful mockery. In the role-playing, however, there is a 
real individual, an embodied being, behind all the layers. Accordingly, evaluating 
a celebrity as a ‘chav‘, ‘bitch’ and an ‘attention whore’ is a self-expression and 
rhetors’ attempt to find their own place in the complex network of relationships in 
which proximity to something or someone is a way into distance from something 
or someone else and vice versa.  
The struggle of self-expression is a rhetorical struggle of identifying with a 
trustworthy ethos. Ethos involves the idea of the relational self, which can be 
found Aristotle’s Rhetoric in which he argues that ‘a person would present 
himself [sic] as being of a certain sort from the same sources that he would use to 
present another person’ (see Rhetoric II.i.1378a: 7). Consequently, the means of 
persuasion contributing to ethos play an essential role in struggles through which 
rhetors as relational selves try to find their own voices. The rhetorical struggle of 
finding one’s own voice through means of persuasion is not a new idea but has 
strong historical roots in the expressions of anonymous people who have the 
desire for social mobility. For instance, rhetorical struggles became the key issue 
of free speech fights in the U.S. among industrial workers at the beginning of the 
20th century (May 2013). These workers did not ‘own’ a status or economic 
capital as a powerful property to improve their position in society. They used 
rhetoric for their own empowerment (see ibid.).  
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Relating to the struggles of finding one’s own voice, I want to raise the rhetorical 
issue of agency. By agency I mean the common and shareable capacity of rhetors 
and their audiences to respect other people as responsive beings and identify with 
them, be they close or far. In rhetorical studies, there are two distinct ways of 
understanding agency. On the one hand, agency is understood as a discursive 
force of interaction, located between the rhetor and audience. According to Miller 
(2007), agency is ‘kinetic energy’ and an attribution from another agent. As she 
argues, agency is ‘the property of a relationship between rhetor and audience’ 
(Miller 2007: 150). On the other hand, Marilyn M. Cooper (2011), in her criticism 
of agency as mere interaction, defines agency as an emergent property of 
embodied individuals who know that their actions are their own. According to 
Cooper (2011), moreover, this internal model of agency calls for the individual’s 
responsibility.  
I suggest that these two ways of dealing with agency should be regarded as 
supplementing rather than contradicting each other. Agency, as both Miller (2007: 
153) and Cooper (2011: 443) argue, is more than self-empowerment. While 
agency as the property of relationship can be seen as pedagogical interaction, the 
self-internal agency is the stage of more independent agents who have learned to 
use their own voices as means of persuasion. Agency in relationships supports the 
internal agency and vice versa, like oscillation between company and 
independence is important for experiencing oneself as both socially real and 
personally sincere (see Lanham 2006: 110). Such oscillation as interaction 
between contrasts dynamizes rhetorical expression because it involves a deeply 
practical dimension: a relationship that is not stuck in the form of discourse 
(ibid.). The continuous oscillation between agency in relationships and in 
personal discretion, between social proximity and distance from it, is a way of 
finding a balance in communication and taking responsibility for rhetorical 
actions. Responsibility taken by the rhetor is not possible without personal 
awareness of the ‘self’ that is both related to and distinct from other selves, be 
they present or absent. As Bauman (1993: 85) argues, responsibility ‘is the a 
priori measure of all commitments’. The ability to take responsibility for one’s 
own actions in relation to other people, as a way of being close but not too close, 
is essential to proper distance (see Silverstone 2003; 2007: 47–48). Moreover, 
being close is the way of reinforcing ties of trust but it also is risky because in the 
state of proximity the temptation to escape responsibility is the strongest (Bauman 
1993: 88–89).  
Responsibility is undermined if the environment of rhetorical speeches is 
completely ‘authorless’ (see Warnick 2004: 264), if it is ‘not an author’ but ‘the 
context that writes’ (see Fleckenstein 2007) and if networks ‘define our 
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possibilities for action’ (see Paasonen 2014: 13). I argue that agency is to be seen 
as a fundamentally rhetorical struggle of ethos. From this perspective, 
relationships in digital and networked spaces are issues of rhetorical choice 
relating to the question of trust. Thus agency is a rhetorical struggle of ethos 
calling for the responsibility of both rhetors and their audiences who make 
choices. Ethos based on intimacy with objects is a self-interested choice that 
ultimately attacks the very idea of the ‘self’ that needs otherness for its own 
survival as an agent. Responsible agency in digital contexts comes with the ability 
to criticize self-expression in the media participation of both oneself and other 
people through seeing the available means of persuasion. As this study has 
shown, the art of self-expressions is central for the new media literacy of those 
who act alone together, not only on celebrity-gossip sites, but also in other digital 
spaces. 
To go back to my interest in little figures, the self-expressions of anonymous 
online participants are similar to miniatures. Academically they may seem too 
insignificant, frivolous, even naive to be analysed. This study, however, has 
uncovered the means of persuasion that make these self-expressions socially 
meaningful and fundamentally greater than themselves. To borrow Lanham’s 
(2006) terms of looking AT and looking THROUGH, the holistic analysis of self-
expressions requires a researcher to look AT them both closely, in their 
proximity, and from a theoretical and rational distance. This is the only way of 
seeing THROUGH their rhetoric.    
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'IPIFVMX] 7XYHMIW 
:SP  2SW z z LXXTH\HSMSVK
u-XvW WS [VSRK ]IX WS JYRR]v GIPIFVMX] ZMSPIRGI ZEPYIW ERH XLI
.ERYWJEGIH GYPXYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI SRPMRI
1EVME )VSRIR
(ITEVXQIRX SJ 'SQQYRMGEXMSR 7XYHMIW 9RMZIVWMX] SJ :EEWE :EEWE *MRPERH
6IGIMZIH  2SZ  EGGITXIH  1E] 
8LI EMQ SJ XLMW WXYH] MW XS I\TPSVI XLI ZEPYIW XLEX GLEVEGXIVMWI TEVXMGMTEXMSR MR XLI GYP
XYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI SJ PSGEP *MRRMWL ERH TSXIRXMEPP] QSVI KPSFEP SV QYPXMREXMSREP
)RKPMWLPERKYEKI GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT WMXIW &] YXMPMWMRK XLI EREP]WMW SJ IZEPYEXMZI PER
KYEKI XLI ZEPYIW I\TVIWWIH MR  )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH  *MRRMWL GSQQIRXW JVSQ
HMJJIVIRX [IFWMXIW WYGL EW .YWX .EVIH =SY8YFI 3L 2S 8LI] (MHRvX ERH SRPMRI RI[W
TETIV WMXIW [IVI I\TPSVIH 8LI VIWYPXW MRHMGEXI XLEX XLI GYPXYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI SJ FSXL
KPSFEP ERH PSGEP GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT WMXIW LEW XLVII FEWMG JYRGXMSRW [LMGL - [MPP GLEV
EGXIVMWI LIVI EW QSVEPMX] TYVTSWI GSQTIXMXMSR SJ TS[IV KEQI ERH IRXIVXEMRQIRX
TPE]
*MVWX ERH IWTIGMEPP] MJ GIPIFVMXMIW YRHIVKS WIVMSYW QMWIVMIW WYGL EW HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI
MRKW SJ FIMRK E GMXM^IR 7YGL QSVEP WIVMSYWRIWW MW TEVXMGYPEVP] TVSQMRIRX SR *MRRMWL
WMXIW SJ GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT [LMGL QE] MRHMGEXI XLEX [LIR GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT MW PMQMXIH XS SRI
GYPXYVI ERH REXMSR XLI TYFPMGWTMVMXIH JSGYW WIIQW WXVSRKIV XLER MR TSXIRXMEPP] KPSFEP
KSWWMT HMWGYWWMSRW 7IGSRH ERH TIVLETW QSWX TVSQMRIRXP] XLI GYPXYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI
MW E XIVVEMR SJ GSRXIWX GLEVEGXIVMWIH F] QSGOIV] TMX] ERH LSWXMPMX] XS[EVHW GIPIFVMXMIW
TEVXMGYPEVP] [SQIR 8LMVH XLI GYPXYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI JSGYWIW SR WLEVIH IRXIVXEMRQIRX
ERH IWTIGMEPP] ZS]IYVMWXMG TPIEWYVIW 1SVISZIV GSQQIRXW TSWXIH XS FSXL *MRRMWL ERH
)RKPMWLPERKYEKI SRPMRI IRZMVSRQIRXW SJ GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT EVI GLEVEGXIVMWIH F] XLI SZIV
PET SJ KEQI [MXL FSXL TYVTSWI ERH TPE] 7IVMSYW QSVEP TYVTSWI WXVIWWMRK SFIHMIRGI XS
GSQQYREP VYPIW ERH TPE]JYP QSGOIV] EW E LYQSVSYW WIPJI\TVIWWMSR LEZI E GSQQSR
KSEP MR GSRXVMFYXMRK XS WIPJMRXIVIWXIH ERH SJXIR WI\MWX HMWGSYVWIW SJ TS[IV
/I][SVHW GIPIFVMX] MRXIVRIX GYPXYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI ZEPYIW QSVEPMX]
-RXVSHYGXMSR GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI ZEPYIW ERH TYFPMG GSRGIVR
8LI TSXIRXMEP SJ TSTYPEV GYPXYVI XS IRGSYVEKI TYFPMGGSRGIVRIH TEVXMGMTEXMSR WIIQW XS FI
TPI 1G+YMKER  .IROMRW  'SYPHV] ERH 1EVOLEQ  .SLERWWSR  +SVMR
ERH (YFMIH  +VELEQ ERH ,EVNY  %LZE IX EP  3R XLI SRI LERH TVIZM
SYW IQTMVMGEP WXYHMIW MRHMGEXI XLEX GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI HSIW RSX GVIEXI E HMVIGX GSRRIGXMSR XS E
FVSEHIV TYFPMG GSRGIVR RIMXLIV GIPIFVMX] RI[W +SVMR ERH (YFMIH  RSV XLI [E] KSWWMT
VIEHIVW QEOI QIERMRKW SJ GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI I\TPMGMXP] GSRXVMFYXIW XS TSPMXMGEP TEVXMGMTEXMSR
'SYPHV] ERH 1EVOLEQ  %LZE IX EP  ,S[IZIV MX WLSYPH FI RSXIH XLEX IZIR
XLSYKL LIEZ] MRXIVIWX MR GIPIFVMXMIWv PMZIW [SYPH RSX GSVVIPEXI [MXL ER MRXIVIWX MR XVEHMXMSREP
)QEMP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 1 )VSRIR
TSPMXMGW MX QE] IRGSYVEKI EGXMZI GMXM^IRWLMT [MXL E HIITIV GYPXYVEP GSRGIVR 1G+YMKER
 T  %GGSVHMRK XS .MQ 1G+YMKER  T  XLI HMWGYVWMZI WMXI JSV WYGL
GYPXYVEPP] GSRGIVRIH HMWGYWWMSR MW XLI GYPXYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI QIERMRK uXLI EVXMGYPEXMSR SJ
TSPMXMGW TYFPMG ERH TIVWSREP EW E GSRXIWXIH XIVVEMR XLVSYKL EJJIGXMZI EIWXLIXMG ERH IQS
XMSREP QSHIW SJ GSQQYRMGEXMSRv 'IPIFVMX] GER FI WIIR EW E TVSXSX]TI SJ E TLIRSQIRSR MR
XLI GYPXYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI MX MW E GYPXYVEP JSVQEXMSR [MXL E WSGMEP JYRGXMSR MR XLI IZIV]HE]
PMZIW ERH I\TIVMIRGIW SJ ]SYRK TISTPI MR TEVXMGYPEV 8YVRIV F T  -R SXLIV [SVHW
E GIPIFVMX] MW RSX SRP] E [IPPORS[R MRHMZMHYEP FYX ER I\IQTPEV SJ GYPXYVEP QIERMRKW ERH
ZEPYIW MR XLI GSRXIQTSVEV] QIHMEXIH [SVPH 3RI SJ XLI WSGMEP JYRGXMSRW SJ GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI
PMIW MR MXW TSXIRXMEP XS TVSZSOI HMWGYWWMSR SJ ZEPYIW ERH QSVEPMX] VIMRJSVGMRK ERH YTHEXMRK
XLI WLEVIH RSVQEXMZI WXERHEVHW SJ GSQQYRMX] ,IVQIW  T  6SNIO  T 
8YVRIV  TT z .SLERWWSR  T 
:EPYIW FSXL QSVEP ERH WIPJMRXIVIWXIH GER FI YRHIVWXSSH EW KSEPW WIVZMRK EW KYMH
MRK TVMRGMTPIW MR XLI PMJI SJ E TIVWSR SV E KVSYT 7GL[EVX^  ERH XLI] EVI SJXIR QSVI
7E]IV  TT z 1SVISZIV ZEPYIW TPE] E VSPI MR GSQQYRMX]FYMPHMRK [I XIRH
SRI IPWI WYTTSVXWv 7E]IV  T  'SRWIUYIRXP] ZEPYIW GER FI WIIR EW MRHMGEXSVW SJ
XLI REXYVI SJ TEVXMGMTEXMSR SR KSWWMT WMXIW ERH XLI] IQFSH] JYRGXMSRW SJ XLI GYPXYVEP TYF
7LEPSQ 7GL[EVX^vW  GEXIKSV] SJ  ZEPYIW REQIP] ZEPYIW XLEX EVI YWYEPP] GSRWMHIVIH
QSVEP YRMZIVWEPMWQ FIRIZSPIRGI XVEHMXMSR GSRJSVQMX] WIGYVMX] ZEPYIW SJ WIPJMRXIVIWX MR
GSQTIXMXMSR [MXL SXLIVW TS[IV EGLMIZIQIRX ERH [MXLSYX VIPEXMSR XS SXLIV TISTPI WIPJ
HMVIGXMSR WXMQYPEXMSR LIHSRMWQ WII 7GL[EVX^  TT z *YVXLIV XLIWI ZEPYIW
VIWSREXI [MXL 6MGLEVH 0ERLEQvW  TT z QSXMZI WTIGXVYQ GSRWMWXMRK SJ TYV
TSWI E WIVMSYW TVEGXMGEP QSXMZI SJ VIEWSR GJ 7GL[EVX^vW GEXIKSV] SJ QSVEP ZEPYIW KEQI
XLI GSQTIXMXMZI WMHI SJ LYQER REXYVI GJ 7GL[EVX^vW GEXIKSV] SJ WIPJMRXIVIWX MR GSQTI
XMXMSR [MXL SXLIVW ERH TPE] QIVI TPIEWYVI ERH IRXIVXEMRQIRX GJ 7GL[EVX^vW GEXIKSV] SJ
WIPJMRXIVIWX [MXLSYX VIKEVH XS SXLIVW
7MRGI QSVEP ZEPYIW QE] GSRXVMFYXI XS TSWMXMZI WSGMEP VIPEXMSRW ERH MRZSPZI E QSXMZI XS
MQTVSZI XLI [IPPFIMRK SJ SXLIVW 7GL[EVX^  TT z  XLI] GER FI WIIR
EW VIPEXIH XS XLI TYFPMG MRXIVIWX YRHIVWXSSH EW XLI GSQQSR KSSH 3R XLI GSRXVEV] KEQI
ERH TPE] EVI WIPJQSXMZEXMRK ERH XLI] IQIVKI WTSRXERISYWP] MR LYQER FILEZMSYV 0ERLEQ

HE] WSGMEP PMJI LS[IZIV HMJJIVIRX OMRHW SJ ZEPYIW SZIVPET [MXL SRI ERSXLIV VEXLIV XLER
IQIVKI MR ZEGYYQW *SV MRWXERGI QSVEP ZEPYIW XIRH XS SZIVPET [MXL GSQTIXMXMZI WIPJ
MRXIVIWX XLIVI MW EP[E]W XLI TSWWMFMPMX] XLEX QSVEPMX] MW EJJIGXIH F] GPEWW ERH TS[IV WII
;EP^IV  TT z 1SVISZIV TPE] XIRHW XS SZIVPET [MXL GSQTIXMXMZI WIPJMRXIVIWX
[LMGL MW X]TMGEP SJ ;IWXIVR GETMXEPMWXMG GYPXYVI MRZSPZMRK XLI MHIE SJ LEZMRK JYR [LIR GSQ
TIXMRK [MXL SXLIVW WII 0ERLEQ  TT z 8LI SZIVPET SJ KEQI ERH TPE] MR
TEVXMGYPEV GER FI WIIR EW X]TMGEP SJ GSRXIQTSVEV] GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI [LMGL KIXW MXW JYIP
JVSQ uJEQI KEQIWv WII JSV I\EQTPI 8YVRIV IX EP  LEZMRK XLIMV ERGMIRX VSSXW MR XLI
 T  8LMW HIWMVI XS TSWM
XMSR XLI WIPJ EFSZI SXLIVW XLVSYKL XLI QIERW SJ IRXIVXEMRQIRX HSIW RSX SRP] GLEVEGXIVMWI
GIPIFVMXMIWv WIPJTVSQSXMSR FYX EPWS KSWWMT VIEHIVWv TEVXMGMTEXMSR MR [LMGL RI[W EFSYX
GIPIFVMXMIW MR XLIMV QMWIVMIW SJXIR TVSZSOIW 7GLEHIRJVIYHI XEOMRK TPIEWYVI MR GIPIFVMXMIWv
QMWJSVXYRIW WII 'VSWW ERH 0MXXPIV  TT z 7GLEHIRJVIYHI GER FI WIIR XS FI
PMROIH [MXL GEQT VIEHMRKW SJ GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT MR [LMGL XLI VIEHIVW SJ KSWWMT HMWMHIRXMJ]
[MXL E GIPIFVMX] XLVSYKL QIERMRKW SJ TPE]JYP RSRWIVMSYWRIWW WII ,IVQIW  TT 
 1I]IVW  TT    %PXLSYKL WYGL GSRWYQIVMWQ GER FI WIIR EW HIQSGVEXMG
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'IPIFVMX] 7XYHMIW 
JVSQ XLI TSMRX SJ ZMI[ SJ [LEX 1G+YMKER  TT z GEPPW YRGVMXMGEP TSTYPMWQ
7GLEHIRJVIYHI MW E VIEPMWEXMSR SJ E GYPXYVEPP] ERH IGSRSQMGEPP] GPSWIH W]WXIQ XLEX uGERRSX
TSWMXMSR MXWIPJ MR VIPEXMSR XS [MHIV WSGMEP JSVQEXMSRW SV GYPXYVEP IGSPSKMIWv EW 'VSWW ERH
0MXXPIV  T  RSXI GVMXMGEPP] -R SXLIV [SVHW 7GLEHIRJVIYHI GER FI WIIR EW E WMKR
SJ GIPIFVMX] MRHYWXV] XLEX WXMQYPEXIW KSWWMT VIEHIVWv MRXIVIWX MR NYHKMRK GIPIFVMX] [MXLSYX
KMZMRK XLI VIEHIVW ER]XLMRK FI]SRH XLI XSTMG SJ GIPIFVMX]
8SHE] XLI MRXIVRIX LEW ER MQTSVXERX VSPI MR XLI GMVGYPEXMSR ERH TVSHYGXMSR SJ GIPIFVMX]
GYPXYVI WII JSV I\EQTPI 1EVWLEPP  8YVRIV E ERH SRPMRI JSVYQW ERH HMW
GYWWMSR FSEVHW WIVZI EW TSTYPEV IRZMVSRQIRXW IREFPMRK KPSFEP HMWGYWWMSR SJ GIPIFVMX]
,S[IZIV [LEX MW WXMPP PEGOMRK MR GIPIFVMX] WXYHMIW MW E LSPMWXMG EREP]WMW SJ XLI ZEPYIW XLEX
EVI GSRWXVYGXIH F] PSGEP ERH QSVI KPSFEP GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT VIEHIVW SRPMRI ERH E GSQTEVMWSR
FIX[IIR XLIWI X[S KVSYTW SJ TEVXMGMTERXW MR XLIMV TSXIRXMEP XS GSRXVMFYXI XS TYFPMGWTMVMXIH
HMWGYWWMSR SRPMRI 8LI EMQ SJ XLMW WXYH] MW XS I\TPSVI XLI ZEPYIW XLEX GLEVEGXIVMWI TEVXMG
MTEXMSR MR XLI GYPXYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI SJ PSGEP *MRRMWL ERH TSXIRXMEPP] QSVI KPSFEP SV
QYPXMREXMSREP )RKPMWLPERKYEKI GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT WMXIW - EQ TEVXMGYPEVP] MRXIVIWXIH MR XLI
[E]W XLEX ZEPYIW MRZSPZI QSVEP GSRGIVR JSV XLI [IPPFIMRK SJ SXLIV TISTPI SV WIVZI KSEPW
SJ WIPJMRXIVIWX ERH [LIXLIV XLIVI EVI HMJJIVIRGIW MR XLI WLEVMRK ERH RIKSXMEXMSR SJ ZEPYIW
MR *MRRMWL ERH )RKPMWLPERKYEKI SRPMRI IRZMVSRQIRXW 8LI GSQQIRXW GLSWIR JSV XLI WXYH]
[IVI GSPPIGXIH JVSQ SRPMRI HMWGYWWMSRW EFSYX GIPIFVMX] ZMSPIRGI FIGEYWI EW E XLIQI SJ TST
YPEV GYPXYVI ZMSPIRGI ERH TEVXMGYPEVP] HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI %LZE IX EP  TT z MW
PMOIP] XS FVMRK XS XLI WYVJEGI WIVMSYW WSGMEP MWWYIW WYGL EW HSQMREXMSR SJ GPEWW ERH KIRHIV
SGGYVVMRK MR E WSGMIX] ERH GYPXYVI EX PEVKI WII *MWOI  TT z -R EHHMXMSR XS
]WIH MR XLMW WXYH] WMRGI MX MW MRXIVIWXMRK XS WII [LIXLIV ERH LS[ XLI QIERMRKW SJ WI\MWX
SFZMSYW QIRZW[SQIR NY\XETSWMXMSR
1EXIVMEP ERH QIXLSH
8LI JSGYW SJ XLMW WXYH] PMIW MR EW]RGLVSRSYW GSQQIRX WIGXMSRW 8LI VIWIEVGL QEXIVMEP
SJ XLI WXYH] GSRWMWXW SJ  )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH  *MRRMWL GSQQIRXW SR ZMSPIRGI
MRZSPZMRK GIPIFVMXMIW ,EPJ SJ XLI GSQQIRXW  )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH  *MRRMWL TSWXW
HIEP [MXL HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI 8LI )RKPMWLPERKYEKI GSQQIRXW GSRGIVR XLI GEWI SJ KPSF
EPP] ORS[R TST WMRKIVW 6MLERRE ERH 'LVMW &VS[R [LMPI XLI *MRRMWL GSQQIRXW HIEP [MXL
ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK E *MRRMWL JSVQIV WOM NYQTIV 1EXXM 2]OÈRIR ERH LMW JSVQIV [MJI 1IVZM
8ETSPE -R XLI *MRRMWL XEFPSMH TVIWW ERH SR GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT WMXIW XLMW QMHHPIEKIH GSY
TPI [IVI WIIR EW E WSVX SJ GYPXYVEP I\IQTPEV SJ uJEPPIRv ERH XVEKMG GIPIFVMXMIW [LS LEH
MRZSPZMRK JIQEPI GIPIFVMXMIW 8LI )RKPMWLPERKYEKI GSQQIRXW SR JIQEPI ZMSPIRGI GSR
GIVR XLI &VMXMWL%QIVMGER QIHME TIVWSREPMX] 7LEVSR 3WFSYVRI [LS EXXEGOIH ER %QIVMGER
4PE]FS] QSHIP ERH VIEPMX]8: GSRXIWXERX 1IKER ,EYWIVQER F] TSYVMRK E HVMRO SR LIV ERH
TYPPMRK LIV LEMV MR XLI 'LEVQ 7GLSSP VIEPMX] WLS[ EJXIV ,EYWIVQER WEMH XLEX 3WFSYVRI [EW
SRP] JEQSYW XLVSYKL LIV LYWFERH 8LI *MRRMWL ZIVWMSR SJ JIQEPI GIPIFVMXMIWv ZMSPIRGI GSR
1EVXMRE %MXSPILXM ERH %RRI1EVM &IVK 8LI XVMEP EPWS MRZSPZIH 1EVXMRE %MXSPILXMvW LYW
FERH [LS XSKIXLIV [MXL LMW [MJI [EW EGGYWIH SJ LEVEWWMRK %RRI1EVM &IVK 8LIWI JSYV
GEWIW [IVI GLSWIR JSV XLI WXYH] FIGEYWI XLI GIPIFVMXMIW MRZSPZIH MR XLIQ EVI [IPP ORS[R
IMXLIV PSGEPP] SV KPSFEPP] [LMGL MW [L] KSWWMT VIPEXMRK XS XLIWI GIPIFVMXMIW TVSZSOIH E PSX SJ
MRXIRWMZI GSQQIRX SR XLI MRXIVRIX
(
S
[
R
PS
E
H
I
H
F
]
?
1
E
VM
E
)
VS
R
I
R
A
E
X






1
E
]





 Acta Wasaensia        129 
 1 )VSRIR
8EFPI  6IWIEVGL QEXIVMEP
8LI GEWIW SJ GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT %W]RGLVSRSYW HMWGYWWMSR GSQQIRXW
4ST WMRKIVW 6MLERRE 
 'LVMW &VS[R
HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI
.YWX .EVIH ER )RKPMWLPERKYEKI [IFWMXI HIHMGEXIH XS
GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT 
97%83(%=GSQ E 97 SRPMRI RI[WTETIV 
=SY8YFI E KPSFEP YWIVKIRIVEXIH [IFWMXI JSV ZMHIS
WLEVMRK ERH GSQQIRXMRK 
% *MRRMWL I\WOM NYQTIV 1EXXM
2]OERIR 
 LMW I\ [MJI 1IVZM
8ETSPE HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI
,7´ E *MRRMWL SRPMRI RI[WTETIV 
/EOWTPYW´ E [IFWMXI SJ E *MRRMWL uFEF] QEKE^MRIv
MRGPYHMRK E PSX SJ KSWWMT 
7YSQM E KIRIVEP *MRRMWL HMWGYWWMSR JSVYQ [MXL E
LIEZ] MRXIVIWX MR GIPIFVMX] ERH KSWWMT 
)RXIVXEMRQIRX GIPIFVMXMIW 7LEVSR
3WFSYVRI 
 1IKER ,EYWIVQER
8LI ,YJ´RKXSR 4SWX E 97 SRPMRI RI[WTETIV 
0MZI .SYVREP 3L 2S 8LI] (MHR¬X ER )RKPMWLPERKYEKI
SRPMRI GSQQYRMX] HIHMGEXIH XS GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT 
=SY8YFI 
*MRRMWL IRXIVXEMRQIRX GIPIFVMXMIW
1EVXMRE %MXSPILXM 
 %RRI1EVM
1XZ´ E [IFWMXI SJ E *MRRMWL XIPIZMWMSR GLERRIP 
7IMWOE´ E [IFWMXI SJ E *MRRMWL KSWWMT QEKE^MRI 
7YSQM 
8LI VIWIEVGL QEXIVMEP WXIQW JVSQ FSXL REXMSREPP] ERH KPSFEPP] TSTYPEV SRPMRI IRZMVSR
QIRXW WYGL EW .YWX .EVIH ERH =SY8YFI ERH ZEVMSYW SRPMRI RI[WTETIV WMXIW WII 8EFPI  MR
[LMGL XLI HMWGYWWMSR MW JSGYWIH SR GIPIFVMX] 8LI QEXIVMEP [EW GSPPIGXIH FIX[IIR .ERYEV]
ERH 3GXSFIV  -R KIRIVEP MJ XLI QSWX GSQQIRXIHSR HMWGYWWMSR XLVIEH MRGPYHIH
 GSQQIRXW SV QSVI SRP] SRI XLVIEH [EW GLSWIR JSV XLI WXYH] 1SVISZIV MR SVHIV XS WII
XLI [MHI WTIGXVYQ SJ ZEPYIW - GSPPIGXIH  GSQQIRXW EX XLI FIKMRRMRK ERH  GSQQIRXW
MR XLI QMHHPI SV EX XLI IRH SJ E XLVIEH %W 1I]IVW  T  TSMRXW SYX WSQIXMQIW
SRIW QE] XV] XS EXXVEGX EXXIRXMSR F] GSQQIRXMRK SR GIPIFVMXMIW MR QSVI EKKVIWWMZI [E]W
%PP GSQQIRX WIGXMSRW EREP]WIH MR XLI WXYH] EVI EZEMPEFPI XS ZMI[ SRPMRI JSV EPP [MXLSYX
PSKKMRK MR
1IXLSHMGEPP] XLMW WXYH] MW FEWIH SR XLI EREP]WMW SJ IZEPYEXMZI PERKYEKI 7MQTP] TYX
u- LEXI ZMSPIRGIv u- PSZI 6MLERREv NYHKIQIRX u,I HMH [VSRK [LIR LI LMX LIVv ERH
ETTVIGMEXMSR u7LI MW E FIEYX] UYIIRv WII 1EVXMR ERH ;LMXI  -R XLMW WXYH] ZEPYIW MR
XLI TSWXMRKW XS XLI GSQQIRX WIGXMSRW EVI WIIR XS FI GSRWXVYGXIH MR ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW XLEX MW
WSGMEPP] WLEVIH TIVGITXMSRW SJ [LEX MW HIWMVEFPI ERH KSSH 7MRGI IZEPYEXMSR GSQIW MRXS PMJI
XLVSYKL GSQTEVMWSR 8LSQTWSR ERH ,YRWXSR  TT   ZEPYIW GER FI EPWS WIIR EW
XLI STTSWMXIW SJ [LEX MW IZEPYEXIH RIKEXMZIP] -R XLI EREP]WMW SJ IZEPYEXMZI PERKYEKI ZEPYI
HMWGSYVWIW MR XLI GSQQIRXW TSWXIH XS GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT WMXIW [IVI EREP]WIH EW MRHMGEXSVW
SJ KSEPW WYGL EW XLI ZEPYI HMWGSYVWI SJ ETTIEVERGI [LIR IZEPYEXMRK 6MLERRE EW E FIEYX]
UYIIR SV TL]WMGEP MRXIKVMX] MR XLI GEWI SJ LEXMRK ZMSPIRGI +SEPW GER FI QSVEP [LIR
WLS[MRK GSRGIVR JSV XLI [IPPFIMRK SJ SXLIV TISTPI SV WIPJMRXIVIWXIH [LIR IZEPYEXMRK
XLMRKW SV TISTPI EW uXLMRKWv JSV XLI TPE] SJ TPIEWYVI SV XLI KEQI SJ TS[IV -R XLMW WXYH]
[IVI WIIR EW GSRXVMFYXMRK XS XLI  ZEPYIW WYKKIWXIH F] 7GL[EVX^  JSV MRWXERGI E
GSQQIRX XLEX MRZSPZIW XLI ZEPYI HMWGSYVWI SJ ETTIEVERGI IQFSHMIW EGLMIZIQIRX ERH WSQI
WSVX SJ LIHSRMWQ [LMPI E GSQQIRX EFSYX TL]WMGEP MRXIKVMX] VIPEXIW XS YRMZIVWEPMWQ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'IPIFVMX] 7XYHMIW 
,S[IZIV SJXIR IZEPYEXMZI PERKYEKI QE] PEGO I\TPMGMXP] IZEPYEXMZI [SVHW [LMGL QIERW
XLEX IZEPYEXMSR GERRSX FI YRHIVWXSSH [MXLSYX E GEVIJYP GSRXI\XYEP EREP]WMW 1EVXMR ERH
;LMXI  TT z 8LI TSXIRXMEP SJ PERKYEKI XS GEVV] MQTPMGMX QIERMRKW VIPEXIW XS
XLI RSXMSR XLEX IZEPYEXMZI PERKYEKI LEW E VLIXSVMGEP JYRGXMSR FI]SRH E PMXIVEP YRHIVWXERH
ERH ,YRWXSR  TT    1SVISZIV ZEPYIW IWTIGMEPP] XLSWI GSRWXVYGXIH MR NYHKI
QIRX ERH ETTVIGMEXMSR QE] MRZSPZI HMWGSYVWIW SJ TS[IV XLVSYKL uMRWXMXYXMSREPMWIH JIIPMRKWv
1EVXMR ERH ;LMXI  T  XLEX XEOI YW SYX SJ XLI HSQEMR SJ TIVWSREP HIWMVIW NS]W
ERH KVMIZERGIW XS XLEX SJ WLEVIH GSQQYRMX] ZEPYIW -R XLI PMRKYMWXMG ETTVEMWEP JVEQI[SVO
NYHKIQIRX MW WIIR EW E [VMXXIR SV WTSOIR VIEPMWEXMSR SJ MRWXMXYXMSREPMWIH JIIPMRKW GSRGIVR
MRK VYPIW ERH VIKYPEXMSRW SJ QSVEPMX] [LMPI [SVHW SV YXXIVERGIW SJ ETTVIGMEXMSR EVI FEWIH
SR MRWXMXYXMSREPMWIH JIIPMRKW SJ EIWXLIXMGW MR [LMGL XLMRKW ERH TLIRSQIRE EVI IZEPYEXIH
1EVXMR ERH ;LMXI 
0ERLEQvW  TT z QSXMZI WTIGXVYQ .YHKIQIRX EW E PMRKYMWXMG VIEPMWEXMSR SJ
VYPIW ERH VIKYPEXMSRW SJ QSVEPMX] VIWSREXIW [MXL XLI MHIE SJ E GSQQYREPP] WLEVIH QSVEP
TYVTSWI [LIVIEW ETTVIGMEXMSR EW XLI IZEPYEXMSR SJ XLMRKW WYGL EW E TMGXYVI SJ E GIPIFVMX]
GER FI WIIR EW E WMKR SJ TPE] MR [LMGL TEVXMGMTEXMSR MW QSXMZEXIH F] XLI TPIEWYVI SJ XLMRKW
&IGEYWI IZEPYEXMZI PERKYEKI GEVVMIW E GSRXI\XYEP QIERMRK XLMW WXYH] LSPHW XLEX SRI SRPMRI
GSQQIRX GER FI EQFMKYSYW ERH GSRXEMR WIZIVEP WIPJMRXIVIWXIH ERH QSVEP ZEPYIW ERH ZEPYI
HMWGSYVWIW
(MKMXEP QIHME GIPIFVMX] ERH XLI ERXMHIQSGVEXMG TSXIRXMEP
;LEX LETTIRW XS GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI [LIR MX MW TVSHYGIH ERH GMVGYPEXIH SRPMRI# 3R XLI
SRI LERH XLIVI EVI TVIZMSYW WXYHMIW EVKYMRK XLEX HMKMXEP QIHME QE] LMKLPMKLX XLI HIQS
GVEXMG TSXIRXMEP SJ TSTYPEV GYPXYVI *SV MRWXERGI XLI GYPXYVEP ERH QIHME EREP]WX ,IRV]
.IROMRW  TT z WYKKIWXW XLEX GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT HMWGYWWIH SR XLI MRXIVRIX LIPTW
TISTPI JVSQ ZEVMSYW GYPXYVEP FEGOKVSYRHW XS WLEVI ZEPYIW ERH PIEVR RI[ [SVPHZMI[W
1SVISZIV EGGSVHMRK XS .IROMRW  TT z TSTYPEV GYPXYVI TEVXMGYPEVP] MR XLI
RI[ QIHME QE] EGXMZEXI SVHMREV] TISTPI ERH TVSZMHI IQERGMTEXMRK EPXIVREXMZIW XS TSPMXM
GEP GSRXIWXW *YVXLIVQSVI TVIZMSYW IQTMVMGEP VIWIEVGL MRXS GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT WMXIW .IVWPIZ
 GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT FPSKW 1I]IVW  ERH VIEPMX]8: JSVYQW +VELEQ ERH ,EVNY
 WYKKIWXW XLEX GIPIFVMX] TVSZSOIW QSVEP HMWGYWWMSR SRPMRI ERH QE] EPWS GLEPPIRKI
XVEHMXMSREP MHISPSKMGEP WYGL EW WI\MWX SV VEGMWX ZEPYIW ERH QIERMRKW WII 1I]IVW 
TT z   z -R EHHMXMSR 8SHH +VELEQ ERH %YPM ,EVNY 
TT z WYKKIWX MR XLIMV IQTMVMGEP WXYH] SJ SRPMRI HMWGYWWMSRW SJ &MK &VSXLIV ERH ;MJI
7[ET XLEX GIPIFVMXMIW TVSZSOI TYFPMGGSRGIVRIH GSQQIRXW ERH IRGSYVEKI SRPMRI TEVXMGM
TERXW XS XEPO EFSYX MWWYIW VIPEXMRK XS XLI GSQQSR KSSH WYGL EW TEVIRXMRK ERH XLI [IPJEVI
SJ JEQMPMIW
3R XLI SXLIV LERH XLI VIWYPXW SJ XLI TVIZMSYW WXYHMIW MRHMGEXI XLEX GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI
MR XLI GSRXI\X SJ RI[ QIHME QE] IZIR VIMRJSVGI XLI ERXMHIQSGVEXMG ERH WIPJMRXIVIWXIH
REXYVI SJ TEVXMGMTEXMSR -R GSRXIQTSVEV] WSGMIXMIW JEQI MW RS PSRKIV E TVSTIVX] SJ QEWW
QIHME GIPIFVMXMIW SRP] ;IF  LEW QEHI MX TSWWMFPI JSV EPP MRHMZMHYEPW MRGPYHMRK XLI
VIEHIVW SJ GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT XS WXVMZI JSV E TPEGI EX XLI GIRXVI SJ QIHMEXIH EXXIRXMSR F]
TVIWIRXMRK ERH TVSQSXMRK XLI MRHMZMHYEP WIPJ 1EVWLEPP  WII EPWS 1EV[MGO 
1SVISZIV GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT WMXIW EPWS MRZSPZI HMWGSYVWIW SJ WSGMEP HSQMREXMSR ERH GSQ
TIXMXMSR FIX[IIR WSGMEP KVSYTW WYGL EW XLSWI SJ GPEWW ERH VEGI ERH IWTIGMEPP] KIRHIV WII
*EMVGPSYKL  1I]IVW  %W /MVWX] *EMVGPSYKL  T  EVKYIW GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT
FPSKW [MXL LIEZ] MRXIVIWX MR JIQEPI FSH] MQEKIW ERH XLI I\TVIWWMSR SJ MVSR] EVSYRH
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uJEPPIRv GIPIFVMXMIW MRZSPZI E WIIQMRKP] HIQSGVEXMG HMWGSYVWI IZSOMRK uE TSWXJIQMRMWX XVMGO
IV]v XLEX IRGSYVEKIW L]TIVWI\YEPMWEXMSR ERH I\TPSMXEXMSR uMR XLI REQI SJ IQTS[IVQIRXv
'LEVEGXIVMWXMG SJ WYGL HMWGSYVWI MW XLEX IZEPYEXMZI GSQQIRXW SR JIQEPI GIPIFVMXMIWv ETTIEV
ERGI EVI SJXIR QEHI F] [SQIR XLIQWIPZIW ERH EHHVIWWIH XS JIQEPI VIEHIVW *EMVGPSYKL
 TT z z %PWS )VMR %RR 1I]IVW  T  EVKYIW XLEX XLI LYQSVSYW
WX]PI SJ GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT FPSKW QE] VIMRJSVGI HSQMRERX MHISPSKMIW -R SXLIV [SVHW FSXL
*EMVGPSYKLvW  ERH 1I]IVWv  [SVO LMKLPMKLXW LS[ KEQI MR SRPMRI HMWGSYVWI SJ
GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI QE] GSQI MRXS PMJI EW IRXIVXEMRMRK TPE] WII 0ERLEQ  TT z
%W TVIZMSYW WXYHMIW WYKKIWX GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI SRPMRI MRZSPZIW TSXIRXMEP JSV FSXL TYFPMG
GSRGIVR JSV QSVEPMX] TYVTSWI ERH HMWGSYVWIW SJ WIPJMRXIVIWX KEQI ERH TPE] [LMGL KMZIW
ER MRXIVIWXMRK WXEVXMRK TSMRX XS XLI LSPMWXMG EREP]WMW SJ ZEPYIW MR XLI GYPXYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI
SJ GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT WMXIW
6IWYPXW ZEPYIW MR MRXIVRIX HMWGYWWMSRW SJ GIPIFVMX] ZMSPIRGI
-R [LEX JSPPS[W ZEPYIW JSYRH MR FSXL )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH *MRRMWL GSQQIRX WIGXMSRW
SJ GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT WMXIW EVI EREP]WIH MR HIXEMP &IGEYWI SJ XLI PMQMXIH WTEGI EPP ZEPYI HMW
GSYVWIW MRZSPZIH MR XLI  QEMR ZEPYI GEXIKSVMIW EVI I\TPEMRIH MR XLI %TTIRHM\ EX XLI IRH SJ
 ZEPYIW MW MR PMRI [MXL 7GL[EVX^vW  SVMKMREP GEXIKSVMWEXMSR FYX LIVI uWSGMEP HSQMRE
XMSRv VIJIVW XS ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW MR [LMGL E KVSYT SJ TISTPI WYGL EW E KVSYT GEXIKSVMWIH F]
VEGI KIRHIV SV GPEWW MW HSQMREXIH [LMPI uEGLMIZIQIRXv GSRGIVRW GSQTIXMXMSR SR E QSVI
MRHMZMHYEP PIZIP
8LI I\EQTPIW HIQSRWXVEXI LS[ WSQI SJ XLI QSWX X]TMGEP ZEPYIW JSYRH MR XLI VIWIEVGL
QEXIVMEP EVI WLEVIH MR ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW 8LI ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW HMWGYWWIH MR HIXEMP LEZI
FIIR QEVOIH EX XLI IRH SJ IEGL I\EQTPI 2SXI XLEX XLI I\EQTPIW QE] EPWS GSRXEMR ZEPYI
HMWGSYVWIW XLEX GSYPH RSX FI HMWGYWWIH MR HIXEMP FIGEYWI SJ XLI PMQMXIH WTEGI SJ XLI EVXM
GPI &IGEYWI SJ GST]VMKLX WII JSV I\EQTPI &VYGOQERR  SVMKMREP TWIYHSR]QW SV
YWIVREQIW ERH XLI REQIW SJ XLI [IFWMXIW GER FI WIIR EW VIJIVIRGIW 7MRGI SRI GSQQIRX
MRGPYHIH E TIVWSREP WXSV] SJ HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI - HIGMHIH XLEX MX [SYPH FI MRETTVSTVMEXI XS
VIZIEP XLI YWIVREQI JSV IXLMGEP VIEWSRW
:EPYIW MR SRPMRI HMWGYWWMSRW SJ HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK GIPIFVMXMIW
;LIR GSQQIRXMRK SR HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK XLI %QIVMGER TST WMRKIVW 6MLERRE
ERH 'LVMW &VS[R ERH *MRRMWL JSVQIV WOM NYQTIV 1EXXM 2]OÈRIR ERH LMW I\[MJI 1IVZM
8ETSPE EGLMIZIQIRX ERH WIGYVMX] [IVI XLI QSWX TVSQMRIRX ZEPYIW XLEX QEXXIVIH XS SRPMRI
TEVXMGMTERXW EW *MKYVI  WLS[W % XSXEP SJ 	 SJ GSQQIRXW SR )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH
	 SR *MRRMWL GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT WMXIW MRHMGEXIH EGLMIZIQIRX EW XLIMV KSEP [LMPI ZEPYEXMSR
SJ WIGYVMX] [EW MRZSPZIH MR 	 SJ GSQQIRXW SJ XLI )RKPMWLPERKYEKI QEXIVMEP ERH MR
	 SJ XLI *MRRMWL GSQQIRXW SR HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI 8LI LMKL VEXIW SJ XLI WIGYVMX] ZEPYI
GER FI I\TPEMRIH F] XLI JSGYW SR VIPEXMSRWLMT LEVQSR] XLEX XLIWI GIPIFVMX] GSYTPIW [IVI
WIIR XS LEZI FVSOIR 7SGMEP HSQMREXMSR MW LMKLIV [LIR GSQQIRXMRK SR HSQIWXMGZMSPIRGI
KSWWMT MR *MRRMWL 	 XLER MR )RKPMWL 	 -R EHHMXMSR XS WI\MWX TS[IV SRPMRI
HMWGYWWMSR EFSYX HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK XLI *MRRMWL GIPIFVMX] GSYTPI FVSYKLX XS XLI
WYVJEGI HSQMREXMSR SJ GPEWW F] QSGOMRK EPGSLSPMGW ERH GEPPMRK XLIQ HVYROEVHW [LMGL
MRHMGEXIW E HIWMVI XS PSSO HS[R SR E KVSYT MWSPEXIH JVSQ XLI VIWX SJ E WSGMIX] ERH MXW EGXMZI
PEFSYV JSVGI
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'IPIFVMX] 7XYHMIW 
*MKYVI  :EPYIW VIPEXMRK XS HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK GIPIFVMXMIW
-R XLMW WXYH] XLI  QEMR GEXIKSVMIW SJ ZEPYIW WYKKIWXIH F] 7GL[EVX^   [IVI
WIIR XS FI JSVQIH F] WIZIVEP ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW JSYRH MR XLMW EREP]WMW [LMGL GER FI WIIR MR
*MKYVI  :EPYI HMWGSYVWIW LEZI FIIR KMZIR RYQFIV GSHIW MR EGGSVHERGI [MXL XLI X]TI SJ
QSVEP SV WIPJMRXIVIWXIH ZEPYI XLI] MRZSPZI :EPYIW XLEX LEZI XLI RYQFIV GSHIW z [IVI GEX
IKSVMWIH EW uQSVEPv TYVTSWI [LIVIEW XLI RYQFIVW z VIJIV XS GSQTIXMXMZI WIPJMRXIVIWX
KEQI ERH ZEPYIW z MRZSPZI WIPJMRXIVIWX VIPEXIH XS TPIEWYVIW TPE] 8LI QSVEP ZEP
YIW z EVI WMXYEXIH SR XLI PIJXLERH WMHI SJ *MKYVI  [LMPI XLI ZEPYIW SJ WIPJMRXIVIWX
z GER FI JSYRH SR XLI VMKLX ;LIR GPEWWMJ]MRK ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW MR XLI uWIKQIRXWv
- YXMPMWIH 7GL[EVX^vW HIWGVMTXMSR SJ ZEPYIW *SV MRWXERGI ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW XLEX GSRXVMFYXI
XS XVEHMXMSR [IVI WIIR XS FI FEWIH SR E GSRWIVZEXMZI [SVPHZMI[ XLEX PIERW SR XLI GYWXSQW
SJ SRIvW S[R GYPXYVI WII 7GL[EVX^  T  *MKYVI  EPWS WLS[W XLI JVIUYIRGMIW SJ
IEGL ZEPYI HMWGSYVWI MR HSQIWXMGZMSPIRGI HMWGYWWMSRW % HIXEMPIH HIWGVMTXMSR SJ ZEPYIW
ERH ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW GER FI WIIR MR XLI %TTIRHM\
%W GER FI WIIR MR *MKYVI  IEGL SJ XLI  ZEPYIW MRGPYHIH WIZIVEP ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW
RYQFIVIH EW z -R SRPMRI HMWGYWWMSRW SJ GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT XLI QSVEP ZEPYI SJ
YRMZIVWEPMWQ RYQFIV  JSV MRWXERGI [EW GSRWXVYGXIH MR X[S ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW REQIP]
 TL]WMGEP MRXIKVMX] MR  )RKPMWLPERKYEKI SRPMRI GSQQIRXW ERH  *MRRMWL SRIW ERH
 WSGMEP NYWXMGI ERH IUYEPMX] MR  )RKPMWLPERKYEKI SRPMRI GSQQIRXW ERH  *MRRMWL
SRIW 8LI JYRGXMSR SJ XLIWI RYQFIV GSHIW MW XS WIVZI EW [LEX [I QE] GEPP REZMKEXMSR GSSV
HMREXIW JSV XLI VIEHIV 8LI WEQI RYQFIV GSHIW EVI YWIH MR XLI %TTIRHM\ MR [LMGL IEGL
ZEPYI HMWGSYVWI MW HIWGVMFIH -R [LEX JSPPS[W - [MPP WLS[ GSRGVIXI I\EQTPIW SJ X]TMGEP
ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW SR FSXL )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH *MRRMWL KSWWMT WMXIW HIEPMRK [MXL HSQIW
XMG ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK GIPIFVMXMIW - [MPP GSRGIRXVEXI SR XLI XLVII QSWX X]TMGEP QSVEP ERH
WIPJMRXIVIWXIH ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW
1SVEP ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW MR GSQQIRXW SR HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK GIPIFVMXMIW
7MRGI GSQQIRXW MRZSPZMRK QSVEP ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW [IVI VIPEXMZIP] PSRK )RKPMWLPERKYEKI
ERH *MRRMWL I\EQTPIW EVI HMWGYWWIH WITEVEXIP] MR [LEX JSPPS[W -R )RKPMWLPERKYEKI
HMWGYWWMSRW EFSYX HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI XLI QSWX TSTYPEV QSVEP ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW [IVI 
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 1 )VSRIR
*MKYVI  :EPYI HMWGSYVWIW MR SRPMRI HMWGYWWMSRW EFSYX HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK GIPIFVMXMIW
 WSGMEP SVHIV MR  GSQQIRXW   VIPEXMSRWLMT LEVQSR] MR  GSQQIRXW
ERH   SFIHMIRGI XS PE[W ERH VYPIW MR  GSQQIRXW WII *MKYVI  )ZEPYEXMSR MR
XLI HMWGSYVWI SJ WSGMEP SVHIV VIPEXMSRWLMT LEVQSR] ERH SFIHMIRGI GER FI VIKEVHIH EW
QIERMRKW SJ WSGMEP WERGXMSR WXVIWWMRK GMZMG HYX] WII 1EVXMR ERH ;LMXI  TT z
)\EQTPIW z WLS[ LS[ XLIWI XLVII ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW IQIVKIH [LIR HMWGYWWMRK HSQIWXMG
ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK GIPIFVMXMIW -R )\EQTPI  XLI JSGYW MW SR XLI PEXXIV GSQQIRX [LMGL
[SYPH RSX FI YRHIVWXERHEFPI [MXLSYX XLI TVIZMSYW SRI
 -R *PSVMHE SRGI ]SY KIX GSRZMGXIH SJ IZIR WMQTPI RSRMRNYVMSYW HSQIWXMG FEXXIV] ]SY PSWI
XLI VMKLX XS IZIV LEZI E KYR =SY KS XS ERKIVQEREKIQIRX GPEWWIW JSV EX PIEWX E ]IEV XLEX EVI
KS XS NEMP JSV E PSRK XMQI 8LI] KY] EP[E]W KIXW XLI VET IZIR [LIR XLI [SQER MW XLI EKKVIWWSV
IXG 8LMW ERMQEP WLSYPH FI PSGOIH YT MR E GEKI JSV [LEX LI HMH -J ]SY GLI[ SR WSQISRIvW EVQ
EX LMQ - NYWX FIX LI MW WSVV] 7SVV] JSV [LEX# ,MQWIPJ QSWX PMOIP] 7TEVI YW TPIEWI 4E] XLI
TVMGI ERH XEOI MX PMOI E QER MRWXIEH SJ PMOI E [LMQTIVMRK FEF] FIEGLFYQ 97%8SHE]GSQ
?WSGMEP SVHIV  VIPEXMSRWLMT LEVQSR]  SFIHMIRGIA
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'IPIFVMX] 7XYHMIW 
IPWI HMH XLEX XS E [SQER XLI] [SYPH FI MR NEMP WLI MW VIEPP] FEHP] FVYMWIH [LEXIZIV EPPIKIHP]
LETTIRIH FIX[IIR XLIQ MW FIWMHIW XLI TSMRX ]SY 2):)6 ):)6 LMX E [SQER M LSTI LI VSXW
MR NEMP GGEVW .YWX .EVIH ?WSGMEP SVHIV  VIPEXMSRWLMT LEVQSR]  SFIHMIRGIA
"" WS M XLIR WXEVXIH HVMZMRK XS[EVHW XLI TSPMGI WXEXMSR [LIR WLI [EW GEPPMRK XLI TSPMGI WLI
XSPH XLIQ M TYRGLIH LIV MR XLI PMT ERH XLEX LIV PMT [EW W[SPPIR [IPP [LIR [I KSX XS XLI WXEXMSR
M XSPH XLI GST IZIV]XLMRK ERH IRHIH [MXL uSL ]IEL WLI EPWS XSPH XLI HMWTEXGLIV M TYRGLIH LIV MR
XLI PMT ERH LIV PMT [EW W[SPPIRv XLI KMVP WEMH RSXLMRK ?GEYKLX MR LIV PMIA ERH XLI TSPMGI PSSOIH
ERH WE[ RS W[SPPIR PMT EX XLEX TSMRX M [EW VIPMIZIH SJ XLEX WXYTMH JYGOMRK FMXGL =SY8YFI
"" 8LEX [EW QIWWIH YT [LEX WLI HMH -vQ KPEH XLEX XLI TSPMGI WE[ XLVI[ LIV PMIW ERH QEHI E
KSSH GEPP ERH XSSO LIV MR -R RS [E] - [EW WE]MRK XLEX VMLERRE [EW I\GYWIH SV VMKLX MR [LEX WLI
HMH - NYWX [ERXIH XS WXEXI LS[ HEQEKMRK GLVMWvW GLSMGI ERH EGXMSRW [IVI GSQTEVIH XS VMLERREvW
XLEXvW EPP ;LEX LI HMH [EWRvX [SVXL [LEX LI LEW PSWX WO]FPYIHMEQSRH  =SY8YFI ?WSGMEP
SVHIV  VIPEXMSRWLMT LEVQSR]A
TEVXMGMTERXW GEPP JSV XLI EVVIWX SJ 'LVMW &VS[R MR )\EQTPI  u8LMW ERMQEP WLSYPH FI PSGOIH
YT MR E GEKI JSV [LEX LI HMHv ERH MR )\EQTPI  uMJ ER]SRI IPWI HMH XLEX XS E [SQER
XLI] [SYPH FI MR NEMPv ERH uM LSTI LI VSXW MR NEMPv -R )\EQTPI  XLI ZEPYI HMWGSYVWI SJ
WSGMEP SVHIV u-vQ KPEH XLEX XLI TSPMGI WE[ XLVI[ ?WMGA LIV PMIW ERH QEHI E KSSH GEPP ERH
XSSO LIV MRv VIPEXIW XS XLI TVIGIHMRK XYVR MR [LMGL XLI SRPMRI TEVXMGMTERX XIPPW EFSYX LMW
I\TIVMIRGI [LIR LMW KMVPJVMIRH PMIH EFSYX FIMRK E ZMGXMQ SJ HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI 1SVISZIV
VIPEXMSRWLMT LEVQSR] GSQIW MRXS TPE] [LIR GSRHIQRMRK ZMSPIRGI ERH P]MRK MR E VIPEXMSR
WLMT [LMPI SFIHMIRGI HMWGSYVWI IQIVKIW [LIR TSMRXMRK SYX 'LVMW &VS[RvW VSPI EW E GMXM^IR
[LS LEW FVSOIR MRHMWTYXEFPI TVMRGMTPIW SJ QSVEPP] KSSH FILEZMSYV 8]TMGEP SJ XLI ZEPYI
HMWGSYVWI SJ SFIHMIRGI MW EFWSPYXIRIWW VIPEXMRK XS RSVQW WYGL EW u-J ]SY GLI[ SR WSQI
)\EQTPI  2SXI XLEX )\EQTPI  EPWS MRZSPZIW REQIGEPPMRK SJ 'LVMW &VS[R u?XALMW ERM
QEPv ERH )\EQTPI  MRGPYHIW E HIJEQEXSV] ZIVF uM LSTI LI VSXW MR NEMPv [LMGL IQFSH]
MRHMZMHYEP TS[IV XS NYHKI GIPIFVMXMIW
-R *MRRMWL HMWGYWWMSRW EFSYX HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI XLI QSWX X]TMGEP QSVEP ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW
[IVI   SFIHMIRGI XS PE[W ERH VYPIW MR  GSQQIRXW   GVMXMGMWQ SJ KSWWMT
QIHME ERH EYHMIRGI MR  GSQQIRXW ERH   VIPEXMSRWLMT LEVQSR] MR  GSQQIRXW
[LMGL GER FI WIIR MR )\EQTPIW z FIPS[ - LEZI XVERWPEXIH XLI SVMKMREP *MRRMWL GSQQIRXW
MRXS )RKPMWL 2SXI XLEX XLI XVERWPEXMSRW EVI EW TVIGMWI EW TSWWMFPI ERH XLIVIJSVI YXXIVERGIW
JVSQ XLI SVMKMREP GSQQIRXW XLEX [IVI RSX KVEQQEXMGEPP] GSVVIGX SV [IVI QSVI GSQQSR XS
XLI WTSOIR HMWGSYVWI [IVI EPWS XEOIR MRXS GSRWMHIVEXMSR MR XLI XVERWPEXIH ZIVWMSRW
 2S VIEWSR XS TVEMWI
2]OÈRIR GERRSX FI I\GYWIH SRP] FIGEYWI LI MW E [SVPH GLEQTMSR ERH [MRRIV SJ 3P]QTMGW
2]OÈRIR [MXL E GEVIIV MR WMRKMRK ERH WXVMTXIEWI HSIWRvX KMZI QYGL VIEWSR XS FI TVEMWIH % [MWI
QER HSIWRvX YRHIVXEOI EPP WXYTMH XLMRKW -J WSQISRI LEWRvX RSXMGIH MX ]IX XLMW QER LEW %(,(
PMOI QSWX TVMWSRIVW HS %PGSLSP WLSYPH RSX FI WSPH XS WYGL E TIVWSR FIGEYWI XLIR LI [MPP PSWI
IZIR XLI QMRMQEP GSRXVSP LI LEW %RH IZIR [LIR WSFIV 2]OÈRIR MW RSX TIVJIGX ,MW IHYGEXMSR
LEW KSRI ZIV] FEHP] ERH LI LEW FIIR MR E GPEWW JSV OMHW [MXL WTIGMEP RIIHW QER] QEVVMEKIW
E PSX SJ GLIEXMRK ERH LI LEWRvX XEOIR ER] VIWTSRWMFMPMX] JSV LMW S[R OMHW 1IVZM 8ETSPE MW
SFZMSYWP] GSHITIRHIRX SV XLI] LEZIRvX QEHI TVIRYTXMEP EKVIIQIRX FIGEYWI WLIvW EFPI XS WXERH
F] 2]OÈRIR EFG  GVMXMGMWQ  VIPEXMSRWLMT LEVQSR]A
 1%88- %2( 1)6:- /2-*) 7)6-%0
3 HEQRKSH      
HMZSVGI VIGSRGMPI ERH EPP XLMW EKEMR EKEMR EKEMR %+%-2    XIPIXYFF] 2]OÈRIRW(( SRI
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 1 )VSRIR
[SYPH XLMRO XLEX IZIR XLI QIHME KSX JIH YT 8LI WEQI RI[W VITIEXW MXWIPJ ]IEV EJXIV ]IEV 7SSR
1EXXM MW MR E TVMWSR ERH IZIV]XLMRKvW VIGSRGMPIH    FYX - %1 %0;%=7 /))2 32 6)%(-2+
   ,)= ,)0033 23 32) %(1-87 &9=-2+ 1%+%>-2)7 ;-8, 1%88- %2(
1)6:- ,)%(0-2)7 78-00 8,) 1%+%>-2)7 7)00 ;)00 1IHMEEXMOOS 7YSQM
?SFIHMIRGI  GVMXMGMWQ  VIPEXMSRWLMT LEVQSR]A
 XLIMV SRSJJ VIPEXMSRWLMT [MPP RIZIV IRH YRXMP XLI ORMJI LMXW ERSXLIV WTSX WSQI SXLIV XMQI
WSSR [I [MPP VIEH XLEX QIVZM LEW TSWXIH HMZSVGI TETIVW ERH E [IIO EJXIV XLEX WLI [MXLHVE[W
XLIQ EKEMR [SYPH MX FI IZIR XLI XL XMQI# ZMIVEW  VIPEXMSRWLMT
LEVQSR]A
*MVWX XLI XLVII I\EQTPIW EFSZI LMKLPMKLX XLI SFIHMIRGI XS PE[W ERH VYPIW 8LI SRPMRI TEVXMG
MTERXW IZSOI QSVEP ZEPYIW F] MQTP]MRK XLI MQTSVXERGI SJ GSQQYREP PE[W ERH VYPIW XLEX XLMW
GSYTPI LEH FVSOIR F] YRHIVXEOMRK uWXYTMH XLMRKWv WII )\EQTPI  FIMRK EFPI XS NYWX KIX
WLMT WII )\EQTPI  7IGSRH XLI HMWETTVSZEP IQFSHMIW XLI ZEPYI SJ VIPEXMSRWLMT LEVQSR]
XLEX XLMW GIPIFVMX] GSYTPI EGGSVHMRK XS XLI SRPMRI TEVXMGMTERXW LEW HIWXEFMPMWIH 8LMVH MR
)\EQTPI  XLI HMWGYWWMSR TEVXMGMTERX GVMXMGMWIW XLI TSWMXMZI XVIEXQIRX SJ XLI JSVQIV WTSVXW
QER [LS EGGSVHMRK XS XLI SRPMRI TEVXMGMTERX uGERRSX FI I\GYWIH SRP] FIGEYWI LI MW E
[SVPH GLEQTMSR ERH [MRRIV SJ 3P]QTMGWv [LMPI XLI TEVXMGMTERX MR )\EQTPI  [SRHIVW
GSYTPI ;MXLMR GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI GVMXMGMWQ SJ QIHME GSZIVEKI WIVZIW EW XLI FEWMG MRKVIHMIRX
SJ GMXM^IRWLMT EPXLSYKL XLI FVMHKI XS FVSEHIV TSPMG] MWWYIW [SYPH FI QMWWMRK %LZE IX EP
 T 2SXI XLEX )\EQTPIW  ERH  MR EHHMXMSR XS XLIMV MRXIVIWX MR QSVEP RSVQW EPWS
IQFSH] WIPJMRXIVIWXIHRIWW -R )\EQTPI  TISTPI YREFPI XS HS uRSVQEPv [SVO ERH FI TEVX
%(,( EVI IZEPYEXIH EW TVMWSRIVW EW TISTPI HIWIVZMRK QSVEP HMWETTVSZEP 1SVISZIV MR
)\EQTPI  XLIWI GIPIFVMXMIW EVI GEPPIH uXIPIXYFFMIWv [LMGL KMZIW XLI NYHKIQIRX E LYQSVSYW
ERH TPE]JYP XSRI RSXI EPWS XLI IQSXMGSRW
:EPYI HMWGSYVWIW SJ WIPJMRXIVIWX MR GSQQIRXW SR HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK GIPIFVMXMIW
-R FSXL )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH *MRRMWL HMWGYWWMSRW EFSYX HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK
GIPIFVMXMIW XLI QSWX TSTYPEV ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW SJ WIPJMRXIVIWX [IVI   MRHMZMHYEP TS[IV
MR  )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH  *MRRMWL GSQQIRXW   ZS]IYVMWQ MR  )RKPMWL
ERH  *MRRMWL GSQQIRXW ERH   WI\MWX TS[IV MR  )RKPMWL ERH  *MRRMWL GSQ
QIRXW :S]IYVMWQ SGGYVVIH [LIR SRPMRI TEVXMGMTERXW GSQQIRXIH SR XLI TMGXYVI SJ E FIEXIR
GIPIFVMX] EW )\EQTPIW z HIQSRWXVEXI )\EQTPIW  ERH  EPWS GSRXVMFYXIH XS XLI
HMWGSYVWI SJ MRHMZMHYEP TS[IV F] TSWMXMSRMRK XLI WIPJ EFSZI XLI GIPIFVMX]
 SQK WS TSSV XLMRK    :ERIWWE .YWX .EVIH ?MRHMZMHYEP TS[IV  ZS]IYVMWQA
 1] I]IW [EXIVIH [LIR - WE[ XLEX TMG 7LI VIEPP] HSIW PSSO PMOI WLI LEW HIZMPvW LSVRW 'LVMW
&VS[R WLSYPH FI MR NEMP ,I [MPP EP[E]W FI ER EFYWIV XS QI =EV .YWX .EVIH ?ZS]IYVMWQA
 3,)1+)) -2())(    QM',)00) & .YWX .EVIH ?ZS]IYVMWQA
 ,30= 7,->2-87 ',6-7 &63;2 -7 7)6-3970= )**)( 94 HEQR PSSO EX XLEX
JEGI .S .YWX .EVIH ?ZS]IYVMWQA
 GSYPH MX FI XLEX XLMW MW NYWX LIV [MXLSYX QEOIYT# TEPZEWLE .YWX .EVIH ?MRHMZMHYEP
TS[IV  ZS]IYVMWQ  WI\MWX TS[IVA
7SQIXMQIW PMRKYMWXMG I\TVIWWMSRW MRZSOI ER IQSXMSREP VIEGXMSR [MXLSYX HMVIGXP] TIVWYEHMRK
XLI VIEHIV SV LIEVIV WII 1EVXMR ERH ;LMXI  T  8S TYX MX QSVI GSRGVIXIP] RS SRI
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'IPIFVMX] 7XYHMIW 
WE]W XLEX WIIMRK XLI TMGXYVI SJ 6MLERREvW FIEXIR JEGI EPFIMX WLSGOMRK MW MRXIVIWXMRK ERH
IRXIVXEMRMRK 2IZIVXLIPIWW [I GER HVE[ XLI GSRGPYWMSR SJ ZS]IYVMWQ SR XLI FEWMW SJ TEV
XMGMTERXWv S[R VIEGXMSRW uSQKv u1] I]IW [EXIVIH [LIR - WE[ XLEX TMG 7LI VIEPP] HSIW
PSSO PMOI WLI LEW HIZMPvW LSVRWv u3,)1+))v u,30= 7,->2-87v ERH uGSYPH MX FI
XLEX XLMW MW NYWX LIV [MXLSYX QEOIYT#v [LMGL TVSZSOI SXLIV SRPMRI TEVXMGMTERXW XS WII
XLI TMGXYVI SJ 6MLERREvW FIEXIR JEGI 'LEVEGXIVMWXMG SJ ZS]IYVMWQ MW XLEX EPXLSYKL SJXIR
QSVEPP] RIYXVEPMWIH ERH uRSVQEPv XS SRPMRI TEVXMGMTEXMSR WYGL EW FPSKKMRK MX IRXEMPW E [E]
SJ WIIMRK SXLIVW EW GYVMSWMXMIW VEXLIV XLER EW QSVEP IUYEPW WII 1MPPIV ERH 7LITLIVH 
1SVISZIV WSQIXMQIW ZS]IYVMWQ MW GPIEVP] PMROIH XS XLI [E] SJ TSWMXMSRMRK SRIWIPJ EFSZI
XLI GIPIFVMX] XLI SRPMRI TEVXMGMTERX MR )\EQTPI  WLS[W TMX] XS[EVHW 6MLERRE F] IZEPYEX
MRK LIV EW E uWS TSSV XLMRKv [LMPI XLI GSQQIRXIV MR )\EQTPI  QSGOW XLI GIPIFVMX] F]
EWOMRK E VLIXSVMGEP UYIWXMSR uGSYPH MX FI XLEX XLMW MW NYWX LIV [MXLSYX QEOIYT#v )\EQTPI 
MR EHHMXMSR XS TVSZSOMRK SXLIVW XS WII XLI GIPIFVMX]vW FIEXIR JEGI MRHMGEXIW E TPIEWYVI SJ
QEOMRK XLI GIPIFVMX] ER SFNIGX SJ TPE]JYP QSGOIV] MR XIVQW SJ ETTVIGMEXMSR %GGSVHMRK
XS 1EVXMR ERH ;LMXI  TT z ETTVIGMEXMSR GSRXVMFYXIW XS XLI ZEPYI SJ uXLMRKWv
[LMGL EW YXMPMWIH EW E X]TI SJ IZEPYEXMSR MR )\EQTPI  LEW E HILYQERMWMRK JYRGXMSR 7YGL
QMWSK]RMWX HILYQERMWMRK SJ XLI GIPIFVMX] TEXLSPSKMGEPP] XVMIW XS HIR] LIV HMKRMX] QEOMRK
W]QTEXLIXMG VIWTSRWIW WIIQ MVVIPIZERX
'SQQIRXW XV]MRK XS HMQMRMWL W]QTEXL] VIPEXIH XS WIIMRK E JIQEPI GIPIFVMX]vW TMG
XYVI [IVI QSVI GSQQSR XS *MRRMWL KSWWMT WMXIW GSQTEVIH [MXL )RKPMWLPERKYEKI SRIW
3R *MRRMWL KSWWMT WMXIW XLI I\GMXIQIRX SJ [EXGLMRK E GIPIFVMX]vW TMGXYVI [EW PMROIH XS XLI
IEKIVRIWW SJ HMWHEMRMRK XLI GIPIFVMX] JSV XLI [E] WLI PSSOW EW )\EQTPIW z HIQSR
WXVEXI
 )ZIR E WGEV [SYPH FIEYXMJ] XLEX JEGI ZMIVEW
TS[IV  ZS]IYVMWQ  WI\MWX TS[IVA
 3L WLIvW LSVVMFP] W[IPPIH YT 3L 1IVZM 1IVZM HSRvX HVMRO ER]QSVI    ZMIVEW
 ZS]IYVMWQ  WI\MWX TS[IVA
 3L JYGO 8LI GYX MW WS RIEV LIV I]I    FYX HSIWRvX XLMW PEH] PSSO PMOI [SVRSYX XLEXvW
[LEX ZSHOE HSIW XS ]SY 3HHFEPP  ZS]IYVMWQ  WI\MWX
TS[IVA
 8LMW 1IVZM MW ZIV] TYJJ] 0SSOW PMOI E HVYROEVH% WGEV HSIWRvX QEOI XLEX
JEGI PSSO [SVWI IZIR XLSYKL XLMW MW E WIVMSYW MWWYI ZMIVEW
TS[IV  ZS]IYVMWQ  WI\MWX TS[IVA
 - KYIWW 1EXXM XLSYKLX [LMPI FIMRK HVYRO XLEX XLMW MW E PMZMRK TMK WS LI GSYPH QEOI E
LEQ JSV 'LVMWXQEW    FII  ZS]IYVMWQ  WI\MWX TS[IVA
%W GER FI WIIR MR )\EQTPIW z MR XLI *MRRMWL HMWGYWWMSR SJ HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI SR
KSWWMT [IFWMXIW ZS]IYVMWQ [EW I\TVIWWIH F] GSQQIRXMRK SR XLI TMGXYVI SJ XLI JIQEPI
GIPIFVMX]vW FIEXIR JEGI )ZEPYEXMZI PERKYEKI XEVKIXMRK XLI GIPIFVMX]vW TL]WMGEP ETTIEVERGI
MRHMGEXIW XLI MRXIRWMX] SJ IQSXMSREP VIEGXMSRW ERH TVSZSOIW SXLIVW XS WII XLI TMGXYVI SJ
LIV JEGI -R )\EQTPIW z XLI TMGXYVI SJ XLI GIPIFVMX]vW JEGI EPWS TVSZSOIH HMWHEMR
SJ EPGSLSP YWI ERH SJ EPGSLSPMGW 7YGL NYHKIQIRXW GPEMQMRK XLEX XLI JIQEPI GIPIFVMX]vW
TL]WMGEP ETTIEVERGI MW E GSRWIUYIRGI SJ LIV S[R LEFMXW SJ EPGSLSP HVMROMRK GER FI WIIR EW
[E]W SJ HMQMRMWLMRK XLI W]QTEXL] WLI GSYPH KIX MJ WIIR EW E ZMGXMQ SJ HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI
1SVISZIV )\EQTPI  GER FI WIIR EW ER I\XVIQIP] QMWSK]RMWX GSQQIRX NYWXMJ]MRK XLI
JIQEPI GIPIFVMX]vW ZMGXMQMWEXMSR F] QEOMRK JYR SJ LIV TL]WMGEP ETTIEVERGI
8]TMGEP SJ HSQIWXMGZMSPIRGI HMWGYWWMSRW MR FSXL )RKPMWL ERH *MRRMWL EPWS [EW E HMW
GSYVWI MR [LMGL HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI EKEMRWX E JIQEPI GIPIFVMX] SV [SQIR MR KIRIVEP [EW
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QMWSK]RMWX ZEPYI HMWGSYVWI
 VMLERRE MW XLI EKKVIWWSV WLI TVSZSOIH LMQ XS FIEX LIV YT 4097 WLI [EW XLI SRI [LS LMX
LEZI ER] LMWXSV] SJ ZMSPIRGI [L] [SYPH LI PEWL SYX SR LIV EPP SJ E WYHHIR JSV 23 VIEWSR#
YWI YV PSKMG TISTPI WS WLI HSIWRX RIIH XS TPE] E ZMGXMQ R TTP HSRX LEZI XS HIJIRH LIV WLI
WYVI ORS[W LS[ XS WXERH YT JSV LIVWIPJ M LSTI TSSV GLVMW HSIWRX XYVR KE] EJXIV XLMW EPMEIZE
=SY8YFI ?WI\MWX TS[IV  MRHMZMHYEP TS[IVA
 ;8*    ):)6=32) 2))(7  +)8 3** 396 1%2  7,) +%:) (9()
,)64)7 033/%8 (%8 &6)%/398 %6392(,)6 u0-47v - ;390(v:) *9'/)(
,)6 (% 94  ,) 7,390(v:) u/-00)(v ,)6 %77 ;) (3
*))0 7=14%8,= .97 % 71-(+)8 &-8 &98 7,) 7,390( ,%:) ;6%44)(
-8 94 & ',6-7 ;) =39 ',6-7 ):)6 %2( -8v7 2):)6 % 6-+,8
8-1)  7%=+33(&=)     73 %00 9 ,%8%7 ,) %--28 +3-2  +)8 23
8-1) u v
',7 +)8 '692/ '6); .YWX .EVIH ?WI\MWX TS[IV  MRHMZMHYEP TS[IVA
 1MRMWXIV8SS XLI *-678 XMQI MX LETTIRW MXvW LMW JEYPX 8LI 7)'32( XMQI MX LETTIRW MXvW
LIVW    %WE +Y] 97%8SHE]GSQ ?WI\MWX TS[IV  MRHMZMHYEP TS[IVA
 .YWX [SRHIVMRK XLEX WSQI [SQIR HSRvX IZIV PIEVR XLIMV PIWWSR +EZMSXE
TS[IVA
 3RI XLMRK - LEZI FIIR [SRHIVMRK EFSYX MW XLEX 1EXXM MWRvX E FMK KY] WS MW 1IVZM YREFPI
XS HIJIRH LIVWIPJ SV HSIW WLI HS MX SR TYVTSWI TVSZSOIW 1EXXM ERH FIGEYWI 1EXXM GERRSX
ZMIVEW
 MRHMZMHYEP TS[IVA
 ;IPP MR XLMW GEWI 1IVZM MW XLI HVYROEVH ERH [LEX MW [SVWI XLER E HVYRO [SQER IZIR
WEXER QIRXMSRIH MR XLI FMFPI GERRSX FI GSQTEVIH [MXL E HVYRO [SQER VYRRMRK LIV QSYXL OO
7YSQM ?WI\MWX TS[IV  MRHMZMHYEP TS[IVA
8LI I\EQTPIW EFSZI EVI EPP I\TPMGMX MR NYWXMJ]MRK [SQIRvW STTVIWWMSR WYGL EW u,)
7,390(v:) w/-00)(x ,)6 %77v MR )\EQTPI  -R EHHMXMSR XS XLI
I\TPMGMXP] NYHKIQIRXEP XSRI )\EQTPIW z EMQ EX REXYVEPMWMRK XLI [SVPHZMI[ MR [LMGL
QSVEPP] NYHKIQIRXEP [SVHW WYGL EW uEKKVIWWSVv uTVSZSOIv uJEYPXv uPIWWSRv ERH uHVYRO
EVHv MRHMGEXI MRWXMXYXMSREPMWIH IQSXMSRW SJ WSGMEP WERGXMSR WII 1EVXMR ERH ;LMXI 
T  XV]MRK XS GSRZMRGI SXLIVW F] VIJIVVMRK XS E GSRWIVZEXMZI QSVEP uSFNIGXMZMX]v 8S TYX
XLEX MR 0ERLEQvW  TT z XIVQW KEQI GSQIW MRXS PMJI YRHIV XLI KYMWI SJ TYV
TSWI -R SXLIV [SVHW XLI ETTEVIRX EXXIQTX XS GSRHIQR HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI SV EX PIEWX WII MX
EW WIVMSYW IRSYKL XS TVSZSOI HMWGYWWMSR SJ WSGMEP RSVQW HSIW XLI STTSWMXI F] GSRXVMFYXMRK
XS QMWSK]RMWX MHISPSKMIW XLEX NYWXMJ] XLI ZMGXMQMWEXMSR SJ [SQIR [LS uHSRvX IZIV PIEVR XLIMV
PIWWSRv EW XLI HMWGYWWMSR TEVXMGMTERX MR )\EQTPI  QERMJIWXW 1SVISZIV )\EQTPI  EPWS
HMWHEMRW LSQSWI\YEPW z uM LSTI TSSV GLVMW HSIWRX XYVR KE] EJXIV XLMWv z [LMGL MW ERSXLIV
[E] SJ GSRXVMFYXMRK XS WI\MWX HSQMREXMSR
:EPYIW MR SRPMRI HMWGYWWMSRW SJ ´KLXW MRZSPZMRK JIQEPI GIPIFVMXMIW
*MKYVI  WLS[W XLI HMWXVMFYXMSR SJ ZEPYIW MR FSXL )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH *MRRMWL SRPMRI
LIHSRMWQ [IVI XLI X[S QSWX TVIZEPIRX ZEPYIW 	 SJ )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH 	 SJ
*MRRMWL HMWGYWWMSR GSQQIRXW GSRXVMFYXIH XS EGLMIZIQIRX [LMPI LIHSRMWQ [EW MRZSPZIH
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'IPIFVMX] 7XYHMIW 
*MKYVI  :EPYIW VIPEXMRK XS ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK JIQEPI GIPIFVMXMIW
MR 	 SJ )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH 	 SJ *MRRMWL GSQQIRXW 7SGMEP HSQMREXMSR EPWS
SGGYVVIH MR 	 SJ GSQQIRXW MR )RKPMWL ERH [EW TVIZEPIRX MR 	 SJ GSQQIRXW MR
SJ FSXL )RKPMWLPERKYEKI 	 ERH *MRRMWL 	 HMWGYWWMSRW
:EPYI HMWGSYVWIW IQFSH]MRK XLI  QEMR GEXIKSVMIW SJ ZEPYIW GER FI WIIR MR *MKYVI 
-R EHHMXMSR XLI JVIUYIRGMIW SJ GSQQIRXW MRZSPZMRK IEGL ZEPYI HMWGSYVWI MR FSXL )RKPMWL
SJ GVMXMGMWQ SJ KSWWMT QIHME ERH EYHMIRGI WII XLI RYQFIV GSHI  [LMPI MR *MRRMWL
HMWGYWWMSRW XLI RYQFIV SJ WYGL GSQQIRXW [EW  % HIXEMPIH HIWGVMTXMSR SJ ZEPYIW ERH
ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW GER FI WIIR MR XLI %TTIHM\
%W GER FI WIIR MR *MKYVI  XLI ZEPYIW MR SRPMRI HMWGYWWMSRW SJ JIQEPI GIPIFVMXMIWv
WMSRW SJ HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW [IVI RSX WS WTVIEH SYX *SV MRWXERGI XLI ZEPYI
HMWGSYVWI SJ VIPEXMSRWLMT LEVQSR] RYQFIVIH  MW IRXMVIP] QMWWMRK MR XLI SRPMRI HMWGYW
ZEPYI HMWGSYVWI SJ MRHMZMHYEP TS[IV RYQFIVIH  [EW QSVI TVIZEPIRX MR GSQQIRXW SR
TEVIH [MXL XLSWI GSRGIVRMRK HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK GIPIFVMXMIW GJ *MKYVI  -R SXLIV
ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW XLER KSWWMT FEWIH SR E QERZW[SQER NY\XETSWMXMSR -R [LEX JSPPS[W
- [MPP WLS[ I\EQTPIW SJ X]TMGEP ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW SR FSXL )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH *MRRMWL
SJ XLI EVXMGPI - [MPP GSRGIRXVEXI SR XLI XLVII QSWX X]TMGEP QSVEP ERH WIPJMRXIVIWXIH ZEPYI
HMWGSYVWIW
1SVEP ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW MR GSQQIRXW SR ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK JIQEPI GIPIFVMXMIW
-R FSXL )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH *MRRMWL HMWGYWWMSRW EFSYX ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK JIQEPI GIPIFVM
XMIW XLI QSWX TSTYPEV QSVEP ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW [IVI   SFIHMIRGI XS PE[W ERH VYPIW MR
 SJ )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH  SJ *MRRMWL GSQQIRXW   GVMXMGMWQ SJ KSWWMT QIHME
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 1 )VSRIR
*MKYVI  :EPYI HMWGSYVWIW MR SRPMRI HMWGYWWMSRW EFSYX ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK JIQEPI GIPIFVMXMIW
ERH EYHMIRGI MR  SJ )RKPMWL ERH  SJ *MRRMWL GSQQIRXW ERH   LYQFPIRIWW MR
 SJ )RKPMWL ERH  SJ *MRRMWL GSQQIRXW )\EQTPIW FIPS[ HIQSRWXVEXI LS[ XLIWI ZEPYI
HMWGSYVWIW [IVI GSRWXVYGXIH MR GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT HMWGYWWMSRW
 8LIVI EVI ER] RYQFIV SJ uXEPOv WLS[W XLEX FSSWX VEXMRKW F] TMXXMRK [SQIR EKEMRWX
IEGL SXLIV FYX XLMW MW FI]SRH XLI TEPI 7LEQI SR 7LEVSR 3WFSVRI JSV TEVXMGMTEXMRK MR XLMW
HVMZIP -X PSSOW PMOI XLI TVSHYGX SJ E QEXMRK FIX[IIR 8LI ,S[EVH 7XIVR WLS[ ERH .IVV]
MP] [MXLSYX TL]WMGEP EXXEGO - LSTI XLI] LEZI XS KS XS GSYVX /E](+II
?SFIHMIRGI  GVMXMGMWQ  LYQFPIRIWWA
 =SY KY]W LEZI XS KIX XLMRKW WXVEMKLX WLI QEREKIH 3^^] %RH QEREKIQIRX MWRvX ER IEW]
NSF 7LIW E LEVH [SVOMRK FYWMRIWW [SQER [LMPI 1IKER MW NYWX EER IEW] KMVP XLMROMRK WLIW
JEQSYW FIGEYWI WLI MW REOIH LEPJ XLI XMQI 7LEVSR QEOIW QSRI] SR LIV S[R XLVSYKL LEVH
[SVO 8LEXW WSQIXLMRK XS FI TVSYH SJ +SSH JSV ]SY 7LEVSR JSV WXERHMRK YT JSV ]SYV LYW
FERH ERH STIRMRK E GER SJ [LSST EWW SR 1IKER 7LI RIIHIH SRI lCl GIPXMGWTEVO =SY8YFI
?SFIHMIRGI  LYQFPIRIWWA
;,)2 YRHIV ER] GMVGYQWXERGIW LEW MX FIIR %'')48%&0) FILEZMSV XS EXXEGO WSQISRI#
;,)2 ,%7 -8 &))2# 91 ,)003 6)%0-8= 8:# ?XLI HMWGYWWMSR TEVXMGMTERX MW GMXMRK E
TVIZMSYW GSQQIRXA
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'IPIFVMX] 7XYHMIW 
-XvW FIIR EGGITXEFPI ERH )2'396%+)( XS EXXEGO WSQISRI SR VIEPMX] WLS[W )74)'-%00=
HEXMRK SRIW PMOI JSP VSP WLSX EX PSZI IXG IXG WMRGI VIEPMX] XZ [EW WLEX YTSR WSGMIX] ?  A
CCCGPSWIXSQI 328( ?SFIHMIRGI  GVMXMGMWQA
 ,SLYQ
%RH XLMW MW [LEX SYV XE\ QSRI] MW YWIH JSV ;L] GSYPHRvX XLIWI uWLI GEPPIH QI ER EWWLSPI
RS WLI WXEVXIH MXv MWWYIW SJ XIIREKI ERKIV FI LERHPIH TVMZEXIP] SRP] FIX[IIR XLSWI MRZSPZIH
7YVIP] XLIVI [IVI QSVI MQTSVXERX XEVKIXW JSV XLI QSRI] IK IPHIVP] GEVI ERH LIEPXL GEVI   
1EVXMRE )WOS ERH %RRI1EVM WLEQI SR ]SY ERH KVS[ YT EX PEWX ;EWXI SJ QSRI] EKEMR
8EEW XYLPEXEER     GVMXMGMWQ  LYQFPIRIWWA
 ;LMRMRK [ERREFIW
7II MXvW RSXLMRK RI[ 8LIWI [ERREFI GGPEWW GIPIFVMXMIW XV] XS QEOI LIEHPMRIW [LEXIZIV
MX GSWXW 8LIWI RIIHPIWW TMIGIW SJ TYFPMGMX] XVEWL NYWX LSTIH WSQISRI GSRXEGXIH WIMWOE SV
SXLIV WLMXX] QEKE^MRIW 7S XLI] GER QMVVSV XLIMV TIVWSREPMXMIW 7YSQM ?SFIHMIRGI  GVMXM
GMWQ  LYQFPIRIWWA
 3L KSWL [LEX E GLMPHMWL JYWW MW XLMW SL KII [LS MW MRXIVIWXIH OIXn OMMRRSWXEE
?SFIHMIRGI  GVMXMGMWQA
%PP I\EQTPIW EFSZI MRZSPZI XLI ZEPYI HMWGSYVWI SJ SFIHMIRGI XLI SRPMRI TEVXMGMTERXW
GPIEVP] I\TVIWW LS[ XLI JIQEPI GIPIFVMXMIW LEZI FVSOIR XLI I\TIGXEXMSRW SJ u[SQIRvWv
FILEZMSYV ERH XLIVIJSVI WLSYPH FI EWLEQIH SJ XLIQWIPZIW 8LI [E] XLEX XLI KSWWMT QIHME
ERH XLIMV EYHMIRGI XVIEXW GIPIFVMXMIW [EW EPWS E TSMRX SJ GVMXMGMWQ MR QSWX SJ XLI I\EQ
TPIW EFSZI 8LI HMWETTVSZEP SJ XLI QIHME MRHYWXV] EVSYRH GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI GSRGIVRW FSXL
XLI VIEPMX]8: MRHYWXV] )\EQTPIW  ERH  ERH KSWWMT QEKE^MRIW )\EQTPIW  ERH
 [LMPI )\EQTPI  MQTPMIW HMWETTVSZEP SJ XLI KSWWMT EYHMIRGIvW MRXIVIWX MR XLI uGLMPH
MWL JYWWv 1SVISZIV GSQQIRXW GEPPMRK JSV LYQFPIRIWW WII )\EQTPIW    ERH
 FPEQI GIPIFVMXMIW JSV XLIMV IKSMWXMG FILEZMSYV IWTIGMEPP] JSV XLI [E] XLI] WIIO JEQI
ERH VIGSKRMXMSR %X XLI WEQI XMQI LS[IZIV XLI LYQFPIRIWW HMWGSYVWI MXWIPJ GSRXVMFYXIW
XS WIPJMRXIVIWXIHRIWW MR [LMGL HIJEQEXSV] IZEPYEXMSR SJ GIPIFVMXMIW LMKLPMKLXW XLI IKS SJ E
GSQQIRXIV [LS MW WIIOMRK EXXIRXMSR SRPMRI 7YGL L]TSGVMW] GER FI WIIR XS MRHMGEXI XLEX XLI
EXXIRXMSRWIIOMRK SJ XLI SRPMRI WIPJ QE] EPWS GSQTIXI [MXL JEQIWIIOMRK SJ E QIHMEQEHI
GIPIFVMX] EW E HMWGSYVWI SJ WIPJTVSQSXMSR GJ 1EVWLEPP  T 
:EPYI HMWGSYVWIW SJ WIPJMRXIVIWX MR GSQQIRXW SR ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK JIQEPI GIPIFVMXMIW
-R FSXL )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH *MRRMWL HMWGYWWMSRW EFSYX ZMSPIRGI MRZSPZMRK JIQEPI GIPIFVM
XMIW XLI XLVII QSWX TVSQMRIRX ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW SJ WIPJMRXIVIWX [IVI   MRHMZMHYEP
TS[IV  )RKPMWLPERKYEKI  *MRRMWL   ZS]IYVMWQ  )RKPMWL  *MRRMWL
ERH   WI\MWX TS[IV  )RKPMWL  *MRRMWL -X [EW X]TMGEP XLEX XLIWI XLVII
ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW SGGYVVIH XSKIXLIV EW )\EQTPIW z JVSQ )RKPMWLPERKYEKI WMXIW ERH
)\EQTPIW z JVSQ *MRRMWL GSQQIRX WIGXMSRW WLS[
 (EEEE]YQ
+SXXE [SRHIV LS[ QYGL SJ XLEX MW GEYWIH JVSQ WLMXX] I\XIRWMSRW XLS    'EYWI MX HSIWRvX
PSSO ZIV] VIH SV MVVMXEXIH 8LIVI EPWS MWRvX ER] FPSSH SV WGEFFMRK    7LEVSR - I\TIGXIH ]SY
XS PIEZI WGEVW WMPP]NEGOM 328( ?MRHMZMHYEP TS[IV  ZS]IYVMWQ  WI\MWX TS[IVA
 1IKER HSIW RSX SRP] LEZI WMPMGSRI MR LIV GLIWX FYX MR LIV LIEH EW [IPP    *EOI FSSFW
ERH JEOI TIVWSREPMX] WS [LEX GER ]SY I\TIGX    -vQ KPEH 7LEVSR FIEX XLEX FMXGL YT E PMXXPI FMX
   *MREP*EREXMG =SY8YFI ?MRHMZMHYEP TS[IV  ZS]IYVMWQ  WI\MWX TS[IVA
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 8LI JYRRMIWX [EW [LIR XLI] [EPOIH XLI KMVP SYX EJXIV 7LEVSR LEH LEH E KS EX LIV z
7EFVMRE*EMV
 ZS]IYVMWQ  WI\MWX TS[IVA
GETIVGEMPPMIW NSOY  ZS]IYVMWQ  WI\MWX TS[IVA
(-( 731)32) +)8 8,-7 )4-73() *-01)(238,-2+v7 73 -28)6)78-2+ 8,%2
;%8',-2+ ;31)2 *-+,8-2+ 8,%8 -7 '330 %;)731)0= '330 QSVI 136)
PMWnn 0-7dd 7YSQM ?MRHMZMHYEP TS[IV  ZS]IYVMWQ  WI\MWX TS[IVA
 7IVMSYW XLMRK
8LMW LEMV I\XIRWMSR MRGMHIRX WXEVXIH XS QEOI QI PEYKL - WYTTSWI XLIVI EVI IZIR QSVI
HIXEGLEFPI TEVXW XS FI JSYRH( /IPI  ZS]IYVMWQ  WI\MWX
TS[IVA
8LI XSRI SJ HMWGSYVWI YXMPMWIH MR )\EQTPIW z VIPEXIW XS 1I]IVWv  T  RSXMSR
XLEX GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT FPSKW QE] VIMRJSVGI HSQMRERX MHISPSKMIW YRHIV XLI KYMWI SJ LYQSYV
ERH TPIEWYVI %PXLSYKL WYGL HMWGSYVWIW HS RSX MRZSPZI GSRWIVZEXMZI QSVEPMWMRK SJ [SQIR
EIWXLIXMG IZEPYEXMSR MR )\EQTPIW z GER RIZIVXLIPIWW FI WIIR EW MRHMGEXMRK MRWXMXYXMSR
EPMWIH IQSXMSRW XLEX EMQ EX NYWXMJ]MRK XLI STTVIWWMSR SJ [SQIR F] QSGOMRK XLIQ XLVSYKL
XLI ZSGEFYPEV] SJ uXLMRKWv WII 1EVXMR ERH ;LMXI  TT  z 1SVISZIV WYGL
MVSRMG QSGOIV] SJ JIQEPI GIPIFVMXMIW EPWS MRHMGEXIW LS[ SRPMRI GSQQIRXMRK SR GIPIFVMX]
KSWWMT MRZSPZIW EXXMXYHIW SJ 7GLEHIRJVIYHI WII 'VSWW ERH 0MXXPIV  TYFPMG LYQMPMEXMSR
SJ GIPIFVMXMIW MW E WSYVGI SJ TPIEWYVI JSV TEVXMGMTERXW SR GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT WMXIW -R SXLIV
[SVHW XLI HMWGSYVWI SJ KEQI GSQIW [MXL XLI XSRI SJ RSRWIVMSYWRIWW QIVI TPE] WII
0ERLEQ 
MTERXW NYWXMJ] EPFIMX MVSRMGEPP] XLI TPIEWYVI SJ [EXGLMRK [SQIR EXXEGOMRK IEGL SXLIV WYGL
EW MR )\EQTPI  MR [LMGL XLI SRPMRI TEVXMGMTERX MRZSOIW IRNS]QIRX [LIR WYKKIWXMRK XLEX
*MRRMWL TEMRXIV )\TPMGMX IZEPYEXMSR MRZSPZMRK ER EJJIGXMZI VIEGXMSR WII 1EVXMR ERH ;LMXI
 TT z MW VIEPMWIH MR EXXMXYHMREP I\TVIWWMSRW WYGL EW u(EEEE]YQv uKPEHv uJYRR]v
-RXIVIWXMRKP] WSQIXMQIW SRPMRIKSWWMT TEVXMGMTERXW XLIQWIPZIW FVSYKLX SYX XLIMV E[EVIRIWW
SJ XLI .ERYWJEGIH REXYVI SJ GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI EPXLSYKL ZMGXMQMWEXMSR SJ E GIPIFVMX] MW RSX
WIIR EW QSVEPP] VMKLX MX MW WXMPP E WSYVGI SJ NS] ERH TPIEWYVI JSV XLI TEVXMGMTERXW [LMGL MW
IZMHIRX MR )\EQTPI  u-XvW WS [VSRK ]IX WS JYRR]v
(MWGYWWMSR XLI GYPXYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI ERH MXW JYRGXMSRW
8LMW WXYH] JSGYWIH SR ZEPYIW ERH EWOIH [LEX OMRH SJ TEVXMGMTEXMSR GLEVEGXIVMWIW XLI
GYPXYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI SJ PSGEP *MRRMWL ERH TSXIRXMEPP] QSVI KPSFEP SV QYPXMREXMSREP
)RKPMWLPERKYEKI GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT WMXIW &] YXMPMWMRK XLI EREP]WMW SJ IZEPYEXMZI PERKYEKI
EW XLI QIXLSH GSQQIRXW JVSQ )RKPMWLPERKYEKI ERH *MRRMWL KSWWMT WMXIW [IVI EREP
]WIH 8LI VIWYPXW SJ XLI WXYH] WYTTSVX XLI ZMI[ XLEX GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI SRPMRI MRZSPZIW
FSXL QSVEP ERH WIPJMRXIVIWXIH ZEPYIW EW *MKYVI  WLS[W XLI [LSPI QSXMZIZEPYI WTIG
XVYQ MRZSPZMRK TYVTSWI YRMZIVWEPMWQ FIRIZSPIRGI XVEHMXMSR GSRJSVQMX] WIGYVMX] KEQI
EGLMIZIQIRX HSQMREXMSR ERH TPE] WIPJHMVIGXMSR WXMQYPEXMSR LIHSRMWQ [EW JSYRH MR
XMSR SJ ZEPYIW WII 7GL[EVX^   JSV XLI QSXMZI WTIGXVYQ WII 0ERLEQ 
TT z
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142 Acta Wasaensia
'IPIFVMX] 7XYHMIW 
*MKYVI  4YVTSWI KEQI ERH TPE] MR GIPIFVMX] HMWGYWWMSRW SRPMRI
3R *MRRMWL WMXIW XLI JSGYW SR QSVEP TYVTSWI MW LMKLIV JVSQ 	 XS 	 SJ
GSQQIRXW XLER SR )RKPMWLPERKYEKI WMXIW JVSQ 	 XS 	 SJ GSQQIRXW 8LMW
MRHMGEXIW XLEX GSQTEVIH [MXL SRPMRI TEVXMGMTEXMSR SJ E QSVI PMQMXIH GYPXYVEP ERH REXMSREP
KVSYT TSXIRXMEPP] QSVI QYPXMGYPXYVEP ERH KPSFEP TEVXMGMTEXMSR WIIQW XS HIGVIEWI VEXLIV
XLER MRGVIEWI XLI TYFPMG GSRGIVR JSV FIMRK E QSVEPP] KSSH GMXM^IR 3R XLI SXLIV LERH QSVEP
ZEPYIW XIRHIH XS SZIVPET [MXL XLSWI SJ TS[IV &IMRK E GIPIFVMX] ERH WIIOMRK TYFPMG VIGSK
RMXMSR MW WSQIXLMRK XLEX GPEWLIW [MXL XLI KIRIVEP QSVEPMX] SJ *MRRMWL GYPXYVI IWTIGMEPP]
LYQFPIRIWW [LMGL QE] TEVXP] I\TPEMR [L] TEVXMGMTERXW SR *MRRMWL KSWWMT WMXIW WE[ XLI
QSVEPMWMRK SJ GIPIFVMXMIW EW MQTSVXERX
-R EHHMXMSR EW GER FI WIIR MR *MKYVI  XLI TIVGIRXEKI SJ GSQQIRXW MRZSPZMRK QSVEP
TYVTSWI [EW LMKLIV [LIR HMWGYWWMSRW HIEPX [MXL HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI JVSQ 	 XS 	
	 SJ GSQQIRXW 8LIWI VIWYPXW WYTTSVX XLI RSXMSR XLEX HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI MW E XLIQI SJ
TSTYPEV GYPXYVI XLEX MW XEOIR VIPEXMZIP] WIVMSYWP] ERH GSRWMHIVIH E VIEPPMJI TVSFPIQ WII
%LZE IX EP  TT z ,S[IZIV EW )\EQTPIW z HIQSRWXVEXIH WSQIXMQIW
QSVEPMX] MR HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI HMWGYWWMSRW MW SRP] E VLIXSVMGEP [E] SJ VIMRJSVGMRK WI\MWX
;LMPI HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI [EW MR KIRIVEP WIIR EW E WIVMSYW XSTMG MR GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI
WGSVR ERH LYQMPMEXMSR 8LI TIVGIRXEKI SJ GSQQIRXW MRZSPZMRK TPE] SV KEQI [EW LMKLIV
XMG ZMSPIRGI 8LMW MRHMGEXIW XLEX KSWWMT VIEHIVW EVI [IPP E[EVI SJ XLI REXYVI SJ XLI KSWWMT
MRHYWXV] MR QEOMRK LIEHPMRIW ERH HIPMZIVMRK ZMHISW SJ GIPIFVMXMIW %PXLSYKL WYGL E PSKMG
QE] LIPT EYHMIRGI QIQFIVW SJ GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT XS WII XLIQWIPZIW EW QIHMEWEZZ] ERH
GVMXMGEP GSRWYQIVW %LZE IX EP 
SRP] VIMRJSVGIW WXIVISX]TIW SJ [SQIR EW SFNIGXW SJ KE^I ERH WGSVR [LMGL WYTTSVXW XLI
RSXMSR XLEX GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT WMXIW EVI EX PIEWX TEVXP] QIHMEXIH IRZMVSRQIRXW [LIVI [SQIR
EVI STTVIWWIH XLVSYKL E LYQSVSYW WX]PI WII *EMVGPSYKL  TT z z 1I]IVW
 T 
'SRGPYWMSR
8LMW LSPMWXMG EREP]WMW SJ ZEPYIW WYKKIWXW XLEX EPXLSYKL TEVXMGMTEXMSR SR GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT
WMXIW SGGEWMSREPP] WIIQW XS TVSZSOI HMWGYWWMSR EFSYX KSSH GMXM^IRWLMT WII EPWS +VELEQ
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 1 )VSRIR
ERH ,EVNY  XLI SRPMRI TEVXMGMTERXW SJ GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT EVI YREFPI YR[MPPMRK SV YRQS
XLEX EVI HIITP] VSSXIH MR GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI WII EPWS *EMVGPSYKL  TT z z
1I]IVW  T 
%W E GSRXVMFYXMSR SJ XLI EREP]WMW TVIWIRXIH MR XLMW EVXMGPI WSQI VIPIZERX WYKKIWXMSRW JSV
JYXYVI WXYHMIW GER FI QEHI *MVWX MX MW RSXI[SVXL] [LS XLI SRPMRI TEVXMGMTERXW SJ GIPIFVMX]
KSWWMT EVI EW 8YVRIV F T  WXVIWWIW GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI MW PMROIH XS XLI IZIV]HE] PMJI
SJ ]SYRK TISTPI MR TEVXMGYPEV 8LIWI TISTPI EVI RSX RIGIWWEVMP] MRXIVIWXIH MR TYFPMG TEV
XMGMTEXMSR MR XLI XVEHMXMSREP WIRWI SJ uHIPMFIVEXMRKv XLI MWWYIW XLEX EVI KMZIR XLIMV WSGMIXEP
MR GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT ]SYRK TISTPI GVIEXI TYFPMG HMWGSYVWIW F] XLIQWIPZIW SR XLI FEWMW SJ
XLIMV S[R I\TIVMIRGIW ERH MHIRXMXMIW MR [LMGL QSVEP ZEPYIW QE] WIVZI EW PMROW XS E TSXIR
XMEP MRXIVIWX MR SXLIV TISTPIvW [IPPFIMRK ,S[IZIV EW TSMRXIH SYX XLVSYKLSYX XLMW WXYH]
QSVEP ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW EPXLSYKL TYFPMGWTMVMXIH QE] EPWS FI YXMPMWIH ERXMHIQSGVEXMGEPP]
F] STTVIWWMRK KVSYTW SJ TISTPI TEVXMGYPEVP] [SQIR
-X MW EPWS RSXI[SVXL] XLEX XLI STTVIWWMSR SJ [SQIR SR GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT WMXIW MW RSX
I\GPYWMZIP] E WMKR SJ QMWSK]R] %W *EMVGPSYKL  TT z z EVKYIW QER]
SRPMRI KSWWMT TEVXMGMTERXW SJ E TSWXJIQMRMWX GVMXMGMWQ XEVKIXMRK XLI JIQEPI FSH] EVI ]SYRK
[SQIR [LMGL MW XS FI XEOIR MRXS EGGSYRX [LIR MRXIVTVIXMRK VIWYPXW SJ SRPMRI TEVXMGMTE
XMSR MR GIPIFVMX] GYPXYVI -J XLI KVSYT XLEX TEVXMGMTEXIW MR TPE]JYP ERH WIIQMRKP] MRRSGIRX
GIPIFVMX] QSGOIV] GSRWMWXW SJ ]SYRK [SQIR XLI GYPXYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI EVSYRH GIPIFVMX]
EW XLI SFNIGX SJ WSGMEP I\TPSMXEXMSR
8S GSRGPYHI XLI VIWYPXW SJ XLMW WXYH] RSX SRP] MRHMGEXI XLEX GSQQIRXW WIRX F] MRHMZMH
YEP TEVXMGMTERXW EVI .ERYWJEGIH FYX EPWS WYKKIWX E .ERYWPMOI REXYVI SJ XLI GYPXYVEP TYFPMG
WTLIVI EVSYRH GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT SRPMRI -R SRPMRI IRZMVSRQIRXW JSGYWMRK SR GIPIFVMX] ZMS
PIRGI QSVEP WIVMSYWRIWW WXVIWWMRK SFIHMIRGI XS VYPIW ERH TPE]JYP QSGOIV] EW E LYQSVSYW
WIPJI\TVIWWMSR LEZI E GSQQSR KSEP MR GSRXVMFYXMRK XS WIPJMRXIVIWXIH ERH SJXIR WI\MWX HMW
GSYVWIW SJ TS[IV .YWX PSSOMRK EX SRI WMHI z IMXLIV XLI QSVEPP] WIVMSYW SV XLI TPE]JYP SRI
z SJ WYGL E .ERYWPMOI GYPXYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI MW RSX IRSYKL [LIR XV]MRK XS YRHIVWXERH MXW
GSQTPI\ REXYVI
%GORS[PIHKIQIRXW
8LI EYXLSV [SYPH PMOI XS XLERO LIV WYTIVZMWSV 1IVNE /SWOIPE LIV GSPPIEKYIW (ERMIP 6IPPWXEF ERH
1SPP] ,EVX^SK 7XSVQIRX ERH XLI IHMXSVW ERH XLI X[S ERSR]QSYW VIJIVIIW SJ 'IPIFVMX] 7XYHMIW JSV
XLIMV YWIJYP EHZMGI ERH GVMXMGEP TIVWTIGXMZIW XLEX [IVI RIIHIH XS QEOI XLMW EVXMGPI FIXXIV
2SXIW
 -R EW]RGLVSRSYW HMWGYWWMSRW MRXIVEGXMSR MW WXVYGXYVIH MRXS XYVRW FYX E VITP] QE] FI TSWXIH
QSRXLW SV IZIR ]IEVW EJXIV XLI TVMSV XYVR WII /SPPSGO ERH 7QMXL  T 
 -R XLI TYFPMGEXMSR SJ +VELEQ ERH ,EVNY  ,EVNYvW WYVREQI [EW [VMXXIR MRGSVVIGXP] EW
u,ENVYv
 % PMRO XS XLI .YWX .EVIH [IFWMXI GER FI JSYRH LIVI LXXT[[[NYWXNEVIHGSQ
VMLERREWFVYMWIHJEGIVIZIEPIH
TPYWWEPEMWIXQMXEWR]XQIVZMXETSPEVYLNSXXYRESMOIYHIWWEOEXWSOYZE
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144 Acta Wasaensia
'IPIFVMX] 7XYHMIW 
2SXIW SR GSRXVMFYXSV
1EVME )VSRIR MW E 4L( WXYHIRX JVSQ XLI 9RMZIVWMX] SJ :EEWE *MRPERH 7LI MW GYVVIRXP] [SVOMRK SR
LIV HMWWIVXEXMSR GSRGIVRMRK QSVEPMX] ERH VLIXSVMG SR GIPIFVMX]KSWWMT WMXIW 8LMW EVXMGPI MW E TEVX SJ
LIV PEVKIV [SVO
6IJIVIRGIW
%LZE 0 IX EP  % FVMHKI SZIV XVSYFPIH [EXIV# GIPIFVMXMIW MR NSYVREPMWQ GSRRIGXMRK MQTPMGMX
ERH MRWXMXYXMSREP TSPMXMGW .SYVREPMWQ   z
&VYGOQER %  )XLMGEP KYMHIPMRIW JSV VIWIEVGL SRPMRI %ZEMPEFPI JVSQ LXXT[[[GGKEXIGL
IHYbEWFIXLMGW ?%GGIWWIH  .ER A
'SYPHV] 2 ERH 1EVOLEQ 8  'IPIFVMX] GYPXYVI ERH TYFPMG GSRRIGXMSR FVMHKI SV GLEWQ#
-RXIVREXMSREP NSYVREP SJ GYPXYVEP WXYHMIW   z
'VSWW 7 ERH 0MXXPIV .  'IPIFVMX] ERH 7GLEHIRJVIYHI XLI GYPXYVEP IGSRSQ] SJ JEQI MR JVIIJEPP
'YPXYVEP WXYHMIW   z
*EMVGPSYKL /  *EQI MW E PSWMRK KEQI GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT FPSKKMRK FMXGL GYPXYVI ERH TSWX
JIQMRMWQ +IRHIVW  z %ZEMPEFPI JVSQ LXXT[[[KIRHIVWSVKKKCJEMVGPSYKLLXQP
?%GGIWWIH  2SZ 
*MWOI .  9RHIVWXERHMRK TSTYPEV GYPXYVI 0SRHSR 6SYXPIHKI
+SVMR : ERH (YFMIH %  (IWMVEFPI TISTPI MHIRXMJ]MRK WSGMEP ZEPYIW XLVSYKL GIPIFVMX] RI[W
1IHME GYPXYVI 
 WSGMIX]   z
+VELEQ 8 ERH ,EVNY %  6IEPMX] 8: EW E XVMKKIV SJ IZIV]HE] TSPMXMGEP XEPO MR XLI RIXFEWIH
TYFPMG WTLIVI )YVSTIER NSYVREP SJ GSQQYRMGEXMSR   z
,IVQIW .  6IEHMRK [SQIR¬W QEKE^MRIW ER EREP]WMW SJ IZIV]HE] QIHME YWI 'EQFVMHKI
4SPMX] 4VIWW
.IROMRW ,  'SRZIVKIRGI GYPXYVI [LIVI SPH ERH RI[ QIHME GSPPMHI YTHEXIH ERH [MXL E RI[
EJXIV[SVH 0SRHSR 2I[ =SVO 9RMZIVWMX] 4VIWW
.IVWPIZ %  w6EVIP] E HSWI SJ TYVI XVYXLx GIPIFVMX]WPEHHIV WSQQIHMIVIX OSQQYRMOEXMSRWJSVQ
2SVHMGSQMRJSVQEXMSR   z
.SLERWWSR 7  6IEHMRK XEFPSMHW XEFPSMH RI[WTETIVW ERH XLIMV VIEHIVW ,YHHMRKI 7ÚHIVXÚVRW
LÚKWOSPE
/SPPSGO 4 ERH 7QMXL 1%  'SQQYRMXMIW MR G]FIVWTEGI -R 1% 7QMXL ERH 4 /SPPSGO IHW
'SQQYRMXMIW MR G]FIVWTEGI 0SRHSR 6SYXPIHKI z
0ERLEQ 6%  8LI IGSRSQMGW SJ EXXIRXMSR WX]PI ERH WYFWXERGI MR XLI EKI SJ MRJSVQEXMSR
0SRHSR 8LI 9RMZIVWMX] SJ 'LMGEKS 4VIWW
1EVWLEPP 4(  8LI TVSQSXMSR ERH TVIWIRXEXMSR SJ XLI WIPJ GIPIFVMX] EW QEVOIV SJ TVIWIRXEXMSREP
QIHME 'IPIFVMX] WXYHMIW   z
1EVXMR .6 ERH ;LMXI 466  8LI PERKYEKI SJ IZEPYEXMSR ETTVEMWEP MR )RKPMWL 2I[ =SVO
4EPKVEZI 1EGQMPPER
1EV[MGO %  7XEXYW YTHEXI GIPIFVMX] TYFPMGMX] ERH WIPJFVERHMRK MR [IF 
%GEHIQMG HMWWIVXEXMSR %ZEMPEFPI JVSQ LXXT[[[XMEVESVKFPSK[TGSRXIRXYTPSEHW
QEV[MGOCHMWWIVXEXMSRCWXEXYWYTHEXITHJ ?%GGIWWIH  2SZ A
1G+YMKER .  8LI GYPXYVEP TYFPMG WTLIVI )YVSTIER NSYVREP SJ GYPXYVEP WXYHMIW   z
1I]IVW )%  +SWWMT XEPO ERH SRPMRI GSQQYRMX] GIPIFVMX] KSWWMT FPSKW ERH XLIMV EYHMIRGIW
?SRPMRIA 3TIR %GGIWW (MWWIVXEXMSRW 4ETIV  %ZEMPEFPI JVSQ LXXTWGLSPEV[SVOWYQEWWIHY
STIRCEGGIWWCHMWWIVXEXMSRW ?%GGIWWIH  .YR A
1MPPIV '6 ERH 7LITLIVH (  &PSKKMRK EW WSGMEP EGXMSR E KIRVI EREP]WMW SJ XLI [IFPSK -R 0
+YVEO 7 %RXSRMNIZMG 0 .SLRWSR ' 6EXPMJJ ERH . 6I]QER IHW -RXS XLI FPSKSWTLIVI VLIXSVMG
GSQQYRMX] ERH GYPXYVI SJ [IFPSKW %ZEMPEFPI JVSQ LXXTFPSKPMFYQRIHYFPSKSWTLIVI
FPSKKMRKCEWCWSGMEPCEGXMSRCECKIRVICEREP]WMWCSJCXLIC[IFPSKLXQP ?%GGIWWIH  2SZ A
6SNIO '  'IPIFVMX] 0SRHSR 6IEOXMSR &SSOW
7E]IV %  ;L] XLMRKW QEXXIV XS TISTPI WSGMEP WGMIRGI ZEPYIW ERH IXLMGEP PMJI 'EQFVMHKI
9RMZIVWMX] 4VIWW
7GL[EVX^ 7,  9RMZIVWEPW MR XLI GSRXIRX ERH WXVYGXYVI SJ ZEPYIW XLISV] ERH IQTMVMGEP XIWXW MR
 GSYRXVMIW -R 1 >ERRE IH %HZERGIW MR I\TIVMQIRXEP WSGMEP TW]GLSPSK] ZSP  2I[ =SVO
%GEHIQMG 4VIWW z
7GL[EVX^ 7,  9RMZIVWEPMWQ ZEPYIW ERH XLI MRGPYWMZIRIWW SJ SYV QSVEP YRMZIVWI .SYVREP SJ
GVSWWGYPXYVEP TW]GLSPSK]   z
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 1 )VSRIR
8LSQTWSR + ERH ,YRWXSR 7  )ZEPYEXMSR ER MRXVSHYGXMSR -R 7 ,YRWXSR ERH + 8LSQTWSR
IHW )ZEPYEXMSR MR XI\X EYXLSVMEP WXERGI ERH XLI GSRWXVYGXMSR SJ HMWGSYVWI 3\JSVH 9RMZIVWMX]
4VIWW z
8YVRIV +  9RHIVWXERHMRK GIPIFVMX] 0SRHSR 7%+)
8YVRIV + E 3VHMREV] TISTPI ERH XLI QIHME XLI HIQSXMG XYVR 0SRHSR 7%+)
8YVRIV + F %TTVSEGLMRK GIPIFVMX] WXYHMIW 'IPIFVMX] WXYHMIW   z
8YVRIV + &SRRIV * ERH 1EVWLEPP 4(  *EQI KEQIW XLI TVSHYGXMSR SJ GIPIFVMX] MR
%YWXVEPME 'EQFVMHKI YRMZIVWMX] TVIWW
;EP^IV 1  -RXIVTVIXEXMSR ERH WSGMEP GVMXMGMWQ 'EQFVMHKI 1% ,EVZEVH 9RMZIVWMX] 4VIWW
%TTIRHM\ HIXEMPIH HIWGVMTXMSR SJ ZEPYIW ERH ZEPYI HMWGSYVWIW
 9RMZIVWEPMWQ GSRGIVR JSV KIRIVEP LYQER [IPJEVI RSX SRP] JSV SRIvW S[R TVMQEV] KVSYT WII
7GL[EVX^  TT z
 4L]WMGEP MRXIKVMX] LMKLPMKLXMRK RSRZMSPIRGI EW E KIRIVEP LYQER ZEPYI
 7SGMEP NYWXMGI ERH IUYEPMX] EVKYMRK JSV NYWXMGI FEWIH SR IUYEPMX] SJ KVSYTW SJ TISTPI
 &IRIZSPIRGI GSRGIVR JSV XLI [IPJEVI SJ XLSWI [LS EVI GPSWI ERH [MXL [LSQ SRI MRXIVEGXW MR
IZIV]HE] PMJI WII 7GL[EVX^  T 
 *SVKMZIRIWW JSVKMZMRK XLI FILEZMSYV SJ GIPIFVMXMIW LMKLPMKLXMRK JSVKMZIRIWW EW E KIRIVEP ZEPYI
 ,IPTJYPRIWW LIPTMRK SXLIV HMWGYWWMSR TEVXMGMTERXW F] KMZMRK XLIQ MRJSVQEXMSR [LIR EWOIH SV
LMKLPMKLXMRK LIPTJYPRIWW EW E KIRIVEP ZEPYI
 ,SRIWX] LMKLPMKLXMRK LSRIWX] EW E ZEPYI SV GSRHIQRMRK P]MRK EW ER EGX
1SVEP VIWTSRWMFMPMX] WXVIWWMRK XLEX TISTPI WLSYPH ORS[ XLEX XLIMV EGXW LEZI GSRWIUYIRGIW
 4EVEWSGMEP JVMIRHWLMT GLIIVMRK YT GIPIFVMXMIW ERH XEPOMRK XS XLIQ F] YWMRK XLI WIGSRH TIVWSR
WMRKYPEV u]SYv
 7TMVMXYEP PMJI XEPOMRK EFSYX TVE]MRK JSV WSQISRI TEVXMGYPEVP] JSV GIPIFVMXMIW
 7]QTEXL] WLS[MRK TSWMXMZMX] XS[EVHW GIPIFVMXMIW SV HMWGYWWMSR TEVXMGMTERXW [LS EVI SV LEZI
FIIR MR E XVSYFPIWSQI WMXYEXMSR
 'SRJSVQMX] VIWXVEMRX SJ FILEZMSYV PMOIP] XS YTWIX SV LEVQ SXLIVW ERH ZMSPEXI WSGMEP I\TIGXEXMSRW SV
RSVQW WII 7GL[EVX^  T 
 ,SRSYV SJ IPHIVW PSSOMRK YT XS SPHIV TISTPI JSV QSVEP EHZMGI SV EVKYMRK JSV XLIMV [IPPFIMRK
 ,SRSYV SJ TEVIRXW PSSOMRK YT XS TEVIRXW JSV QSVEP EHZMGI
 3FIHMIRGI XS PE[W ERH VYPIW VIJIVVMRK XS GSQQYREP RSVQW EW YRHMWTYXEFPI TVIQMWIW
 7IPJHMWGMTPMRI ZEPYMRK WIPJGSRXVSP ERH GEPQRIWW VIJVEMRMRK JVSQ EPGSLSP ERH HVYKW
 8VEHMXMSR PIERMRK SR XLI GYWXSQW ERH MHIEW SJ SRIvW S[R GYPXYVI SV VIPMKMSR WII 7GL[EVX^ 
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'IPIFVMX] 7XYHMIW 
 'VMXMGMWQ SJ KSWWMT QIHME ERH EYHMIRGI GVMXMGMWMRK XLI QIHME SV XLI EYHMIRGI JSV XLIMV XVIEXQIRX
SJ ERH WXVSRK MRXIVIWX MR GIPIFVMXMIW
 (IZSYXRIWW XEPOMRK EFSYX +SH XEPOMRK TSWMXMZIP] EFSYX JEMXL ERH VIPMKMSR
 ,EVH [SVO ERH WXYH] ZEPYMRK [SVO ERH IHYGEXMSR JSV E GSQQYRMX]
 ,YQFPIRIWW GVMXMGMWMRK GIPIFVMXMIW JSV JEQIWIIOMRK ERH XLIMV IKSMWXMG ERH IEW]KSMRK PMJI WX]PI
SV TVEMWMRK XLIQ JSV XLI STTSWMXI
 2EXYVEP ETTIEVERGI EVKYMRK JSV REXYVEP ETTIEVERGI ERH FIMRK EKEMRWX QEOMRKYT TMIVGMRK
TPEWXMG WYVKIV] SV LEMV I\XIRWMSRW
 7IGYVMX] uWEJIX] LEVQSR] ERH WXEFMPMX] SJ WSGMIX] SJ VIPEXMSRWLMTW ERH SJ WIPJv WII 7GL[EVX^
 T 
 *EQMP] WIGYVMX] EVKYMRK JSV XLI [IPPFIMRK SJ JEQMP] QIQFIVW HIJIRHMRK JEQMP]
 ,IEPXL XEPOMRK TSWMXMZIP] EFSYX LIEPXL SV GVMXMGMWMRK YRLIEPXL] PMJIWX]PIW EVKYMRK JSV VILEFMPMXE
XMSR SJ uJEPPIRv GIPIFVMXMIW
 6IGMTVSGEXMSR SJ JEZSYVW GVMXMGMWMRK XLI YWI SJ WSGMIX]vW QSRI] SV WIVZMGIW JSV IKSMWXMG
TYVTSWIW
 6IPEXMSRWLMT LEVQSR] EVKYMRK JSV RSRZMSPIRGI ERH WSGMEP FEPERGI MR VIPEXMSRWLMT
 7SGMEP SVHIV XVYWX MR WIRXIRGIW SV SXLIV EGXMSRW F] ER EYXLSVMX] EW E QIERW SJ KYEVERXIIMRK WSGMEP
WIGYVMX]
 7SGMEP HSQMREXMSR EXXEMRQIRX SV TVIWIVZEXMSR SJ HSQMRERGI TS[IV [MXLMR E WSGMEP W]WXIQ WII
7GL[EVX^  TT z
 %KIMWX TS[IV IZEPYEXMRK SXLIV TISTPI RIKEXMZIP] SV TSWMXMZIP] FIGEYWI SJ XLIMV EKI
'PEWW TS[IV ERH [IEPXL IZEPYEXMRK TSSV ERH QEVKMREPMWIH KVSYTW RIKEXMZIP] IZEPYEXMRK [IEPXL]
KVSYTW TSWMXMZIP]
 2EXMSREP TS[IV FPEQMRK JSVIMKR REXMSRW JSV MQQSVEPMX]
 6EGMWX TS[IV IZEPYEXMRK VEGMEP KVSYTW RIKEXMZIP]
 7I\MWX TS[IV WXIVISX]TMRK KIRHIV GEPPMRK [SQIR u[LSVIWv uFMXGLIWv uWOEROWv IXG NYWXMJ]MRK
HSQIWXMG ZMSPIRGI F] QIR HMWHEMRMRK WI\YEP QMRSVMXMIW
 %GLMIZIQIRX TIVWSREP WYGGIWW F] SFXEMRMRK WSGMEP ETTVSZEP WII 7GL[EVX^  T 
 %TTIEVERGI IZEPYEXMRK TISTPI TSWMXMZIP] SV RIKEXMZIP] FIGEYWI SJ XLIMV ETTIEVERGI
 -RHMZMHYEP TS[IV TSWMXMSRMRK SRIWIPJ EFSZI GIPIFVMXMIW SV HMWGYWWMSR TEVXMGMTERXW F] REQI
GEPPMRK MVSR] SV XVSPPMRK SV F] YWMRK HIJEQEXSV] EHNIGXMZIW SV ZIVFW
 4YFPMGMX] ZEPYMRK GIPIFVMX] EW E GEVIIV
 7OMPPW ERH XEPIRXW ZEPYMRK WOMPPW ERH XEPIRXW MR KIRIVEP SV MR EVX QYWMG ERH WTSVX MR TEVXMGYPEV
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 1 )VSRIR
 -RXIPPMKIRGI ERH GPIZIVRIWW ZEPYMRK MRXIPPMKIRGI SV QSGOMRK WSQISRI JSV XLI PEGO SJ MX YWMRK
GPIZIV [SVHTPE]W [LIR QSGOMRK GIPIFVMXMIW
 T 
 'IPIFVMX] XEWXI TVIJIVVMRK SRI GIPIFVMX] XS ERSXLIV JSV XLI WEOI SJ QIVI PMOMRK ERH JERHSQ
 +PSWW] PMJI TVEMWMRK GIPIFVMXMIW FIGEYWI SJ XLIMV TSTYPEVMX] GPSXLIW ERH TEVXMIW
1YWMGEP XEWXI PMOMRK SV HMWPMOMRK XLI QYWMG E GIPIFVMX] QEOIW
 7I\YEP TPIEWYVI XEPOMRK EFSYX GIPIFVMXMIW EW WI\YEP SFNIGXW F] IZEPYEXMRK XLIMV WI\MRIWW SV
MQEKMRMRK LEZMRK WI\ [MXL XLIQ
 :S]IYVMWQ GSQQIRXMRK SR GIPIFVMXMIWv TMGXYVIW IZEPYEXMRK XLI EGX SJ [EXGLMRK GIPIFVMXMIW MR
XLIMV QMWIVMIW TSWMXMZIP] IWTIGMEPP] F] YXMPMWMRK I\TVIWWMSRW SJ EQYWIQIRX ERH WYVTVMWI WYGL EW
u030v u31+v uHE]YYQv
 7XMQYPEXMSR ZEPYMRK E ZEVMIH ERH I\GMXMRK PMJI MR [LMGL XLI STXMQEP PIZIP SJ EGXMZEXMSR QEXXIVW WII
7GL[EV^  TT z
 &VIEOMRK PE[W ERH VYPIW XEPOMRK TSWMXMZIP] EFSYX FVIEOMRK KIRIVEP QSVEP RSVQW SV PE[W
 (EVMRK XS XLVIEXIR [MXL ZMSPIRGI WXVSRK MRHMZMHYEP YWI SJ TS[IV F] IRGSYVEKMRK ZMSPIRGI IZIR
XLI OMPPMRK SJ E GIPIFVMX] SV E HMWGYWWMSR TEVXMGMTERX
 7IPJHMVIGXMSR MRHITIRHIRGI MR XLSYKLX ERH EGXMSR F] GLSSWMRK GVIEXMRK I\TPSVMRK WII 7GL[EVX^
 TT z
 'VIEXMZMX] I\TVIWWMRK EJJIGX GVIEXMZIP] F] VL]QMRK SV YXMPMWMRK EQFMKYSYW QIXETLSVMGEP
 7IPJVIWTIGX ERH MRHITIRHIRGI LMKLPMKLXMRK MRHITIRHIRX KSEPW ERH JVIIHSQ JVSQ SXLIV
TISTPI WYGL EW IWGETMRK SRIvW S[R LSQI GSYRXV] JSV JVIIHSQ
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(MWGSYVWI
'SQQYRMGEXMSR
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
6ITVMRXWERHTIVQMWWMSRW
WEKITYFGSYONSYVREPW4IVQMWWMSRWREZ
(3-
HGQWEKITYFGSQ
1SVEPEVKYQIRXEXMSREWE
VLIXSVMGEPTVEGXMGIMRTSTYPEV
SRPMRIHMWGSYVWI)\EQTPIW
JVSQSRPMRIGSQQIRXWIGXMSRW
SJGIPIFVMX]KSWWMT
1EVME)VSRIR
9RMZIVWMX]SJ:EEWE*MRPERH
%FWXVEGX
8LMWWXYH]EREP]WIWLS[SRPMRITEVXMGMTERXWSJGIPIFVMX]KSWWMTTSWMXMSRXLIQWIPZIWMRVIPEXMSRXS
XLIMVEYHMIRGIXLVSYKLJSVQWSJQSVEPEVKYQIRXEXMSRERHXLIVIF]GSRXVMFYXIXSWSGMEPLMIVEVGLMIW
-RXLMWWXYH]JSVQWSJQSVEPEVKYQIRXEXMSREVIWIIREWIRXL]QIQIWXLEXMWGPEMQVIEWSRYRMXW
FEWIHSRQSVEPRSVQWEWTVIQMWIW8LIQEXIVMEPGSRWMWXWSJEXSXEPSJEW]RGLVSRSYWSRPMRI
GSQQIRXWMR)RKPMWLERHMR*MRRMWL-REHHMXMSRXSVLIXSVMGEPEVKYQIRXEXMSREREP]WMWXLIWXYH]
MRZIWXMKEXIW XLI HITIRHIRG] SJQSVEP EVKYQIRXEXMSR SR XLVII GSRXI\XYEP ZEVMEFPIW KIRHIVIH
ZMSPIRGIEW XLIXSTMGSJHMWGYWWMSRHSQIWXMGZMSPIRGIJIQEPI GIPIFVMXMIWv JMKLXW EWXLIWLEVIH
GYPXYVI SJ TEVXMGMTERXW *MRRMWLWTIEOMRK uREXMSREPv)RKPMWLWTIEOMRK uQYPXMGYPXYVEPv TEVXMGMTERXW
ERHEQIHMEMRWXMXYXMSREWXLIQSHIVEXSVSJSRPMRIHMWGSYVWIQIHMEKIRIVEXIHYWIVKIRIVEXIH
[IFWMXIW *SYV JSVQW SJ QSVEP EVKYQIRXEXMSR [IVI JSYRH MR XLI QEXIVMEP  XLISVIXMGEP
HIHYGXMZITVEGXMGEPGSRXI\XYEPGEXIKSVMGEPWXIVISX]TIFEWIHERHHMKMXEPuGVS[HMRKv
IRXL]QIQI 8LISVIXMGEP TVEGXMGEP ERH GEXIKSVMGEP IRXL]QIQIW EVI VLIXSVMGEP MR E XVEHMXMSREP
WIRWI FIGEYWI XLI] MRGPYHI XLILMIVEVGLMGEP MHIESJQSVEP RSVQW EW XLI WLEVIHQSVISV PIWW
EYXLSVMXEVMER FEWMW SJ E GSQQYRMX](MKMXEP IRXL]QIQIW GSRZIVWIP] EVI XI\XW[MXLSYX GPIEV
FSVHIVWSVER]RSXMSRSJQSVEPRSVQW7YGLEVKYQIRXWGLEVEGXIVM^IHIWTIGMEPP]YWIVKIRIVEXIH
)RKPMWLPERKYEKIHMWGYWWMSRWGSRGIVRMRK JIQEPIGIPIFVMXMIWv JMKLXW8LMW MRHMGEXIW XLEXXLIHMKMXEP
IRXL]QIQIMWTEVXMGYPEVP]TVIZEPIRX[LIVIXLIVIMWEPEGOSJSFZMSYWLMIVEVGLMIWMRXLIGSRXI\XSJ
EVKYQIRXEXMSR%WXLMWWXYH]EVKYIWLS[IZIVXLIWIIQMRKP]RSRLMIVEVGLMGEPERHMRHMZMHYEPMWXMG
TEVXMGMTEXMSRXLVSYKLHMKMXEPIRXL]QIQIWMWEQIVIMPPYWMSRJSVXLIWIIRXL]QIQIWEVIFEWIHSR
GVS[HFILEZMSYVWYTTSVXMZISJWI\MWXERHGPEWWFSYRHHSQMREXMSR
'SVVIWTSRHMRKEYXLSV
1EVME)VSRIR(ITEVXQIRXSJ'SQQYRMGEXMSR7XYHMIW*EGYPX]SJ4LMPSWSTL]9RMZIVWMX]SJ:EEWE43&S\
*-:EEWE*MRPERH
)QEMPQEVMEIVSRIR$YZEJM
('1(MWGSYVWI
'SQQYRMGEXMSR)VSRIR
VI WIEVGLEVXMGPI
%VXMGPI
EX:EEWE9RMZIVWMX]SR.YP]HGQWEKITYFGSQ(S[RPSEHIHJVSQ
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/I][SVHW
%VKYQIRXEXMSRGSRXI\XIRXL]QIQIMRXIVRIXQSVEPMX]TSTYPEVGYPXYVI
-RXVSHYGXMSR
8LIVIMWKVS[MRKEGEHIQMGMRXIVIWXMREREP]WMRKXLIVSPISJHMWGSYVWIMRQSVEPMX]WIIIK
HMWGSYVWIFEWIHzSVIQTMVMGEPzETTVSEGLXSQSVEPMX]LMKLPMKLXWXLIVSPISJQSVEPEVKY
QIRXEXMSREW E[E]SJ VIEWSRMRK[LIR NYHKMRKLYQERFIMRKW TIVWSRW MR VIPEXMSR XS
XLIMVFILEZMSYVEGXW8LIWIGSRGITXYEPXSTMGWMIXSTSMEWWSGMEXIH[MXLXLIGSRGITXW
SJEGXERHTIVWSRTPE]EGIRXVEPVSPIMRXLIVLIXSVMGEPXLISV]SJEVKYQIRXEXMSR.SRWIR
ERH8SYPQMR  0IJJ  z 4IVIPQER ERH3PFVIGLXW8]XIGE  
z8LIIZEPYEXMSRSJEGXWERHXLITIVWSRHSMRKXLIWIEGXWGERFIWIIREWE
TEMVSJGPEMQERHVIEWSRJSVQMRKERIRXL]QIQIXLEXMWEVLIXSVMGEPJMKYVIMR[LMGLER]
MHIEMWGSRRIGXIH[MXLVIEWSRWJSVFIPMIZMRKMXXLVSYKLXLIVLIXSVMGEPTVEGXMGIWSJEGSQ
QYRMX]WII;EPOIV8LIW]RXLIWMWSJXLIWISXLIV[MWITSPEVM^IHGSRGITXWWYGLEW
EGX ERH TIVWSRQEOIW VLIXSVMG HMEPIGXMGEP &YVOI  z *SV MRWXERGI XLI
IRXL]QIQIu/IRMWIZMPFIGEYWILILMX&EVFMIvMWXLIW]RXLIWMWSJXLIIZEPYEXMSRSJTIV
WSR/IRERH XLIIZEPYEXMSRSJEGXW ZMSPIRGI MQTP]MRKXLIQSVEPRSVQuXLSWI[LS
FILEZI ZMSPIRXP] EVI FEH TISTPIv -R VLIXSVMGEP XIVQW QSVEP RSVQW EVI XLI [EVVERXW
SV TVIQMWIW SJ FILEZMSYVEP I\TIGXEXMSRW EW XLI YWYEPP] RSREVXMGYPEXIH TEVX SJ XLI
IRXL]QIQIWII.SRWIRERH8SYPQMR
;LMPI XVEHMXMSREP VLIXSVMGEP XI\XW WYGL EW GSYVXVSSQ EVKYQIRXEXMSR SV TSPMXMGEP
WTIIGLIWVIP]SRQSVEPMRWXMXYXMSRWTEVXMGYPEVP]XLIWXEXISVEREXMSREPGSQQYRMX]XI\XW
MRTSTYPEVGYPXYVIJSPPS[EPSKMGXLEXMWRSRZIVFEPEIWXLIXMGHMJJYWIERHPIWWI\TPMGMXP]
LMIVEVGLMGEP&VYQQIXXz7YGLEREVGLMWXMGXI\XWGERFIJSYRHJSVMRWXERGI
MRXLIRI[QIHMEGLEVEGXIVM^IHF]IQSXMSREPTIVJSVQERGIWXLEXEVIVIFIPPMSYWXS[EVHW
SPHVYPIWSJ[VMXMRKERHVIEWSRMRKWII7SJJIV,S[IZIVLMIVEVGL]ERHXLIVIF]
EPWSQSVEPMX]MWMRZSPZIHMRXLIZIV]REXYVISJLYQERPERKYEKIMRGPYHMRKRSRVIEWSRIH
ERHWIIQMRKP]MRHMZMHYEPMWXMGXI\XW&YVOIz8LMWQIERWXLEXEPWS
XLIWIIQMRKP]RSRLMIVEVGLMGEPSVEQSVEPIRXL]QIQIWHIEPMRK[MXLXLIXSTSMSJTIVWSR
WYGLEWFSH]WXEXYWGPSXLIWSVPMJIWX]PI[MXLSYXER]GSRGIVRJSVTISTPIvWEGXWEVIXSFI
WIIREWQSVEPP]RSXI[SVXL]*SVMRWXERGIMRGIPIFVMX]GYPXYVIIRNS]QIRXSJXLIQMWIVMIW
SJXLIVMGLERHJEQSYWMWE[E]SJMQEKMRMRKXLITVIWIRGISJGSWQMGVEXLIVXLERTSPMXM
GEPNYWXMGI,IVQIW
-RXLMWEVXMGPIIRXL]QIQIWGSQFMRMRKSVWITEVEXMRKXLIIZEPYEXMSRSJEGXWERHXLI
IZEPYEXMSRSJTISTPIEVIWIIREWJSVQWSJQSVEPEVKYQIRXEXMSR*SVQWSJQSVEPEVKY
QIRXEXMSRGEREPWSFIYRHIVWXSSHEWXIGLRMUYIWSJTIVWYEWMSRERHXLIMVJYRGXMSRPMIW
MRXLI[E]WSJTSWMXMSRMRKXLIuWIPJvMRVIPEXMSRXSXLIuSXLIVvMRHMWGSYVWIWII4IVIPQER
ERH 3PFVIGLXW8]XIGE 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Abstract  
In this article, I discuss moral and rhetorical challenges in new media discourse 
concerning celebrities. I focus on the concept of digital enthymeme, that is, an online 
comment evaluating people negatively or positively without articulated reasoning, but, 
instead, letting online participants find proofs by themselves in a digital environment 
surrounded by pictures, texts, links, and videos. The aim of this paper is to explore 
what kind of moral rhetoric is involved in digital enthymemes concerning celebrities. 
The research questions are 1) what kinds of digital enthymemes are used by English- 
and Finnish-speaking online participants commenting on gossip about violent 
celebrities and 2) how these enthymemes operate as moral arguments on the level of 
style (discourse itself as a persuasive material) and in relation to moral norms as a 
communally shared purpose. The research material consists of 1800 online comments 
(900 English-language, 900 Finnish comments) of which 808 comments were 
categorized as digital enthymemes (464 English-language, 344 Finnish comments). 
Methodically, this study combines rhetorical argumentation analysis of enthymemes 
with the analysis of evaluative language based on the linguistic appraisal framework. 
Two types of digital enthymemes, namely, moralistic and amoralistic, were identified in 
the material. The moral rhetoric in both types of digital enthymemes is solely based on 
the emotional involvement of online selves as a sign of consumerism and materialism 
becoming more important than moral negotiation. While moralistic digital enthymemes 
invoke personalized moral norms by judging celebrities as moral beings, amoralistic 
digital enthymemes block moral imagination by dehumanizing celebrities and 
evaluating them as objects, such as aesthetic or sexual “things”. In general, amoralistic 
digital enthymemes were more typical than those evaluating celebrities in moralistic 
terms.  
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1. Introduction: popular culture, morality, and digital communication  
We are living the era of constant connectedness, networking, and mobility of 
individuals in which new media make our everyday social connections more visual and 
more widely observable than before. One of the most prominent signs of the digital age 
is participation in contemporary public arenas by ‘ordinary people’, that is, those who 
do not have a societal status as public actors but are able to adopt such a role by 
blogging, commenting, or tweeting. According to the media scholar Graeme Turner 
(2010), we are witnessing a so-called demotic turn by which he means the increasing 
cultural and societal visibility of the ‘ordinary’ and the ‘popular’ through new 
participatory media (such as reality TV or Web 2.0). New media participation, therefore, 
can be seen as a fruitful target for the analysis of contemporary cultures, values, and 
moralities. 
On the one hand, discussion within the fields of cultural and celebrity studies 
points out the possibility that contemporary popular culture as “free” or “open” site for 
public dialogues could increase culturally diverse public negotiation of morality and 
values and create an alternative democratic public sphere to that of often strictly 
bureaucratic governmental discourse (see e.g. McGuigan 2005; Jenkins 2006; Graham 
& Harju 2011). Moreover, new media genres of celebrity gossip, particularly blogs, 
highlight the gossip readers’ role in making meanings, which may challenge the 
hegemony of media-made celebrity culture (Meyers 2012). These optimistic 
approaches to the demotic turn stress the pedagogic and emancipating potential of lay 
people’s participation in contemporary public arenas. As Henry Jenkins (2006: 84–85) 
describes, “there is a real value in gossip that extends into virtual rather than face-to-
face communities” because thereby different social groups can learn how they each 
see the world. 
On the other hand, however, there are a lot of sceptical or at least critical 
notions of what happens to everyday moral reasoning when practiced online and what 
kinds of rhetorical and moral challenges relate to community building in digital networks 
(see e.g. Robins 1999; Miller 2001; 2004; Mitra & Watts 2002; Silverstone 2003; 2007; 
Barney 2004; Orgad 2007; Chouliaraki 2010; Chouliaraki 2011; Chouliaraki & Orgad 
2011; Chouliaraki 2012). One of the most notable critics of technological proximity was 
the media scholar Roger Silverstone who dedicated his life work to ethical criticism of 
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our everyday mediated experiences and technology-based communication shaping the 
moral life (see Orgad 2007; Chouliaraki & Orgad 2011). According to Silverstone 
(2003: 480–483; 2007: 133–135, 173), participation in technologically impregnated 
environments may involve a distorted relation between the self and the other, which 
denies real (moral) responsibility as a duty of care for the ‘other’ beyond reciprocity 
online (see also Robins 1999). Similarly, Carolyn R. Miller argues that participation in 
digital environments involves a rhetorical problem of optimizing the trustworthiness of 
the self and the other (Miller 2001: 267). Communication in computer-mediated settings 
may highlight pathos, emotion, at the expense of reasoning, logos (Miller 2004: 205–
212). Moreover, Lilie Chouliaraki (2010: 212) who has analyzed humanitarian 
participation in the new media argues that one of the characteristics of new media 
discourse is its relation to post-humanitarianism that makes people mirror their own 
world views in a “consumerist” fashion instead of moral negotiation. Typical of new 
media participation is also mediated self-presentation that abandons the normativity of 
the public sphere as linguistic rationalism and highlights playful, ironic textualities 
contributing to particularized meanings and values (Chouliaraki 2011: 368; 2012: 2). 
Similar moral criticism has been presented by Darien Barney who sees online 
participation as empty of moral obligations to community, which, according to him, 
presents “a perfect technological solution to the problem of community in a liberal, 
market society” (Barney 2004: 32). From these critical perspectives, informal online 
discourses, because of their “freedom”, may lack reasoned moral criticism needed to 
develop communities through the solving of social inequalities.  
The lack of moral reasoning in online discourse may be a consequence of the 
nature of new media participation that highlights style (the material and playful side of 
communication) in addition to, but also at the expense of, purpose (ideas, rationality, 
and morality shared and negotiated in communication) (see Lanham 2006). As Richard 
Lanham (2006: 1–22) describes, we are living in an attention economy in which style 
as the way of packing values and information in words or pictures becomes a 
materialistic and therefore an economical issue (ibid. 3). It is the free use of technology 
that enables the endless reproduction in which “we can eat our cake, still have it, and 
give it away too.” In the attention economy, repetition and sharing, however, do not 
mean egalitarianism because the production of “things”, namely texts, pictures, and 
videos to appear on a screen involves competition of attention. (Ibid.12.) In the 
comment sections of celebrity gossip blogs, for instance, “one can attract attention by 
making the most inflammatory comment” (Meyers 2010: 266).  
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This study deals with non-reasoned morality in “ordinary people’s” new media 
participation. Particularly, this study focuses on the digital enthymeme as a morally 
simplistic way of participating in celebrity gossip online. In this study, the definition of 
the digital enthymeme is seen in relation to the concept of enthymeme as a kind of 
syllogism in which an idea is combined with reasons for believing it (see Walker 1994). 
The digital enthymeme is here defined as a non-reasoned value-judgment that appears 
as a comment evaluating people on a website where proofs can be effortlessly found in 
pictures, texts, links, and videos available in the shared digital context. When the 
process of finding proofs is invisible to the audience, online commenting itself follows a 
binary logic in which people and things are evaluated either positively or negatively, in 
terms of liking or disliking. This definition of the digital enthymeme closely relates to 
Barbara Warnick’s (2007) remarks on rhetoric online. According to her, persuasion 
made possible by the hypertextual and intertextual structure of the internet is 
dependent on a user’s ability to find the missing cues and supply the missing links so 
that online arguments work like enthymemes (Warnick 2007: 121). Examples of what I 
mean by digital enthymemes could be evaluative utterances, such as “S/he is ugly” or 
“I hate her/him” as online comments sent to discussion lists on celebrity gossip sites 
where supporting proofs preceding and following the comments can be found by 
clicking, scrolling, and making associations individually. The aim of this paper is to 
explore what kind of moral rhetoric is involved in digital enthymemes concerning 
celebrities. By moral rhetoric I mean the ways of positioning the self in relation to others 
by persuading them to share positive or negative evaluation of people and construct a 
common attitude toward the role of moral norms in a community. The aim is 
approached through two research questions 1) what kinds of digital enthymemes are 
used by English- and Finnish-speaking online participants commenting on gossip about 
violent celebrities and 2) how these enthymemes operate as moral arguments on the 
level of style (discourse itself as a persuasive material) and in relation to moral norms 
as a communally shared purpose.  
The comments on celebrity violence were chosen for this analysis because 
violence as a theme of popular culture tends to provoke judgments relating to larger 
societal issues (such as class or gender) (see Fiske 1989: 127–130). Moreover, 
although a lot of celebrity gossiping is potentially multinational and made possible by 
global celebrity industries and entertainment media, there are online gossip 
discussions taking place within more limited national and cultural groups, such as 
Finnish, in which shared moral norms can be assumed to play a central role. The 
comparison of English-language and potentially more global online discussions with 
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Finnish ones may give some ideas relating to possible moral challenges of 
multinational and multicultural online discourse. Since the possibility of moral 
uncertainty in shared standards of evaluating people is the higher the further we go 
from our home communities (e.g. Luckmann 2002: 27–78), it is interesting to see 
whether English-language online participants, compared with Finnish ones, are more 
likely to judge celebrities by completely avoiding moral terms. 
 
2. The focus of research 
This study utilizes a rhetorical approach to digital communication. In this 
section, I will take a closer look at the concept of enthymeme and discuss its moral 
function and after that describe the material and methods of the study. 
 
2.1 Enthymeme and moral rhetoric 
In a moral sense, there is something fundamental in the concept of enthymeme 
as the body of persuasive argument, that is, a rhetorical syllogism combining any idea 
with reasons for believing it in joint interaction between the rhetor and the audience 
(Bitzer 1959; Conley 1984; Jonsen & Toulmin 1988: 73–74; Walker 1994). Jeffrey 
Walker (1994: 54–55) argues that this “new-rhetorical” definition of enthymeme 
combines Aristotle’s perception of the rational enthymeme with the notion of the 
emotional enthymeme. Namely, in contemporary complex societies, where moral 
contracts are needed to avoid conflicts between different cultures and identities, 
morality needs to be negotiated through interaction (Bergmann 1998), producing 
publicly “crafted virtue” in which both reason and emotion matter (see Condit 1987). 
This study utilizes this new-rhetorical approach to the enthymeme as public interaction 
in which voices “from the grassroots” are to be taken as seriously as an authorial 
discourse. This approach does not hold that all enthymemes necessarily are 
harmonious combinations of reason and emotion, but in such new-rhetorical analysis it 
is possible to deal with the enthymeme’s role in value-based reasoning in which an 
argument gets its meaning in a dialogue between the rhetor and the audience (see 
Walker 1994: 63). Indeed, from a rhetorical point of view, ‘community’ includes the 
rhetor (the speaker or writer) and the audience as the people whom the rhetor wants to 
persuade (Miller 1993: 212). The community of the rhetor and the audience is made 
possible by values, that is, objects of agreement as shared preferences and interests 
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951; 2000 [1969]: 74). Since the enthymeme involves 
the rhetor, the audience, and values as the starting point of a community, it can be 
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seen as a basic way of positioning the self in relation to the other in a rhetorical 
practice.  
In addition, the enthymeme can be seen to consist of different components: the 
claim (the idea that the rhetor wants the audience to believe), the reason (minor 
premises, explanation or proofs why to believe the idea) and major premises of 
argumentation as the enthymeme’s omitted part meant for the audience to complete. 
When looking at enthymemes from a moral or ethical perspective, the judgment of 
people and evaluation of their acts can be seen as the basic pair of claim and reason 
as the rhetoricians Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1951; 2000 [1969]: 
293–316) argue. In rhetorical stylistics focusing on the enthymeme, the interest lies in 
such claim plus minor premise pairs (Fahnestock 2012: 376) that can be seen as the 
material side of rhetoric called specific topoi (indicating the time, the place, the 
circumstances, and the emotional involvement in argumentation) (Grimaldi 1972: 124–
133). That is to say, specific topoi are the material patterns of an argument and serve 
as “places” for different types of genre, institution, or discipline (Miller & Selzer 1985: 
311–316; Miller 1987: 62, 67). In this study, the specific topoi are seen as the styles of 
enthymemes in which the persuasiveness of written or spoken words and utterances is 
dependent on the particularities of an audience (see Burke 1969: 62). These notions of 
specific topoi closely relate to Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (2000 [1969]: 77–79) 
remarks on concrete values that are attached to a specific person, group, or object. 
From the viewpoint of specific topoi, different moral genres, such as celebrity gossip 
online, newspaper discourse on a politician’s reputation, or criminal justice in 
courtrooms, utilize specific styles of act-person argumentation which are persuasive to 
specific audiences in a particular historical and cultural context. A specific style of act-
person argumentation is involved for instance in communally shared togetherness 
based on a shared pleasure of mocking particular celebrities (see Meyers 2010: 266). 
Such a style would be called a separation technique in which people are evaluated as 
“thinglike” objects, not as moral subjects acting in a justifiable or condemnable manner 
(see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951). 
Moreover, however, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1951; 2000 [1969]: 293–
316) also argue that act-person relation is one of the connections of coexistence or 
commonplaces. In classical rhetoric, commonplaces are called common topoi (literally 
“common places”) that are also known as warrants (Toulmin 2003 [1958]) or maxims 
proven by experience (Jonsen & Toulmin 1988: 74). In this study, common topoi are 
seen as the major premises of enthymemes that exist beyond the material and 
concrete discourse, that is, beyond style (see Fahnestock 2012: 376). Within the 
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common topoi, we can distinguish moral norms as the general expectations of 
accepted behavior in a community (the definition of norm, see Luhmann 2008: 28–55). 
Act-person interaction is essential to morality because it contributes to the moral 
development of a community by enabling the negotiation of values. As Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1951: 261) argue, “[s]uccessive evocation of the act and the person, 
then of the person and the act, does not leave the mind at the point at which it started.” 
Elsewhere, they also point out that abstract values “seem to provide criteria for one 
wishing to change the established order” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 2000 [1969]: 
79). According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (ibid. 77–79), these abstract values, 
such as truth, justice, love, and equality, are irreconcilable values that as higher (moral) 
considerations are used for the criticism of concrete values.  Since act-person 
interaction is not only a style (a concrete and material claim-reason unit in discourse) 
but can also be seen as a common topos, it operates as an abstract moral conception 
whether we were dealing with celebrity gossip online, a politician’s reputation in a 
newspaper discourse, or criminal justice in courtrooms. Picture 1 illustrates how the 
enthymeme, as understood in this paper, consists of specific topoi (concrete material 
“places”) and common topos (moral norms as the abstract “common place” guiding 
behavior and discourse in a community).   
 
 
Picture 1. Enthymeme as a moral concept. 
In Picture 1, an example argument (either written or spoken) “Barbie hit Ken 
because she is evil” or “Barbie is evil because she hit Ken”, forms the immediately 
observable part of the enthymeme in which “Barbie hit Ken” brings out an occurred act 
and “Barbie is evil” is an emotional expression judging a person. Such explicitly 
judgmental tones can be found in celebrity gossip discourse, but they would be rare in 
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more formal genres such as in newspaper articles or courtroom speeches. In other 
words, this enthymeme is stylistically specific to popular culture. However, this example 
also has a relation to moral norms (visualized inside the thought bubble) as the part of 
enthymeme “existing” beyond the material form. In this silent and invisible place of 
ideas, the rhetor and the audience can “meet” and form a community beyond what is 
immediately observable. However, in order to find such a common moral place, the 
rhetor and the audience need to follow the empirically observable coordinates of “act” 
and “person”. That is to say, the style of evaluating people and/ or their behavior 
always has moral importance in reinforcing, challenging, or just silently accepting moral 
norms of a community. The audience could argue, for instance, that “Barbie hit Ken 
because she had to defend herself”, which may revise the morality of a community. 
Such act-person interaction characterizes moral negotiation and constant moral 
development of a community that is not stuck in the form. 
 
2.2. Material and methods 
The research material consists of 1800 asynchronous1 comments on four 
cases dealing with either domestic violence or female celebrities’ fights discussed in 
comment sections of English-language and Finnish websites of celebrity gossip. The 
domestic violence as a serious moral and societal topic of popular culture (see Ahva et 
al. 2013: 10–11) and “female fights” discussions focusing on the physical appearance 
of celebrities, rather than their moral character, were chosen for the study to give a 
picture of the possible diversity of digital enthymemes. 900 English-language 
comments concern two cases of American or global celebrities, and 900 Finnish-
language comments relate to two cases of Finnish celebrities. The comments were 
collected between January and October 2010. In general, if the most commented 
discussion thread included 150 comments or more, only one thread was chosen for the 
study. Moreover, I collected 75 comments at the beginning and 75 comments in the 
middle or at the end of a thread in order to see the diversity of digital enthymemes. The 
choosing of arguments was based on the notion that as the number of posts in a thread 
gets higher, the style of online argumentation is easily affected by the rising need to get 
one’s voice heard by commenting on celebrities in more aggressive ways (see Meyers 
2010: 266). A more elaborate description of the research material can be seen in Table 
1. 
 
                                               
1 In asynchronous discussions, interaction is structured into turns but a reply may be posted 
months or even years after the prior turn (see Kollock & Smith 1999: 5). 
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THE CASES OF CELEBRITY 
GOSSIP 
ASYNCHRONOUS DISCUSSION COMMENTS 
(total 1800) 
Pop singers Rihanna & Chris Brown 
(domestic violence) 
Just Jared, an English-language website dedicated to celebrity gossip 
(150)  
USATODAY.com, a U.S. online newspaper (150)  
YouTube, a global, user-generated website for video sharing and 
commenting  (150) 
A Finnish ex-ski jumper Matti Nykänen 
& his (ex-)wife Mervi Tapola          
(domestic violence) 
HS.fi, a Finnish online newspaper (150) 
Kaksplus.fi, a website of a Finnish ‘baby magazine’ including a lot of 
gossip (150) 
Suomi24, a general Finnish discussion forum with a heavy interest in 
celebrity and gossip (150) 
Entertainment celebrities Sharon 
Osbourne & Megan Hauserman            
(fight in a TV show) 
The Huffington Post, a U.S. online newspaper (150)  
LiveJournal (Oh No They Didn't), an English-language online 
community dedicated to celebrity gossip (150) 
YouTube (150) 
Finnish entertainment celebrities Martina 
Aitolehti & Anne-Mari Berg                          
(fight in a bar) 
Mtv3.fi, a website of a Finnish television channel (150)  
Seiska.fi, a website of a Finnish gossip magazine (150)  
Suomi24 (150) 
 
Table 1. Research material 
Methodically, this study utilizes both rhetorical argumentation analysis of 
enthymemes (see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951; Miller & Selzer 1985: 315; 
Jonsen & Toulmin 1988) and the analysis of evaluative language based on the 
linguistic appraisal framework (see Martin & White 2005). First, by utilizing the 
rhetorical argumentation analysis, digital enthymemes could be seen as realizations of 
the separation technique (see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951) in which people are 
evaluated without reasoning because proofs can be found in the shared digital 
environment by scrolling and clicking. Second, the analysis of evaluative language 
(Martin & White 2005) was utilized as a method to explore different ways of evaluating 
people. According to Jim Martin and Peter R. R. White (2005), there are three 
categories of evaluation, namely, affect (ways of feeling, such as “I hate them”), 
judgment (evaluation based on social esteem or sanction, such as “Ken is a bad 
person”), and appreciation (aesthetic evaluation, such as “Barbie is ugly”). Affect is at 
the heart of evaluation and it is transformed either into moral or aesthetic meanings, 
depending on the particular context and community (see Martin & White 2005: 45). In 
the analysis of evaluative language, “emotion” was seen as evaluative uses of 
language involving affect, judgment, or appreciation. Consequently, “emotion” was 
analysed as evaluation, not as a certain psychological reaction or a state of mind. 
Third, digital enthymemes as separation techniques were analyzed in relation to a 
digital environment and moral norms and compared with the idea of act-person relation 
as presented in Picture 2.  
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Picture 2. Analyzing digital enthymemes. 
As Picture 2 illustrates, in the digital enthymeme, material “places” stand for 
both the comments involving evaluation of people and the digital environment where 
proofs and support for the comments can be found (see also Warnick 2007: 121). In 
order to answer to the first research question (what kinds of digital enthymemes are 
used), digital enthymemes were categorized as moralistic or amoralistic, depending on 
the notion of whether people are judged as moral beings (in terms of affect or 
judgment) or as mere “things” to be liked or disliked (in terms of affect or appreciation) 
(see Martin & White 2005). Because digital enthymemes do not involve moral 
reasoning, the way of judging people is necessarily narrow-minded. In this study, 
moralistic is seen as an adjective meaning a simplistic moral attitude, while amoralistic 
refers to morally unconcerned judgments, such as oppressive jokes or comments on 
ugliness, which try to avoid moral criticism by reducing the ways of evaluating people to 
taste. Such “unintended” moral judgments, however, are to be included in the analysis 
when trying to understand the nature of morality in everyday interaction and evaluation. 
(See Young 2011 [1990]: 148–152). 
In accordance with the method of this study, a comment such as “Barbie is ugly” 
would be a realization of an amoralistic digital enthymeme, whereas “Ken is a bad 
person” would be categorized as a moralistic one. The comment “I hate them” would be 
either moralistic or amoralistic depending on the digital environment as the context for 
interpretation. The question marks in Picture 2 stand for the second research question 
of this study: how do these enthymemes operate as moral arguments on the level of 
style (discourse itself as a persuasive material) and in relation to moral norms as a 
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communally shared purpose? In order to answer to this question, the study utilizes 
“retrospective invention” as a rhetorical argumentation analysis in which the analyst 
seeks within empirically observable topoi (such as the comment “Barbie is ugly” and 
the particular digital environment where the comment appears) a way to conceptual 
places where sources for the persuasiveness of style can be found (about the method, 
see e.g. Miller & Selzer 1985: 315). Consequently, I explored how moralistic and 
amoralistic digital enthymemes as comments sent to a particular digital environment 
are related (or not related) to moral norms. In this study, one online comment 
evaluating people without reasoning (such as “Barbie is ugly”), but appearing in a 
digital context of proofs, was seen as one unit of analysis – as one digital enthymeme. 
The next section is for the results. 
 
3. Results: digital enthymemes in celebrity gossip discourse online 
In this study, 808 digital enthymemes were found, which means that almost the 
half (44,9 %) of 1800 comments analyzed were digital enthymemes. The comments left 
out of this analysis were those that somehow evaluated acts or negotiated moral norms 
and were thereby different from digital enthymemes that concern the ‘person’ only. In 
general, digital enthymemes were more common to English-language gossip 
discussions (in 464 comments) than to Finnish ones (in 344 comments). Further, digital 
enthymemes were categorized as moralistic or amoralistic comments depending on 
whether human beings are evaluated as moral beings or as corporeal, aesthetic, or 
cultural “things”. Of the 808 digital enthymemes found in the study, only 222 comments 
were moralistic, while 586 were amoralistic, which can be seen in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Types of digital enthymemes on celebrity gossip sites. 
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As Figure 1 shows, the comments evaluating human beings as amoral objects 
were more common to the discussions about fights involving female celebrities than 
those dealing with domestic violence involving celebrities. Consequently, the gossip 
about fighting female celebrities, especially, provoked online participants to use digital 
enthymemes without a moral concern. Moreover, digital enthymemes as moralistic 
comments characterize particularly English-language discussions of domestic violence 
because the gossip news about the beaten Rihanna provoked a lot of sympathetic 
reactions from her fans and strong negative judgments calling for the penalty of her 
boyfriend Chris Brown. In what follows, I will give some examples of digital 
enthymemes as both moralistic and amoralistic comments and discuss their relation to 
moral norms. Typical of digital enthymemes was to emerge in groups of a few 
consecutive comments, as the examples show. The Finnish example comments have 
been translated into English. 
 
3.1 Digital enthymemes as moralistic comments 
In this section, I will deal with comments in which celebrities are evaluated in 
moralistic terms, as ‘good’ people to be sympathized or ‘bad’ to be condemned. 
Characteristic of the digital enthymemes in which celebrities were evaluated as good or 
bad moral beings, was a more serious tone of discourse compared with amoralistic 
comments. Most of these morally serious, albeit simplistic, comments were posted to 
websites dealing with domestic violence gossip, which resonates with the notion that 
domestic violence, especially, is seen as a morally serious topic of popular culture (see 
Ahva et al. 2013: 10–11). On the Just Jared gossip site involving the gossip news story 
“Rihanna’s bruised face revealed”, moralistic comments were uses of evaluation 
sympathizing Rihanna as the alleged victim and condemning Chris Brown with voices 
aggressively insisting that he should be punished, which can be seen in Picture 3. 
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Picture 3. Examples of digital enthymemes as moralistic comments on Just Jared. 
 
As the comments in Picture 3 show, the gossip news about Rihanna’s alleged 
beating provoked commenting involving an explicit tone of voice, such as “I hope CB 
spends time in jail” (in comment #12), “He should be put in jail!!!” (in comment #13), 
and “We need to boycott that…He is a monster...”(in comment #15). These judgments 
calling for social sanction rely on the moral institution of the state or its capitalistic 
system (see Martin & White 2005: 52). At the same time, emotional comments 
indicating a fellow-feeling for Rihanna can be distinguished when the participants 
evaluate a picture of Rihanna’s bruised face in comments #14 and #15 (e.g. “omg...she 
looks so sad...omg” or “Poor Rihanna”). Such discourse involves language of affect, 
which, according to Martin and White (2005: 46), is based on the relation of an emoter 
(the participant experiencing the emotion) and trigger (the phenomenon causing the 
emotion). In these comments, we can clearly see the strong like-mindedness of 
Rihanna’s fans getting together online to feel and judge on a seemingly same basis. 
However, none of these comments explicitly shows willingness to negotiate the role of 
moral norms in relation to domestic violence: the reasons for the emotional claims are 
not articulated in the public discourse. In other words, these posts can be seen as 
182 Acta Wasaensia
Digital enthymeme: morality, emotions, and 
materialism in new media participation                                                                                                           Maria Eronen 
   Special Issue of “Sociedad de la Información” 2013                                                                                                    48 
signs of emoter-trigger relationship in which online participants are eager to express 
their own feelings, expecting others to feel the same. 
In Finnish online comment sections dealing with celebrity gossip about domestic 
violence, the posts showing fellow-feeling for the female celebrity were less explicit 
than on English-language websites. However, the condemnation of Matti Nykänen, the 
Finnish male celebrity accused of a violent attack against his (ex)wife, was evident, 
which can be seen in Picture 4. The sender of the comment #2 asks a question “Why is 
he always set free?” to which the participant of the comment #3 replies “Well, because 
he is Matti. But if you had done this, you were already in jail”, which is followed by the 
comment #4: “I wonder about that too :O.” All these comments can be seen as digital 
enthymemes insisting that Nykänen should be put in jail. 
 
 
Picture 4. Examples of digital enthymemes as moralistic comments on Kaksplus.fi. 
In addition to the judgment calling for social sanction (see Martin & White 2005: 
52–54), interesting in Picture 4 is the use emoticons: the headwall ([O) in comments #2 
and #3 and surprise (:O) in comment #4. These emoticons can be seen to embody 
some kind of frustration related to the news that the male celebrity is not arrested even 
though he had committed domestic violence. Like the English-language examples, also 
the Finnish examples indicate a way of sharing personal moral judgments in celebrity 
gossip discussions. These notions of digital enthymemes resonate with Chouliaraki’s 
(2012: 3) remarks on self-mediation as mediated participation in which an inner moral 
self is the most authentic expression of publicness. Similarities can also be found with 
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post-humanitarian discourse in which personal moral considerations and individual 
action take place through effortless intimacy with technology (Chouliaraki 2010: 117). 
Such technological proximity on gossip sites may promote a belief that the ‘self’ is an 
autonomous moral judge who can easily support his or her inner moral imagination with 
quickly typed comments. Moreover, previous moralistic digital enthymemes posted to 
the site may persuade new participants to post comments that share the judgment, 
which creates a circle of digital enthymeming as visualized in Picture 5. 
 
 
Picture 5. Digital enthymemes as moralistic comments. 
As Picture 5 shows, digital enthymemes as moralistic comments entail 
searching for proofs in a digital environment, making individual moral considerations 
based on the proofs, and expressing emotions as moralistic comments. Although such 
participation can be seen to involve moral considerations, these considerations are 
merely psychological, not socially negotiated and do not, therefore, occur in common 
topoi. In other words, the community of the rhetor and the audience is built in material 
places – in conclusions that are visible on the screen. Earlier in this paper, the material 
level of discourse was linked with the concept of style in which persuasion derives from 
the particularities of an audience (see Burke 1969: 62). In these comments, the 
particularities of the audience can be seen in the style of pathos that invites other like-
minded participants to express their emotions as results of inner moral considerations. 
Despite the internal, non-argumentative moral logic, the users of moralistic digital 
enthymemes share a common interest in the world of social affairs and provoke new 
invokes 
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like-minded participants who think that Chris Brown is “a monster” or who wonder why 
Matti Nykänen is always set free.  
 
3.2. Digital enthymemes as amoralistic comments 
Compared with digital enthymemes as moralistic comments, digital 
enthymemes as amoralistic comments utilized a less serious but still an aggressively 
judging tone of discourse. Characteristic of the amoralistic comments was non-
reasoned and often ironic evaluation of celebrities as cultural products, or aesthetic and 
sexual “things”. In Martin’s and White’s (2005) categories of evaluative language, 
amoralistic digital enthymemes would be mainly based on appreciation which is 
concerned of evaluation of things and phenomena (see ibid. 56). Moreover, the notion 
of amoralistic digital enthymemes resonates with Chouliaraki’s (2011; 2012: 2) remarks 
that the artful quality of new media contents may become more important than social 
and moral criticism of technological participation. Since digital enthymemes as 
amoralistic comments were more typical of female fights discussions than those of 
domestic violence, I will bring out examples from online comment sections dealing with 
fighting female celebrities. I have categorized the amoralistic digital enthymemes into 
three main groups: 1) ranking and comparison (Pictures 6 and 7), 2) sexual mockery 
(Pictures 8 and 9), and 3) aesthetic mockery (Pictures 10 and 11). In addition to these 
mocking comments, both English-language and Finnish celebrity gossip discussions 
also involved amoralistic digital enthymemes that aggressively invented creative ways 
of killing a celebrity (such as using a celebrity as a human piñata but being 
disappointed when seeing that the celebrity’s broken head were empty). Because of 
research ethics, however, such mockery concerning the killing of celebrities is not cited 
in this study. Pictures 6 and 7 show how online gossip participants ranked female 
celebrities as “things” and compared them with other public figures or things. 
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Picture 6. Examples of digital enthymemes as ranking and  
comparison in ONTD Live Journal community 
 
 
Comments ranking celebrities in Picture 6 can be seen to involve an ironic 
message: “[p]oor Megan” is ranked as “fav. VH1 reality star EVER” and as third in the 
ranking list “1. new york 2. pumkin 3. megan 4. buckwild.” After posting the list, 
however, the discussion participant corrects it by saying in capital letters: “HOW 
COULD I FORGET LACEY,SHES SECOND.” This enthymeming, I argue, has an ironic 
meaning. As a rhetorical style, irony is a figure of speech or writing utilized as a means 
of making a claim but meaning the opposite (Fahnestock 2012: 111). The ironic 
elements in the comments of Picture 6 can be distinguished in the homogeneous 
responses expressing like-mindedness (“she ranks up here for me too”) and in the 
uses of capital letters highlighting the ridiculous nature of entertainment celebrities (see 
Fahnestock 2012: 113). Moreover, irony as a form of community building resonates 
with the ONTD forum’s slogan, “The celebrities are disposable. The gossip is 
priceless.” Through this motto, celebrity gossip discourse is evaluated as worthier than 
individual celebrities who only have a materialistic value to gossipers. Ranking and 
comparison was also utilized on Finnish comment sections, as can be seen in Picture 7 
including comments on the gossip news “Scandalous beauties in the court right now.” 
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Picture 7. Examples of digital enthymemes as 
ranking and comparison on Seiska.fi. 
 
 
In Picture 7, the first commenter expresses his/her mocking attitude “A 
misleading headline, again! Beauties?” as a response to the headline in which the 
female celebrities were called “Scandalous beauties.” In this online discourse, the 
female celebrities are seen as cultural products having some kind of aesthetic essence 
that is not seen to match the way of evaluating them in the gossip headline. By 
comparing the pictures and the physical appearance of celebrities with the headline, 
the gossip participant reduces the celebrities to objects of his or her own “picture 
analysis”; they are not “beauties” (because they are not seen to look like such). The 
second commenter, on the other hand, starts a new topic by asking “Didn’t this AMB 
[Anne-Mari Berg] get some text messages from kanerva before tuksu”, which refers 
back to one of the most well-known political scandals in Finland, in which a minister of 
foreign affairs (Ilkka Kanerva) had to leave his job after an erotic dancer (Johanna 
Tukiainen, mockingly called “tuksu”) publicly revealed the text messages the minister 
had sent to her. By pointing out the possibility that Anne-Mari Berg got text messages 
from the minister before Tukiainen, the gossip participant puts Anne-Mari Berg in 
comparison with the other, widely mocked female celebrity. The last comment in 
Picture 7 claims that “Martina is lying – anne mari is right, martina is number 13 model 
who comes from the ahola’s stall2.” The celebrity’s label “number 13 model” is utilized 
as a means of ranking.  
While Pictures 6 and 7 involve comments in which celebrities are seen as 
cultural products to be compared with other celebrities and cultural artifacts, celebrities 
in Pictures 8 and 9 are mocked as sexual objects. 
                                               
2 Ahola’s stall refers to a Finnish model agency. 
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Picture 8. Examples of digital enthymemes as 
sexual mockery on Huffingtonpost.com. 
 
At least two commenters (Horus and BillMelater) in Picture 8 have male 
identities, which reinforces the notion that the mockery is a sexist discourse oppressing 
women. In the picture, the first commenter implies that having sex is the only thing that 
the celebrity is good for (“She is good for one thing and one thing only”) and provokes 
other participants on the site to respond (“Anyone care to guess what that might be?”). 
As a response to the first commenter, the second participant types “Yea, well, I’ll bet 
she’s not even good at that. I wouldn’t do her with yours... LOL” to reinforce the sexist 
mockery. The last comment in Picture 8 (“It would be like doing it with a syphillitic 
cricket”) makes the style of the sexual ridicule even more intense. Part of the 
playfulness is that the actual topic (having sex with the celebrity) stays in between 
lines. Sexual mockery was also part of Finnish forums, as the comments in Picture 9 
show. 
 
Picture 9. Examples of digital enthymemes as 
sexual mockery on Suomi24.fi. 
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In Picture 9, the first participant types “Good flesh ;)) Pretty comic :)) The fat of 
the miss candidates gets darker when they are boxing :))” to which the other participant 
replies “I wouldn’t be afraid at all if such a little bitch attacked me in a bar..on the 
contrary, it would be nice to have a match.” As in Picture 8, also in Picture 9 celebrities 
are seen as corporeal objects playing a role in relation to the gossip participants’ bodily 
desires expressed with ironic tones. Comments involving sexual mockery as the 
justification of oppression of the female body have a lot of similarities with aesthetic 
mockery included in Pictures 10 and 11.  
 
 
Picture 10. Examples of digital enthymemes as 
aesthetic mockery in ONTD Live Journal community 
 
 
The comments in Picture 10 are responses to a picture in which Megan 
Hauserman shows her hair after having the alleged fight in which Sharon Osbourne 
was reported to have pulled her hair. Again, the playful and non-serious tone of 
commenting is plain to see. For instance, the expression dayum (in the last comment in 
Picture 10) or exaggerated as Daaaayum (in the first comment in Picture 10) indicates 
a happy surprise related to voyeuristic pleasures of seeing the picture and reading the 
gossip news story. As Martin and White (2005: 62) would argue, such linguistic choices 
invoke an emotional reaction, rather than directly tell how the “emoter” feels. In other 
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words, these participants of online gossip perform rather than articulate their reactions. 
The first commenter also expresses disappointment when seeing the picture (“...it 
doesn’t look very red or irritated. There also isn’t any blood or scabbing.... Sharon, I 
expected you to leave scars!”), which, in this context, makes sense as a ridicule. 
Moreover, in the second comment, the participant compares the physical appearance 
of Megan’s head with the butt region of a cat having worms, which not only shares with 
the first participant the right to mockery, but also makes the mocking tone even 
coarser. The third (“weave?”) and the last commenter (“wow i was looking at that for a 
good few seconds before i realized what it was. dayum”) continue the aesthetic 
mockery by indicating that they were not even sure what is in the picture. In Finnish 
comments in Picture 11, the aesthetic mockery was linked with ranking, comparison, 
and sexual mockery, indicating how the main types of amoralistic digital enthymemes 
may overlap with one another. 
 
 
Picture 11. Examples of digital enthymemes as 
 aesthetic mockery on Seiska.fi. 
 
 
The first commenter in Picture 11 asks “Which one is sexier or more beautiful? 
Pretty impossible to say because they both are so perfect. perhaps Martina is a little bit 
cuter and Anne-Mari sinfully sexier. They both are desirable!” which is followed by the 
comment “I haven’t read their blogs but anne-mari has bigger tits!”. This aesthetic 
mockery makes these celebrities voyeuristic objects of sexual desires and sexist 
oppression. Moreover, evident in the comments of Picture 11 is also a comparison 
between these two celebrities (which of them is sexier or more beautiful or has bigger 
tits), which aims at contributing to the ranking of celebrities as cultural products having 
certain empirically observable qualities.  
Digital enthymemes as amoralistic comments highlight materialism in the 
evaluation of people more than digital enthymemes as moralistic comments because 
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the amoralistic digital enthymemes completely block the way to moral thinking. The 
only thing that matters in amoralistic digital enthymemes is the style of discourse, as 
Picture 12 illustrates.  
 
 
Picture 12. Digital enthymemes as amoralistic comments. 
Amoralisti digital enthymemes make celebrities dehumanized objects of stylistic 
evaluation, which is justified by proofs that are to be found in the digital environment. 
Such a shared way of creating an argument in the digital space can be seen to hinder 
moral thinking (be it individual or common), as Picture 12 shows. While the moralistic 
digital enthymeme involves interest in social issues of celebrities, the amoralistic digital 
enthymeme can be seen as new media participation that is entirely dependent on the 
way of evaluating people as “things” and treating their bodies and body parts as objects 
of concrete values, be they sexual, aesthetic, voyeuristic or other. Moreover, Susan 
Barnes (2001: 42) argues that because interruptions and other social cues keeping 
discussion participants aware of group dynamics are missing in an internet discussion, 
online conversation favors “a ping pong kind of arguing” in which frequent 
disagreement keeps discussion going on (see also Shirky 1995: 44). However, the 
digital enthymeme, particularly in its amoralistic form, is characterized by like-
mindedness with the surrounding envicronment. This like-mindedness is realized as a 
ping-pong kind of relation between consecutive amoralistic posts in a comment section. 
Consequently, in celebrity gossip online, “ping-ponging” is not related to disagreement 
as much as it is related to accelerated repetition as if the speed of the ping-pong ball 
would get faster when the competition of who makes the most inflammatory comment 
on celebrities gets tougher (cf. Meyers 2010: 266). Such ping-ponging, therefore, is a 
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good example of reproduction in a digital environment (see Lanham 2006: 12). A style 
is shared when it becomes multiple.  
 
4. Conclusion: Digital enthymemes and moral irresponsibility 
In this article, I have examined moral and rhetorical challenges of a popular new 
media discourse by focusing on the digital enthymeme as an argument that involves a 
claim but abandons reason because proofs for the claim can be found in the 
surrounding digital environment of links, texts, pictures, and videos. Because the 
evaluation of person and his/her acts can be seen as the basic pair of moral claim and 
reason (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951), this paper started from the notion of act-
person argumentation. The digital enthymeme was approached as a separation 
technique in which the evaluation of acts as an explanation for the evaluation of people 
is missing. Moreover, the comment sections dealing with domestic violence and female 
celebrities’ fights were chosen for the study because violence involving celebrities is a 
popular topic that tends to bring important social meanings to the surface (see Fiske 
1989: 127–130). 
The aim of this paper was to explore what kind of moral rhetoric is involved in 
digital enthymemes concerning celebrities. This aim was approached through two 
research questions: 1) what kinds of digital enthymemes are used by English- and 
Finnish-speaking online participants commenting on gossip about violent celebrities 
and 2) how these enthymemes operate as moral arguments on the level of style 
(discourse itself as a persuasive material) and in relation to moral norms as a 
communally shared purpose. In general, digital enthymemes were more typical of 
English-language than Finnish discussions of celebrities. This indicates that perhaps 
the digital enthymeme as an argument avoiding the evaluation of acts is a way of 
making social judgments and community building as easy as possible for participants 
who may come from various national or cultural backgrounds.  
To answer to the first question, this study utilized an analysis of evaluative 
language (Martin & White 2005) through which two types of digital enthymemes were 
found, namely, moralistic and amoralistic. While moralistic digital enthymemes evaluate 
celebrities as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ human beings who deserve sympathy or antipathy, 
amoralistic digital enthymemes dehumanize celebrities and rank them as cultural 
products or evaluate them as corporeal objects having certain sexual or aesthetic 
qualities. To answer to the second research question, this study utilized a rhetorical 
argumentation analysis in which the material discourse (specific topoi) was seen as 
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linguistic cues whose relation to conceptual major premises (common topoi) as 
communally negotiated moral norms was examined (about the method see e.g. Miller & 
Selzer 1985: 315). According to the results, neither moralistic nor amoralistic digital 
enthymemes aim at negotiation of moral norms in a community. While moralistic digital 
enthymemes invoke personalized considerations of moral norms, amoralistic digital 
enthymemes block any relation to moral norms and manifest, therefore, an anarchistic 
freedom from rules. Paradoxically, the shared interest in reducing the evaluation of 
people to aesthetic, sexual, or cultural taste may be a way of avoiding moral 
uncertainty by creating easy and entertaining togetherness beyond national borders. 
This may explain why English-language online environments, especially, favor 
amoralistic digital enthymemes.  
The moralistic digital enthymemes were typical of discourses surrounding 
gossip about celebrities involved in domestic violence. In such digital enthymemes, 
online gossip participants were eager to condemn male celebrities often in harsh words 
and show fellow-feeling for female celebrities by typing short but emotionally intensive 
comments. The notion of digital enthymemes as moralistic comments resonates with 
Chouliaraki’s (2010: 117) remarks on post-humanitarian style that is characterized by 
“no-time engagement with technology” in which the “expectations of effortless 
immediacy, the most prominent element of contemporary consumer culture, are 
increasingly populating the moral imagination of humanitarianism.” Moreover, as 
Chouliaraki (2010: 117) continues, such new media participation is also characterized 
by the absence of reasons and morality explaining why technological action is needed. 
The moral persuasiveness of these digital enthymemes is based on a silent claim that 
individuals have the right to express their emotions in public and build moral norms 
inside their own minds, without taking a communal responsibility. 
Digital enthymemes as amoralistic comments, on the other hand, try to 
challenge moral seriousness by dehumanizing celebrities, often with mocking tones, 
and reducing their characters to corporeal and aesthetic figures. These enthymemes 
were typical of female fights discussions in which moral condemnation of “violent 
celebrities” was not the main point. These notions of amoralistic digital enthymemes 
have similarities with Chouliaraki’s (2011: 364) remarks on playful and self-oriented 
textualities which are concerned of morality of irony turning solidarity into self-centred 
consumerism and reproducing already existing power-structures. It is evident that the 
amoralistic digital enthymemes are born in the context of situated meanings and values 
(see Chouliaraki 2011: 368). A lot of these comments can be seen as a discourse 
mocking celebrities only when analyzed in relation to the surrounding textual, visual, 
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and cultural environment. In celebrity gossip discourse, the power relations particularly 
concern sexist dominance over the woman’s body and character by promoting 
participation in which women are dehumanized and mocked. 
Sexist participation in celebrity gossip online is not, however, necessarily a 
masculine discourse oppressing women. As Kirsty Fairclough’s (2008) study suggests, 
the discourse evaluating the female physical appearance in celebrity gossip online may 
come under the guise of feminist empowerment in which women make evaluative 
meanings of female bodies in the name of freedom. In addition to gender, the mediated 
circulation of emotions in celebrity culture is related to questions of class: the 
comments of mockery typically target relatively young, lower middle class women (see 
Tyler 2008; Paasonen & Pajala 2010). The persuasion in such discourse is based on 
the right to express temptations, desires and likings and dislikings, which, in the name 
of the freedom of expression, deny the role of moral thinking in new media 
participation. Instead of civic morality, the amoralistic digital enthymemes can be seen 
to construct a morality of style in which the shared taste becomes the norm that rules 
the community’s judgment and thus ties community members together, which is typical 
of contemporary popular culture (see Brummett 2008: 102–103).  
Why is digital enthymeming, then, so common to celebrity gossip online? I 
argue that there are at least two main reasons explaining the popularity of non-
reasoned new media discourse. First, participants using digital enthymemes let one 
another pass the test of trustworthiness perhaps too easily. These remarks closely 
relate to Miller’s notions of ethos online. According to her, we have a natural need to 
see our interlocutors as trustworthy, which may explain why online participants assume 
things that are not articulated in the interaction itself (see Miller 2001). In computer-
mediated environments, where cues of the other mind are minimal, we often need to 
optimize both the ‘other’ and ourselves in order to communicate (Miller 2001: 270–
271). Such optimizing abandoning criticism also relates to visuality in online 
environments. What can be seen has an authentic truth value, which, of course, is 
often a mere illusion (see Finnegan 2001). In celebrity gossip online, the visual 
effectiveness is evident when pictures of celebrities and their body parts are taken for 
granted and judged as metonymic evidence justifying the mockery attacking their 
character. When celebrity gossip commenters type their comments online, they expect 
others to see the same textual cues, pictures, and videos which they treat as the 
reference points of their own comments. Consequently, reasoning online becomes 
unnecessary, something that may even threaten affective intensity as an experience of 
togetherness. But the material context is dynamically changing through the constant 
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updating of links and contents and cannot, therefore, serve as the solid common 
ground for online participants. Second, digital enthymemes are based on emotional 
connectivity as the shared self-interest. Lev Manovich (2001: 269) deals with such 
emotional connectivity by bringing out that a digital environment is a subjective space 
because users utilize its architecture to reflect their own movements and emotions. In 
celebrity culture, this individual emotional connectivity has a tendency to become 
affectively and socially “sticky” as clusters of emotions (typically negative ones) are 
constantly linked to particular celebrity phenomena in the popular media and on their 
online forums (see Paasonen & Pajala 2010; about emotional stickiness, see Ahmed 
2004). Popular culture seems to provide a context of evaluation in which women, 
especially, are dehumanized, that is, “amoralized”. This may explain the higher percent 
of amoralistic than moralistic digital enthymemes in discussions of female celebrities’ 
fights. The results of moralistic and amoralistic enthymemes might have been different 
if the discussion concerned for instance male politicians who are taken seriously and 
judged as morally responsible societal authorities. 
Digital enthymemes lack routes to common topoi – to abstract places natural of 
human reasoning – and benefits of these enthymemes can, therefore, be measured in 
specific topoi only, that is, according to Grimaldi (1972: 134), material propositions of 
rhetoric. Since the digital enthymeme does not support our common humanity, it can 
support mere institutions or ideologies, such as capitalistic systems of celebrity media 
that are ruled by concrete values measured in instant benefits. Common to both 
moralistic and amoralistic digital enthymemes is materialism highlighted in the clicking 
and typing behavior when following gossip news and sending comments to gossip 
forums. Such online behavior can be seen to match the commercial interests of many 
celebrity gossip sites and gossip media whose profits are dependent on the number of 
users or readers and their clicks and comments. Carefully reasoned critical 
argumentation as the negotiation based on abstract values (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 2000 [1969]: 79) takes more time and effort and would not do such an instant 
materialistic favor. Moreover, particularly the idea of amoralistic digital enthymemes 
also resonates with what Robert Hariman (1992) calls courtly style. According to 
Hariman (1992: 162), the courtly style is a public discourse that reduces the ethics and 
morality of a community to (mediated) spectacles around public persons’ body parts, 
which is a sign of social immobility that only reinforces the already-existing hierarchies 
of a community through power-spectacular displays. In other words, the courtly style 
tries to direct public focus to issues that hinder moral negotiation of social inequalities. 
Since the amoralistic digital enthymeme reduced young (lower middle-class) women, 
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especially, to their corporeal figures, we can see it as an ideological way of paralyzing 
moral criticism. Amoralistic digital enthymemes, just like the courtly style, try to make 
such serious counter-arguments irrelevant in which ideological power structures are 
challenged. In amoralistic digital enthymemes, it is a discourse-external authority, 
rather than communal moral negotiation or individual moral imagination, which has the 
power to rule and set norms for the discourse. Consequently, the online commenters 
using amoralistic digital enthymemes reproduce the meanings and values (such as 
physical appearance, voyeurism, and sexism) typical of celebrity media institutions, 
which can be seen to reinforce rather than challenge the hegemony of media-made 
celebrity culture (cf. Meyers 2012). In other words, the amoralistic digital enthymeme, 
especially, not only hinders criticism but can be seen to support patriarchal domination 
through the seemingly power-free modes of celebrity gossip discourse. 
The digital enthymeme does not exist by accident. On the contrary, its 
persuasiveness is based on technologically promoted self-interest in which moral 
responsibility as the care for the other is abandoned when embracing the individual 
freedom of choice and expression (see Silverstone 2003, pp. 480–483; 2007, p. 173). 
This self-interest is, perhaps, intertwined with (neo)liberal consumerism at the center of 
which lies the emotional self without true responsibilities (see Barney 2004: 36–37; 
Chouliaraki 2013: 179–180, 185–186). By introducing the digital enthymeme as a new 
concept for communication and media studies, this study has suggested a critical tool 
to approach emotional involvement in new media participation from a rhetorical and 
moral perspective.  
 
5. References 
 Ahmed, S. (2004). The cultural politics of emotion. Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh. 
 Ahva, L., Heikkilä, H., Siljamäki, J. & Valtonen, S. (2013). “A bridge over troubled 
water? Celebrities in journalism connecting implicit and institutional politics”. 
Journalism 0(0), pp. 1–16. 
 Barnes, S.B. (2001). Online connections: internet interpersonal relationships. 
Hampton Press, Inc., Cresskill, New Jersey.  
 Barney, D. (2004). “Communication versus obligation: the moral status of virtual 
community”. In D Tabachnick & T. Koivukoski (Eds), Globalization, technology and 
philosophy. State University of New York Press, New York, pp. 21–41. 
 Bergmann, J.R. (1998). “Introduction: morality in discourse”. Research on 
Language and Social Interaction, 31(1), pp. 279–294.   
196 Acta Wasaensia
Digital enthymeme: morality, emotions, and 
materialism in new media participation                                                                                                           Maria Eronen 
   Special Issue of “Sociedad de la Información” 2013                                                                                                    62 
 Bitzer, L.F. (1959). “Aristotle’s enthymeme revisited”. Quarterly Journal of Speech 
45(4), pp. 399–408. 
 Brummett, B. (2008). A rhetoric of style. Southern Illinois University Press, 
Carbondale. 
 Burke, K. (1969). A rhetoric of motives. University of California Press, Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London. 
 Chouliaraki, L. (2010). “Post-humanitarianism: humanitarian communication beyond 
a politics of pity”. International Journal of Cultural Studies, 13(2), pp. 107–126. 
 Chouliaraki, L. (2011). “Improper distance': towards a critical account of solidarity 
as irony”. International Journal of Cultural Studies, 14(4), pp. 363–381. 
 Chouliaraki, L. & Orgad, S. (2011). “Proper distance: mediation, ethics, otherness”. 
International Journal of Cultural Studies, 14(4), pp. 341–345. 
 Chouliaraki, L. (2012). “Introduction”. In Chouliaraki, L. (Ed.), Self-mediation: New 
media, Citizenship and Civil Selves. Routledge, London & New York, pp. 1–8. 
 Chouliaraki, L. (2013). The ironic spectator: solidarity in the age of post-
humanitarianism. Polity Press, Cambridge & Malden. 
 Condit, C.M. (1987). “Crafting virtue: the rhetorical construction of public morality”. 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 73(1), pp. 79–97.              
 Conley, T.M. (1984). “The enthymeme in perspective”. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 
70(2), pp. 168–187. 
 Fairclough, K. (2008). “Fame is a losing game: celebrity gossip blogging, bitch 
culture and postfeminism”. Genders, 48, pp. 1–19. [Online] Available: 
[http://www.genders.org/g48/g48_fairclough.html] (Nov 7, 2012). 
 Fahnestock, J. (2012). Rhetorical style: the uses of language in persuasion. Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
 Finnegan, C.A. (2001). “The naturalistic enthymeme and visual argument: 
photographic representation in the "skull controversy". Argumentation and 
Advocacy, 37 (Winter 2001), pp. 133–149. 
 Fiske, J. (1989). Understanding popular culture. Routledge, London & New York. 
 Graham, T. & Harju, A. (2011). “Reality TV as a trigger of everyday political talk in 
the net-based public sphere”. European Journal of Communication, 26(18), pp. 18–
32. 
 Grimaldi, W.M.A. (1972). Studies in the philosophy of Aristotle’s rhetoric. Franz 
Steiner, Wiesbaden. 
 Hariman, R. (1992). “Decorum, power, and the courtly style”. Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 78 (1992), pp. 149–172. 
 Acta Wasaensia        197 
Digital enthymeme: morality, emotions, and 
materialism in new media participation                                                                                                           Maria Eronen 
   Special Issue of “Sociedad de la Información” 2013                                                                                                    63 
 Jenkins, H. (2006). Convergence culture: where old and new media collide 
(updated and with a new afterword). New York University Press, New York & 
London. 
 Jonsen, A.R., & Toulmin, S. (1988). The abuse of casuistry: a history of moral 
reasoning. University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London. 
 Kollock, P. & Smith, M.A. (1999). “Communities in cyberspace”. In: M.A. Smith & P. 
Kollock (Eds). Communities in cyberspace. Routledge, London & New York, pp. 3–
25. 
 Lanham, R. (2006). The economics of attention: style and substance in the age of 
information. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London. 
 Luhmann, N. (2008). Die Moral der Gesellschaft. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am 
Main. 
 Luckmann, T. (2002). “Moral communication in modern societies”. Human Studies 
25, pp. 19–32. 
 Manovich, L. (2001). The language of new media. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 Martin, J.R. & White, P.R.R. (2005). The language of evaluation: appraisal in 
English. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 
 McGuigan, J. (2005). “The cultural public sphere”. European Journal of Cultural 
Studies, 8(4), pp. 427–443. 
 Meyers, E.A. (2010). Gossip talk and online community: celebrity gossip blogs and 
their audiences. Open Access Dissertations. Paper 292. [Online] Available: 
[http://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/292/] (Jun 20, 2011). 
 Meyers, E.A. (2012). “Blogs give regular people the chance to talk back’: 
Rethinking ‘professional’ media hierarchies in new media”. New Media & Society, 
14(6), pp. 1022–1038. 
 Miller, C.R., & Selzer, J. (1985). “Special topics of argument in engineering reports”. 
In L. Odell & D. Goswami (Eds). Writing in nonacademic settings. Guilford, New 
York, pp. 309–341. 
 Miller, C.R. (1987). “Aristotle’s “special topics” in rhetorical practice and pedagogy”. 
Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 17(1), pp. 61–70. 
 Miller, C.R. (1993). “The polis as rhetorical community”. Rhetorica: A Journal of the 
History of Rhetoric, 11(3), pp. 211–240. 
 Miller, C.R. (2001). “Writing in a culture of simulation: ethos online”. In P. Coppock 
(Ed.). The Semiotics of writing: transdisciplinary perspectives on the technology of 
writing. Brepols, Turnhout, Belgium, pp. 253–279. 
198 Acta Wasaensia
Digital enthymeme: morality, emotions, and 
materialism in new media participation                                                                                                           Maria Eronen 
   Special Issue of “Sociedad de la Información” 2013                                                                                                    64 
 Miller, C.R. (2004). “Expertise and agency: transformations of ethos in human-
computer interaction”. In M.J. Hyde (Ed.). The ethos of rhetoric. The University of 
South Carolina Press, Columbia, pp. 197–218.   
 Mitra, A., & Watts, E. (2002). “Theorizing cyberspace: the idea of voice applied to 
the internet discourse”. New Media & Society, 4(4), pp. 479–498. 
 Orgad, S. (2007). “The Internet as a moral space: the legacy of Roger Silverstone”. 
New Media & Society, 9(1), pp. 33–41. 
 Paasonen, S. & Pajala, M. (2010). “Trashing the prime minister bride: public dismay 
and intertextual media”. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 27(2), pp. 174–
192. 
 Perelman, C. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1951). ”Act and person in argument”. Ethics, 
61(4), pp. 251–269. 
 Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., (2000 [1969]). The new rhetoric: a treatise on 
argumentation (transl. J. Wilkinson & P. Weaver). The University of Notre Dame 
Press, Notre Dame.   
 Robins, K. (1999). “Against virtual community: for a politics of distance”. Angelaki: 
Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 4(2), pp. 163–170.   
 Shirky, C. (1995). Voices from the net. Zif-Davis Press, Emeryville, CA. 
 Silverstone, R. (2003). “Proper distance: towards an ethics for cyberspace”. In G. 
Liestol, A. Morrison & T. Rasmussen (Eds). Digital media revisited: theoretical and 
conceptual innovations in digital domains. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 469–490. 
 Silverstone, R. (2007). Media and morality: on the rise of the mediapolis. Polity 
Press, Cambridge & Malden. 
 Toulmin, S.E. (2003 [1958]). The uses of argument. Updated edition. Cambridge 
University Press, New York. 
 Turner, G. (2010). Ordinary people and the media: the demotic turn. SAGE, 
London, California, New Delhi & Singapore.       
 Tyler, I. (2008). “Chav mum chav scum:" class disgust in contemporary Britain”. 
Feminist Media Studies, 8(1), pp. 17–34. 
 Walker, J. (1994). “The body of persuasion: a theory of the enthymeme”. College 
English, 56(1), pp. 46–65. 
 Warnick, B. (2007). Rhetoric online: persuasion and politics on the world wide web. 
Peter Lang Publishing, New York. 
 Young, I. M. (2011 [1990]). Justice and the politics of difference. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton and Oxford.  
 
 Acta Wasaensia        199 
ONLINE CELEBRITY GOSSIP, MORAL 
DISIDENTIFICATION, AND ETHOS:  
Exploring the Rhetorical Grounds of Celebrity Mockery 
 
 
Maria Eronen 
University of Vaasa, Communication Studies 
 
Abstract: Typical of celebrity culture in online spaces is the mockery of and disidentification 
with celebrities. This study defines moral disidentification as a rhetorically meaningful positioning 
in which people evaluate others without sympathetically identifying with them. Based on the idea 
of online environments as normative sites where the ethos of co-participants is controlled, this 
study explores the rhetorical grounds of celebrity mockery in new media contexts by focusing on 
types of normativity utilized to support moral disidentification with celebrities in an online 
community for celebrity gossip (Oh No They Didn’t). According to the findings, online gossipers 
support moral disidentification through five types of normativity (virtual; voyeuristic; playful; 
disparate; and aesthetic). These types of normativity contribute to the ethos of clever, self-
empowering participants who argue that celebrities should not be seen as authentic or real but 
openly mocked and ridiculed because they are “fair game” made by the media industry. This study 
discusses such ethos in relation to ethical theories of late modernity and argues that the rhetorical 
grounds of celebrity mockery lie in the contradiction of phronesis and arete in online gossipers’ 
ethos. 
Keywords: Arete, celebrity, ethos, eunoia, morality, online community, phronesis, late 
modernity, rhetoric 
1 Introduction 
# Daaaayum 
  Gotta wonder how much of that is caused from shitty extensions, tho... Cause 
  it doesn’t look very red or irritated. There also isn’t any blood or scabbing.... 
  Sharon, I expected you to leave scars! (sillyjacki) 
# That looks like when my cat had worms and was ripping her hair off her butt 
  region. (orangeandblack) 
#  weave? (rlykewl) 
#  wow i was looking at that for a good few seconds before i realized what it 
  was. dayum. (christiandior) 
#  who the fuck goes to the hospital because their hair was ripped out? Its not 
  bleeding, it’s not even red. What the fuck do you think they are going to do 
  about it? (captain_flappy) 
#  LOL, do not fuck with Sharon Osbourne, bb. (jessashoutbaby) 
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The comments cited above are reactions to a picture of Playboy model and reality 
TV personality Megan Hauserman, which was posted on the website of the 
LiveJournal gossip community Oh No They Didn’t (ONTD) on 15 December 
2008. In the picture, the celebrity shows her hair after the fight filmed on the TV 
show Rock of Law, Charm School in which the host Sharon Osbourne attacked 
Hauserman by pulling out her hair extensions. The attack was preceded by 
Hauserman’s comment that Osbourne is famous only through her husband Ozzy 
Osbourne. In the ONTD online community, this gossip news was seen as staged. 
It provoked humorous comments with the purpose of mocking Hauserman for her 
fame, which was considered undeserved. Such celebrity bashing is linked to 
media-savvy readings of an audience aware of the media industries’ strategies to 
attract attention (see Ahva, et al. 194–195). In other words, readings involving a 
critical and antipathetic stance toward celebrities are made from the role/position 
of a media audience who know that celebrities are not real individuals but mere 
objects of “fair game.” In contemporary celebrity culture, particularly in new 
media environments, such as in blogs and comment sections, celebrity mockery is 
a popular way of media participation (e.g. Fairclough; Meyers, Gossip Talk and 
Online Community; Meyers, Dishing Dirt; Eronen, “It’s so wrong yet so funny”; 
Eronen, “Moral Argumentation as a Rhetorical Practice”). 
In this paper, such mocking of celebrities is called moral disidentification. By 
moral disidentification, I mean a rhetorically meaningful positioning in which 
people evaluate others without sympathetically identifying with them. Joke 
Hermes and Erin Ann Meyers categorize such disidentification as frivolous gossip 
readings, while Lilie Chouliaraki deals with disidentification when speaking 
about ironic spectatorship. As a phenomenon of celebrity culture, frivolous gossip 
readings – both in face-to-face gossip and online – can be defined as 
disidentification with celebrities, resulting from the rejection of dominant values 
and morals (see Hermes 121, 133-141; Meyers, Gossip Talk: 30-32, 53, 169, 283, 
309). According to Joke Hermes (121, 133–141), frivolous gossip readings 
oppose serious ones in which the celebrity gossip audience treats celebrities as 
individuals similar to themselves.  
Moreover, the term “ironic spectator,” as Chouliaraki argues, characterizes 
Western audiences who distance themselves from suffering others when 
consuming humanitarian appeals, news, and concerts or participating in celebrity 
culture with a doubt on their own treatment of mediated others on the basis of 
their common humanity. Such disidentified ways of positioning the self in 
relation to the other derive from the late-modern disbelief in moral “grand 
narratives” of altruistic benevolence and skepticism toward political morality’s 
universal justice (9-15, 172-180). The ironic spectatorship, according to 
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Chouliaraki's remarks, is characteristic of contemporary media participation in 
which people know that media try to persuade them through illusions and 
fantasies.  
Common to frivolous gossip readings and ironic spectatorship is the contribution 
to ethos, the credibility of the rhetor, through the postmodern rejection of the 
moral worth of others who appear as mediated faces. Ethos is central in the 
meaning-making practices surrounding celebrity phenomena, for being a celebrity 
and evaluating celebrities involves the art of the self. Online environments 
provide new, intriguing possibilities for this art, as P. David Marshall suggests in 
his article “The promotion and presentation of the self.” Interestingly, in online 
comment sections of celebrity gossip, autobiographical confessions and 
testimonies as narrative ways of taking celebrities “personally” are particularly 
rare (Eronen “Autobiographical Moralizing”). According to Shani Orgad, 
moreover, online discourse (e.g. blogs, online comments) seems to reject the 
narrative structure when it allows “no ending” and no moral explanation of media 
contents (Media Representation 132, 195-196). These remarks make one assume 
that text-based online contexts in particular are prone to impersonal participation 
that highlights what Laura Gurak calls “group ethos.” According to her analysis, 
group ethos is the collective force of an online community, which contributes to 
insularity and rejects differences in the name of conformism (255).  
Accepting and rejecting certain ethos constructions of others are central 
discourse-internal moral practices in communication. As Jörg R. Bergmann 
(“Introduction” 287-288) argues, the evaluation of people and their behavior 
carries risks for language users, and breaking the norms of a community is likely 
to lead to “counter-moralization” as a discourse-internal moral phenomenon in 
which the moralizers themselves become targets of moralizing. The 
understanding of morality in its discourse-internal role highlights the meaning of 
rhetorical speeches (such as online comments) as ethos-constructing acts that are 
morally controlled. Online communities, seen here as the processes of evolving 
togetherness in cyberspace (Fernback), are dependent on such discourse-internal 
normativity. If participants have broken the shared norms of an online 
community, they are punished – their entire profile may even be deleted (e.g. 
Reid 118-120, 130-132; Orgad “The Internet as a Moral Space” 37-38). Although 
moral disidentification in new media participation has been analyzed previously, 
studying the ways it is normatively supported in the context of online celebrity 
gossip remains a gap to be filled. 
The aim of this paper is to explore the rhetorical grounds of celebrity mockery in 
new media contexts by focusing on types of normativity utilized to support moral 
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disidentification with celebrities in an online community for celebrity gossip (Oh 
No They Didn’t). Oh No They Didn’t (ONTD) was chosen for this study because 
its interest in morally disidentifying readings is very evident and can even be seen 
in the community’s slogan: “The celebrities are disposable. The gossip is 
priceless.” In other words, celebrities evaluated on ONTD have no personal moral 
worth but the online participants regard the gossip about celebrities as valuable. 
2 Morality, identification, and late-modern 
 artificiality 
In this study, morality is understood as a rhetorical practice of positioning oneself 
in relation to the other people. In terms of rhetorical theory, such moral 
positioning can be understood as Burkean identification in which rhetors put 
themselves in the place of other people or objects and by so doing suggest that “I” 
am (or want to be) similar with another in this or that respect (20–21). 
Furthermore, moral positioning contributes to ethos – the character of a rhetor, 
such as that of an online gossip participant. The idea of a credible ethos varies 
according to moral stances dependent on the targets of (dis)identification. One 
such moral stance is moral disidentification with mediated others, differing 
fundamentally from Adam Smith’s classical idea of moral (sympathetic) 
identification (see Smith 3–7). In moral identification, the self as a moral agent 
imagines things happening to the other as if they were happening to the self. 
Hence, moral identification involves the idea that the self is morally present but 
still separate from the other. Moral disidentification, on the contrary, can be seen 
as “role ethics.” According to Alasdair MacIntyre’s work Ethics and Politics, 
complex societies involve social structures that require citizens to act in a context-
bound role that may contradict the moral responsibility to treat others as 
responsive beings. In contexts favoring role-playing, the excellence in role 
performance is regarded as a virtue that substitutes moral virtues (200). In an 
extreme case, as MacIntyre goes on to say, agents exhibit no awareness of 
responsibilities or norms beyond their roles in a particular sphere of activity 
(202). However, the way role-players reject moral perspectives that do not fit with 
a certain role is not simply the lack or absence of the self; it occurs as an active 
refusal and denial (202). In other words, role-playing is based on conscious 
choices that make the role become real.  
Particularly in young people’s new media participation, the borders between role 
positions and the self as a moral agent may become blurred, as Howard Gardner 
argues (99-106). In such participation, people trust the online performer that 
reveals only minimal cues of itself. As the findings of a recently conducted study 
 Acta Wasaensia        203 
suggest, those who are deeply involved in online environments tend to feel moral 
emotions as intensely in their experiences on the screen as in their social 
relationships behind it (see Gabriels et al.). The blurring of the boundaries 
between role-playing and moral identification becomes evident when role-playing 
is seen in conflict with, but is nevertheless preferred to, moral identification. 
Considering media content shown to the audience, such blurred boundaries 
involve meaning-making struggles between seeing media characters as vulnerable 
human beings and treating them as mere objects of pleasure. Specifically, 
disidentifying with celebrities by treating them as disposable, as the slogan of 
ONTD states, indicates seeing celebrities as materialistic products that are 
replaceable and therefore made for the audience to consume (Cross and Littler).  
In addition to MacIntyre’s remarks on role ethics, disidentification with 
celebrities becomes meaningful through the idea of late-modern artificiality. By 
late modernism, I mean the era of culture and communication where rhetors and 
their audiences are faced with uncertainty concerning what is real and what 
should be taken seriously (Bauman Liquid Modernity). Often late modernism and 
postmodernism are seen as synonyms. However, I understand postmodernism as a 
stage in which the aesthetic and superficial is seen as the only truth. In this study, 
I prefer late modernism to postmodernism because the real and aesthetic are still 
negotiable, which is evident on ONTD.  
In his book Postmodern Ethics, Zygmunt Bauman argues that we can distinguish 
two main targets of identification: the proximate Other and the distant Third. 
While proximity is the relationship connecting the Self and the Other on an 
emotional and moral level, distance is the realm of justice and social rules that 
comes with the Third who is also a sort of other but a distant one, an outsider 
(112–116, 132). The existence of the Third before the Self refers to the domain of 
society where relationships are faceless, stereotype-based and group-focused, not 
personal or private (112–116, 130). In online celebrity gossip, the Self represents 
gossip participants who position themselves in relation to celebrities and online 
co-gossipers. In such new media contexts, neither celebrities nor co-gossipers are 
individuals but they represent faceless groups. In Bauman’s terms, identification 
with celebrities, as well as with co-gossipers, would be a sign of “aesthetic 
proximity” representing the nearness of the crowd that effortlessly wipes out 
distance (Postmodern Ethics 115; 130–132). This is because both celebrities and 
online gossipers appear as mediated faces who never reveal their own personality.  
Another fruitful theory that helps to explain the artificiality of contemporary 
media culture is Jean Baudrillard’s theory of Simulacra and Simulation which he 
uses to make sense of the relationships between aesthetic (or symbolic) 
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representations and reality. Literally, the concept of simulacra means similarities 
between the real world item (such as a tree) and its representation (a picture of the 
tree). To distinguish what is real and meaningful to people living with copies of 
reality, Baudrillard deals with first-, second-, and third-order simulacrum. The 
first order is associated with the premodern age in which human-made artifacts 
are unique copies and clearly artificial objects of a real item, such as the Mona 
Lisa painting. In the second order typical of the modern age of industrial 
revolution, copies try to mimic reality, such as celebrity images that represent the 
individual living in Western society. In the third order, which is characteristic of 
postmodernism, the relationship between reality and symbols is no longer seen as 
relevant. The third order of simulacra is simulation beyond true or false (21). 
Thus in the third order, it is irrelevant whether celebrities are morally good or bad 
individuals because the audience is supposed to know that they are artificial and 
merely playing a role made up by the gossip media industry.  
In what follows, I will discuss moral disidentification in rhetorical terms. I first 
deal with the history of gossip and contextualize moral disidentification of 
celebrities in the surrounding kairos – a temporal and spatial context. In a 
rhetorical sense, understanding kairos is important since it is provides an 
explanation of why moral identification and disidentification are competitive 
ways of constructing and controlling ethos in celebrity gossip. After defining the 
kairos of moral disidentification, I will describe the material and method of the 
present study, which is followed by the findings and conclusion. 
3 The kairos of moral disidentification 
In rhetorical studies, kairos is typically defined as the socially perceived space-
time (e.g. Miller “Foreword”): it is the “right timing” and “right placing” of a 
speech (Stephenson). In this paper, accordingly, kairos is seen as the cultural 
moment and material context in which the rhetor’s (the speaker’s or writer’s) 
speech is persuasive to its audience.  
3.1 Gossip and its two kairotic turns as cultural moments 
Gossip is a genre in which people evaluate individuals not present in the 
conversation and by so doing contribute to the normative achievement of social 
integration in a community (Bergmann Discreet Indiscretions). In other words, 
gossip never merely concerns individuals, but rather contributes to the moral 
norms and values of a community. Because gossip is a genre that establishes 
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social bonds between interlocutors (151), it is a rhetorical genre in which the 
rhetor (the speaker or writer) chooses the addressed listener or reader.  
Before the era of mass-media celebrities, gossip was limited mostly to the private 
sphere, as Bergmann suggests (59-67). According to Bergmann, in private sphere 
gossip, the gossip producer, the gossip recipient, and the targets of gossip form a 
mobile triad in which the roles of gossip participants and those gossiped about 
may trade places (45-70). Characteristic of private sphere gossip are “discreet 
indiscretions” as more or less cautious evaluations of people, which means that 
gossipers are aware that their own reputation is also at stake. Private sphere 
gossip, moreover, involves a potential for moral identification, since it is typical 
to negotiate moral principles and social norms as situated meanings with the 
purpose of understanding the individual(s) who have become topics of gossip 
discourse (130-134). 
While private sphere gossip concerns small communities, celebrity gossip was 
born to touch the “masses,” as Bergmann suggests (50-51). I call this first kairotic 
turn of gossip the mass-mediated turn. Unlike private sphere gossip, gossip 
representing the mass-mediated turn is not based on a circle of acquaintanceship 
that includes gossip participants and their targets (51). Celebrities, therefore, are 
“fair game” for mass-mediated moral talk that does not threaten the reputation of 
gossipers. Nevertheless, celebrities tend to be treated as if they were real 
individuals to be identified with. In the mass-mediated turn, such serious gossip 
readings (see Hermes) are legitimate ways of moral positioning. Thus moral 
positioning similar to private gossip is the source of gossiper’s ethos. In 
Baudrillard’s terms, identification with celebrities would be a practice of second-
order simulacrum in which celebrity as a media-made character is treated as real. 
In this phase, celebrities are role players and gossipers make their proximity for 
sale through their consumer habits when identifying with celebrities.  
Today, various online gossip sites and celebrity gossip blogs are popular media 
environments where judgments of people can be found (e.g. Fairclough; Meyers, 
Gossip Talk; Meyers, “Blogs Give Regular People the Chance to Talk Back”; 
Meyers, Dishing Dirt; Eronen, “It’s so wrong yet so funny”; Eronen, “Moral 
Argumentation as a Rhetorical Practice”). Online gossip is part of the so-called 
demotic turn where those without public status can participate in public discourse 
(see Turner). While the mass-mediated turn of gossip already put the individual – 
the celebrity – at the center of public attention, it was the demotic turn that made 
ordinary people as active gossip producers visible. 
At the same time that the circle of gossip expanded and relationships based on 
acquaintanceship emerged on a global scale, relationships of what Jan Fernback 
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calls “convenient togetherness” came to characterize media participation more 
widely. According to Carolyn R. Miller, online togetherness involves emotional 
connectivity between interlocutors (“Writing in a Culture of Simulation”; 
“Expertise and Agency” 205-212). Such an emotional bond between those 
making judgments is also involved in online celebrity mockery. One central 
emotion contributing to disidentification with celebrities by strengthening the 
sympathetic togetherness between interlocutors is Schadenfreude, as Steve Cross 
and Jo Littler point out. In celebrity culture, Schadenfreude means enjoying a 
celebrity’s downfall. It manifests itself as celebrity mockery, being a realization 
of a culturally and economically closed system that “cannot position itself in 
relation to wider social formations or cultural ecologies” (414). In other words, 
Schadenfreude is part of the logic of gossip media industry that stimulates gossip 
readers’ interest in judging celebrity without giving the readers anything beyond 
the topic of celebrity. 
Smith categorizes hatred and resentment, the feelings that provoke 
Schadenfreude, into antisocial passions in which “our sympathy is divided 
between the person who feels them and the person who is the object of them” 
(31–35). In other words, the sympathy involved in moral disidentification has 
both an exclusive and inclusive function. It creates proximity to co-gossipers at 
the expense of celebrities who are disidentified with because of seeing them as 
artificial. This is where the third-order simulacrum as a form of serious role-
playing takes place, and the co-gossipers trade places with celebrities as targets of 
identification. The paradox of such proximity is that celebrity gossipers also are 
role players who use the artificiality of celebrity as the grounds of their own role-
playing. In what follows, a sympathetic relation between online participants is 
discussed in relation to online environments as material, specifically visual, 
contexts.  
3.2 The material kairos of moral disidentification 
The material kairos in new media is based on modes, media, and the technologies 
of product, reproduction, and distribution (Sheridan et al. 4-5). One example of 
such technology is an online comment section (such as the one on ONTD) that 
allows participants to post comments and pictures and reply to others’ comments. 
Such environments easily make things and people appear as material, particularly 
visual, objects to which emotional reactions are attached. In general, emotional 
reactions as bodily sensations and feelings attached to objects are called affect 
(Ahmed  82-100; Paasonen: 22-23, 54-55, 232-236). Affect, therefore, is a 
specific group of emotions targeting material objects rather than subjects seen as 
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morally responsible. In classical treatises on rhetoric, affect is seen as a negative 
emotion. For instance for Quintilian, the “affectus” involves dark emotions, such 
as anger aroused by hatred (see Katula  8). Because Schadenfreude toward 
celebrities goes hand in hand with moral disidentification with them (see Cross 
and Littler), it can be seen as an emotion with “affective” force. 
According to Paasonen, because of the focus on the “visual” in online 
environments, affective reactions to objects are not individual or private discourse 
but rather become collective means of social interaction (232-236).  Moreover, 
communication highlighting the visual also makes this visual itself a topic of 
meta-disagreement according to which the shared style of communication should 
be respected. In online discussion forums, as Shani Orgad argues, the reciprocity 
between like-minded online participants is often the preferable form of 
communication and those who do not respect it may be excluded (37-38). These 
remarks go hand in hand with the notion of “group ethos” as the sign of 
collective, not individual, credibility (see Gurak).  
A demonstrative example of online reciprocity can be found in Miller’s article 
“Writing in a Culture of Simulation”. In that paper, she describes that a 
conversation with artificial-intelligence agents, such as with the artificial, MUD 
(Multi User Domain) -player Julia, created for other MUD-players an illusion of 
interacting with a human other. Although Julia was a robot, and therefore quite 
literally an artificial being, her credibility as an example of role-playing is 
striking. The fact that Julia could not personally produce anything creative did not 
make her less credible. On the contrary, people liked Julia precisely because she 
was able to contribute to reciprocity, such as by sharing humor with users (270). 
In this example, Julia is, literally, a role-player: her character was automated to 
act in a certain way and she was not able to make evaluations and judgments 
independently from her creator and the users of the program. Her ability to play a 
role, however, was effectively persuasive. In other words, this example indicates 
that expectations for role-playing in online environments may challenge the idea 
of trust and credibility as the sincerity of the “self” (Gardner 99-106). 
Interestingly, Miller argues that such ethos of role-playing, despite its highly 
emotional rhetoric, is the ethos of intelligent agents (“Expertise and Agency” 208-
212). Such ethos of intelligent agents is obvious in online celebrity mockery in 
which celebrity gossipers present themselves as highly media-savvy participants, 
aware of the artificial nature of celebrities. 
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4 On the analysis: Material and method  
The comments cited and analyzed in this study derive from two discussion 
threads on ONTD entitled “Megan shows her head after attack by Sharon 
Osbourne, remains butterface while doing so” and “Sharon O. attacked me!” In 
order to analyze comments from several participants, I chose two threads instead 
of one. Particular criteria for collecting a sample from the threads were needed. 
From the discussion “Megan shows her head after attack by Sharon Osbourne, 
remains butterface while doing so,” the first 75 comments were included in the 
material, whereas from the discussion “Sharon O. attacked me!,” 75 comments at 
the end of the thread were collected. This decision was made due to the fact that 
at times the tone of online gossip may become more aggressive, and thereby more 
clearly disidentifying, toward the end of a thread (see Meyers, Gossip Talk 266). 
The total sample size was limited to 150 comments because the comments on 
ONTD were relatively long. Moreover, this particular case of celebrity gossip was 
chosen for the study because online gossip concerning female celebrities, 
specifically those working in the entertainment industry, provokes reactions of 
mockery and disidentification (140; 175; 207-208; 266; 278). 
The methodical basis of this paper is a rhetorical analysis of online 
communication in which the understanding of ethos as a process is central (see 
Miller “Writing in a Culture of Simulation”; Mitra and Watts; Warnick). Such an 
approach to ethos refers back to Aristotle who saw ethos as the process through 
which rhetors aim at creating credibility on the basis of their character (Rhetoric, 
Book 1, Chapter 2, part 3). As Aristotle (Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 2, part 4) 
argues, persuasion based on ethos “should result from the speech, not from a 
previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person.” In this study, online 
ethos is seen as the process of creating credibility in the “dwelling space” of 
cyberspace in which the ethical validity of voices is judged on the basis of how 
they construct this space (see Mitra and Watts 484, 486, 495-496). By the same 
token, “it is the quality of the performance that counts” (Warnick 264). 
Moreover, this study focuses on three components of ethos as aspects of which 
credibility as a rhetorical element is constructed. According to Aristotle, ethos has 
three parts: 1) phronesis (practical wisdom, good sense, and reason); 2) arete 
(good moral character, good moral values or moral virtue); and 3) eunoia 
(goodwill or emotions, the cooperative principle of ethos) (Rhetoric, Book 2, 
Chapter 1, part 5). For Aristotle, phronesis is a reasoned capacity related to moral 
practice (acts) (Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, Parts 1, 5-7, 12). Compared with 
phronesis, which is more distant, identification has a stronger function in arete 
and eunoia. According to Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Parts 6 and 9), 
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moral virtue (arete) is a state of character that makes a person good. 
Consequently, the lack of arete is associated with moral badness, which means 
that rhetors do not say what they really think (see Rhetoric, Book 2, Chapter 1, 
part 6). Miller moreover, argues that a discourse of intelligent agents taking place 
as emotional interaction involves the problem of arete (“Expertise and Agency”). 
According to her, the lack of arete in cyborg discourse is a rhetorical problem 
making people seek feeling and response from an agent who remains unknown 
(212–213). On the contrary, eunoia is the most pathos-oriented and relativistic 
part of ethos, evolving in a sympathetic relationship with the audience (205–213). 
In online communication in particular, eunoia is a central element for the 
sympathetic relation between interlocutors (210–213).  
To analyze phronesis, arete, and eunoia in online discourse, concrete definitions 
of these rather abstract concepts were needed. In this study, phronesis is 
understood as the practical knowledge of the artificial nature of celebrities (such 
as “they should not be identified with because they are stupid attention-seekers”). 
By arete, I mean moral stories and considerations through which online gossipers 
as rhetors identify with celebrities (such as “I know how it hurts when someone 
insults you”). The last one, eunoia, is here defined as a means of emotional 
cooperation with the audience (“She is disgusting!” “LOL,”  “I hate her”). Thus 
eunoia can take place as moral disidentification with celebrities. I chose to 
examine more closely those types of normativity in which ONTD participants 
support moral disidentification with celebrities, such as “you should not take this 
celebrity fight as a personal moral lesson because these celebrities are stupid 
attention-seekers whom we are watching for entertainment.” 
5 Types of normativity supporting moral 
 disidentification on ONTD  
In the ONTD online gossip community, moral disidentification was supported in 
five types of normativity: virtual, voyeuristic, playful, disparate, and aesthetic. 
These types of normativity derive from the role of the media audience that has the 
legitimacy to freely judge celebrities as their “fair game”. In what follows, I will 
provide examples demonstrating that moral disidentification takes place as the 
active refusal and denial of moral identification.  
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5.1 Virtual normativity 
One type of ethos control, called here virtual normativity, was utilized to 
highlight the nature of the celebrity fight as a staged event and thereby to oppose 
interpretations in which participants associated the celebrity fight with “real-life” 
morality. This type of normativity is prominent in the comments of 
sapporonoodles and implexa below. Note that the personal story criticized by 
these two participants had already been deleted on ONTD. 
(1) um. congratulations? idk how we got from pulling out meghan’s extensions to 
  a super personal story. But um. :\ (sapporonoodles) 
(2)  I’m not gonna say don’t share personal stories on ontd, because hey i
get up in people’s shit all the time, but i mean, for a topic that’s really stupid i 
don’t understand why you would delve so deep into  yourself unless you’re 
looking for a pity party. and it’s finals week  and i have no serotonin left in my
brain, so I’m going to be  unnecessarily mean, but i just didn’t get why you 
had to go there. i don’t get why everyone is always trying to out-horror story
everyone else, esp. over a fight about someone’s freaking weave being pulled 
out. i mean, if you’ve “been there” you know that this story is absolute
bullshit compared to what goes on outside of mtv studios, and go on
your merry way. i think it’s really funny that ontd choses  this topic as their
morality buffer du jour. anyway. (sapporonoodles)  [original italics] 
(3) I don’t know what the personal story or w/e was but I love this comment
  because it’s how I feel about so  much of ontd. I hate when people comment
  with a personal story with some tenuous link to the post, trying to get a
  reaction and some pity. We all have shit and we’d all like people to hover
  around us saying “U GO BB” or “poor you bb :(“ but this is real life and you 
  have to get a grip. (implexa) [original italics] 
As can be seen in Examples 1-3, the ethos construction of the participant who had 
shared a personal story is seen as inappropriate. As a punishment for the norm-
breaking behavior, the participant’s comment had been removed. In Examples 1-
3, bringing up moral considerations from one’s personal life is evaluated as a way 
of asking for undeserved pity and is thus condemned. In virtual normativity, ethos 
is based on the awareness concerning the fact that the particular show is produced 
by celebrity media industry. In that sense, the frivolous readings of gossip 
(Hermes 132-141) are highlighted. This manner of rejecting a serious, personal 
interest in celebrities is also typical of other celebrity forums, such as WWTDD 
(see Meyers, Gossip Talk 284).  
Interestingly, however, the responses from both sapporonoodles and implexa 
paradoxically involve argumentation that seriously calls for the eunoia of shared 
frivolous interpretations. The exclusion of the personal story can be seen as the 
exclusion of arete. Phronesis, albeit in the subtext, is implied in these comments 
in the reasoning that one should be media-savvy enough to know that the show 
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was staged and is, therefore, incomparable with moral issues in private life. Such 
phronesis is a good example of practical reasoning in which role-players permit 
only those considerations that derive from their role position (see MacIntyre 200, 
202). Bringing up that the story of the celebrities is “really stupid” and “absolute 
bullshit” is a way of referring to one’s practical knowledge concerning the staged 
nature of the fight. By so doing, online participants contribute to the role of a 
media-savvy audience in the guise of which they have the legitimate right to 
judge celebrities freely. 
5.2 Voyeuristic normativity  
In this study, voyeuristic normativity refers to a persuasive means of criticizing 
participants who have stepped out from their roles as voyeurs and interfered in 
celebrities’ doings. According to voyeuristic normativity, evaluating Sharon 
Osbourne negatively and showing sympathy to Megan Hauserman, as participants 
in Examples 4-8 and 10 do, destabilize the togetherness on ONTD. In Examples 9 
and 11, _closetome attacks these participants, specifically curiouslinh, for such 
destabilization.  
(4) Sue that bitch! I hate the Osbournes (curiouslinh) 
(5) that family is beyond trashy. How the heck are the Osbournes able to teach 
  charm school. I went to a real charm school when I was hitting puberty and let 
  me tell you the teacher was the classiest most elegant woman I ever met in my 
  entire life. Classy women do no need to tell anyone there classy they just are.. 
  and Sharon definitely is not. Another thing Megan was obviously playing a 
  role if Sharon took it this far then that’s crazy and should be sued. Or this 
  could just be an elaborate plan to generate buzz. (beanie1816) 
(6) amen sista (curiouslinh) 
(7) ia (dollicia) 
(8) ia (porcelinaa) 
(9) And most of ONTD hates Megan. And you wonder why we have no sympathy
  for her fug skank ass? (_closetome) 
(10) Sorry, I have a mind of my own and I don’t jump on bandwagons sweetie
  (curiouslinh) 
(11) The only reason you’re defending Megan is because you, as you said, hate the 
  Osbourne’s. Stop pretending you’re Mother Theresa and acting so offended 
  that people on a REALITY SHOW REUNION got into a bitch fight. Um 
  hello, isn’t that the entire fucking point of reality show reunions? Usually they 
  start screaming at each other first and are pried apart before anyone gets 
  seriously hurt, but apparently they didn’t know Sharon doesn’t play that game. 
  And to steal what aeryn said, “And bullshit about how it was not “charming”
  of Sharon to resort to violence after being on Charm School. Like that fucking 
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  show was REALLY about them changing their lives. Get a clue. It’s a 
  paycheck and publicity and we watch them bitching at each other for 
  entertainment.” (_closetome) 
As can be seen in the comments above, the participant in Example 4 interferes in 
the celebrities’ doings by guiding Hauserman to sue Osbourne, while the 
participant of Example 5 defines “classy women” based on personal experiences. 
Participants in Examples 6-8 agree with these views (amen sista = amen sister, ia 
= I agree). In addition, curiouslinh in Example 10 stresses independence from 
ONTD’s general argument that one should disidentify with Hauserman (“Sorry, I 
have a mind of my own and I don’t jump on bandwagons sweetie”). On the 
contrary, the comments by _closetome (Examples 9 and 11) demonstrate that the 
expected moral disidentification on ONTD is to be taken seriously – as a norm. 
The voyeuristic normativity is evident in Example 11, in which _closetome 
condemns interfering in celebrities’ doings and identifying with them. According 
to _closetome (who cites another participant called aeryn), participants on ONTD 
are expected to watch celebrities “bitching at each other for entertainment.”  
Thus voyeurism on ONTD is a shared rhetorical practice that takes place in the 
name of a collective affect. According to voyeuristic normativity, sharing the 
pleasures of watching the celebrity fight forms a credible ethos. As can be seen in 
Example 11, the contribution to shared pleasures involves an attack on naive 
arete (“Stop pretending you’re Mother Theresa and acting so offended that people 
on a REALITY SHOW REUNION got into a bitch fight”). Curiouslinh is blamed 
for pretending to be Mother Theresa and acting offended. Although voyeuristic 
normativity is strictly based on the role of the audience as a voyeur, such 
normativity is utilized to censure those who take the celebrity fight seriously. The 
type of normativity in Example 11 contributes to an ethos in which online 
community members of ONTD are persuaded to play the role of voyeurs, which 
opposes personal moral considerations. Like in virtual normativity, also in 
voyeuristic normativity phronesis is related to the awareness of the frivolous 
nature of the celebrity fight (“It’s a paycheck and publicity”). In other words, 
showing the awareness that media content and characters are mere spectacles 
becomes the sign of practical wisdom in this context. 
5.3 Playful normativity  
By playful normativity, I mean a humorous means of character-construction in 
which participants in a discussion become the target of mockery and become a 
stand-in for the disidentified celebrity because of their sympathy for her. In 
Example 12, pantless_deacon agrees with Megan Hauserman that Sharon 
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Osbourne is famous only through her husband. In their responses, both lilstarmel 
(Example 13) and hemsworth (Example 14) contribute to playful normativity in 
which pantless_deacon, because of his criticism of Osbourne, is equated with 
Hauserman: 
(12) ALSO, what Megan said was true. Sharon needs to give it a rest, she gained 
  fame from the MTV series, basically exploiting Ozzy’s condition. It was fine 
  to point out Ozzy’s issues when she was making money off of them. I guess 
  problem was that Megan forgot to write a check before insulting  
  Ozzy/Sharon? (pantless_deacon) 
(13) Oh, shut up Megan. You need to get your ass kicked. (lilstarmel) 
(14) oh megan, shut the fuck up you stupid attention whore (hemsworth) 
In Examples 13 and 14, playful normativity involves ethos control in which the 
participant who breaks the norm of ONTD is criticized through the idea of role-
playing. Interestingly, in Examples 13 and 14 the participant who had agreed with 
Hauserman is accused of role-playing at the same time when the role of the 
audience as a distant judge becomes the sign of a credible ethos. In Baudrillard’s 
terms, these online participants regard the third-order simulacrum as more 
authentic or real than the second order. Moreover, Examples 13 and 14 operate 
inside the framework of celebrity culture in which Hauserman as an artificial 
celebrity (“attention whore”) is seen as a person whose mockery is legitimized in 
the name of the collective emotions (eunoia) of ONTD participants. An effective 
way of sharing eunoia is the humor under which mockery is covered. What is 
attacked, again, is arete as the part of ethos with considerations beyond what 
appears on the screen (outside of ONTD or reality television). Moreover, 
phronesis is implied in these comments as the way of making the de-faming of 
Hauserman seem a legitimate reaction to her media-made fame.  
5.4 Disparate normativity 
The type of ethos control here called disparate normativity is utilized when one 
sees the character of celebrities as incomparable with that of co-participants. 
Disparate normativity is perhaps the most obvious way of ethos control indicating 
that moral stances of identification and disidentification are based on different 
orders of simulacra. In Examples 15-18, online participants break the third order 
of simulacra as the norm of frivolous online ethos by imagining themselves going 
through the hair-pulling misery. Such interpretations aim at creating relevance 
between the actions of celebrities and reality, and thereby indicate that the 
celebrity fight is taken as a morally serious issue. Example 19 continues the idea 
of taking the reality TV fight as an authentic fact by arguing that Hauserman’s 
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hair was so weak that it would have fallen out without pulling it. Although the 
participant in Example 19 is not sympathetic toward Hauserman, s/he indicates 
taking the gossip of fallen hair extensions seriously. On the contrary, 
sapporonoodles in Example 20 ends this discussion by opposing those who have 
taken the gossip story too personally. 
(15) Bitches get stitches so if someone ripped out my weave because I was being a 
  cunt, I wouldn’t sue, no. (bakemonos) 
(16)  You have issues and you’re lying out of your ass (curiouslinh) 
(17)  Just because I don’t agree with suing over the fact that someone instigated an 
  attack by insulting someone’s family does not mean I have issues nor am I 
  lying, but we can just end it here by saying you will have your opinion and I 
  will have mine. (bakemonos) 
(18) LMFAO you’re still fucking lying. If a celebrity attacked you and proceeded 
to pull out chunks of hair from your scalp, I bet my ass you will sue or settle 
for a settlement. Don’t even try to bullshit (curiouslinh) 
(19) LETS ALL BE CLEAR. 
Sharon probably didn’t touch a hair on little ms thang’s head. Her weak ass 
hair can’t handle all that weave, I mean damn...Beyonce doesn’t even wear 
that much weave. If sharon hadn’t of pulled it out her hair would have fallen 
out anyway. ugh, her whole head disgusts me. (burnbabyburn) 
(20)  i don’t think i or they would be dumb or attention-whorey enough to invoke 
that sort of action from a celebrity. so i mean, no one has any reason to 
bullshit, because we’re not attention whores like meghan. this entire scenario 
is completely ridiculous, and you’re on a high horse for nothing but giving me 
lols right now. (sapporonoodles) 
As can be seen in Example 20, the participant contrasts Hauserman and other 
people and thereby criticizes the naive arete of those participants who had treated 
the celebrity as a real individual. According to sapporonoodles, “this entire 
scenario is completely ridiculous.” Moreover, the explicit mockery of the 
celebrity indicates a commitment to the ONTD’s eunoia according to which 
certain celebrities, symbolized by Hauserman, are to be looked down on because 
of their attention-seeking and therefore untrustworthy behaviour. Interestingly, in 
addition to celebrity mockery, Example 20 aims at supporting a sympathetic 
relation and harmonious reciprocity between participants on ONTD (“no one has 
any reason to bullshit”). This particular comment is a telling example of the 
sympathy-antipathy contradiction in which the emotional reciprocity (eunoia) 
between interlocutors is based on the shared delight of a celebrity’s public self-
humiliation. Accordingly, the harmony and cooperation in the online community 
go hand in hand with the active refusal to identify with a media-made celebrity. 
 Acta Wasaensia        215 
Consequently, Example 20 can be seen to imply phronesis that rationalizes and 
legitimizes moral disidentification as the sign of a media-savvy audience. 
5.5 Aesthetic normativity  
In aesthetic normativity, online gossip participants contribute to ethos which 
celebrities’ appearance, style, and bodies are seen as signs of their character. In 
this study, aesthetic normativity is defined as ethos control in which a discussion 
participant guides others to evaluate celebrities based on their physical 
appearance. In Example 21, _closetome criticizes curiouslinh for the lack of 
phronesis relating to the way of treating the staged celebrity fight as if it would be 
a real incident to be morally condemned. The comment is followed by a response 
from curiouslinh who argues in Example 22 that one can dislike a celebrity but 
nevertheless see her as beautiful. Finally,_closetome in Example 23 utilizes 
aesthetic normativity as a way to criticize curiouslinh for separating the 
celebrity’s appearance from her worth as a person.  
(21) WHEN under any circumstances has it been ACCEPTABLE behavior to 
  attack someone? WHEN HAS IT BEEN? [_closetome citing curiouslinh] 
  UM HELLO REALITY TV? It’s been acceptable and ENCOURAGED to 
  attack someone on reality shows (ESPECIALLY dating ones like fol,rol,shot 
  at love, etc etc) since reality tv was shat upon society. (_closetome) 
  I also hate Kim Kardashian but you do not see me bashing her and shit. I 
  actually own a Kim Kardashian community regardless if I find her personality 
  obnoxious and unbearable, so do not under any circumstances try that shit 
  with me. [_closetome citing curiouslinh] 
  WTF, YOU MAKE NO SENSE WHATSOEVER. If you hate Kim so much, 
  why would you even want community about her? What. The. Fuck. 
  (_closetome) 
(22) UM HELLO REALITY TV? [curiouslinh citing _closetome] 
  Reality TV is not REAL honey. It’s scripted, so no. It is not “real violence”. 
  Now what Mrs. Sharon Osbourne did was NOT scripted under any 
  circumstances because it would have not escalated the way it has now 
  (curiouslinh) 
  WTF, YOU MAKE NO SENSE WHATSOEVER [curiouslinh citing 
  closetome] 
  Let me rephrase that, I do not hate people. I dislike her. Regardless of her 
  personality, I think she is a very beautiful woman with great fashion sense. 
  Regardless, that does NOT give me the right to attack her and be inhuman to 
  her. (curiouslinh) 
  go back to elementary school where you belong darling (curiouslinh) 
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(23) Regardless of her personality, I think she is a very beautiful woman with great 
  fashion sense. Regardless, that does NOT give me the right to attack her and 
  be inhuman to her. [_closetome citing curiouslinh]  
  When you say you “hate” someone I don’t necessarily assume you like their 
  looks/fashion sense. Honest mistake. (_closetome) 
In aesthetic normativity, celebrities’ appearance, literally speaking, is understood 
as the basis of their evaluation, as can be seen in Example 23 above. According to 
_closetome, hating a celebrity and nevertheless liking the person’s appearance is 
not expected (“When you say you “hate” someone I don’t necessarily assume you 
like their looks/fashion sense”). In other words, the comment of _closetome 
indicates that curiouslinh has broken the norm of ONTD when contrasting the 
idea of a celebrity’s moral character (personality) and her physical appearance. In 
aesthetic normativity, moral guidance is to be found in style and appearance – in 
those fields that are the most superficially persuasive (also Brummett 102). By 
linking together the criteria of evaluating celebrities’ character and their 
appearance, aesthetic normativity suggests that celebrities should be treated as 
mere objects of their audience’s changing affects. Such a sharing of eunoia goes 
hand in hand with the refusal to identify personally with celebrities. Phronesis, 
again, can be found in the subtext as the implied way of suggesting that 
celebrities are media spectacles (not moral beings) meant to satisfy the pleasures 
of their audience. 
6 Conclusion: Moral disidentification and ethos 
The aim of this paper was to explore the rhetorical grounds of celebrity mockery 
in new media contexts by focusing on types of normativity utilized to support 
moral disidentification with celebrities in an online community for celebrity 
gossip (Oh No They Didn’t). In this study, ethos was seen as a combination of 
phronesis (moral reasoning), arete (moral stories and considerations indicating 
the rhetor’s moral personality) and eunoia (shared emotions as the cooperative 
principle of ethos). Those comments in which participants opposed arete because 
they saw it as the sign of taking celebrities “too personally” were analyzed in 
detail. According to the findings, the rhetorical grounds of celebrity mockery can 
be found in the contradictory relationship of arete and phronesis evident in online 
gossipers’ ethos. Online gossip participants contributing to celebrity mockery do 
not “sacrifice” their arete for identification with celebrities whom they see as 
highly artificial. On the contrary, online gossip participants of celebrity mockery 
highlight phronesis as the sign of their media-savvy character. Such contradiction 
of arete and phronesis was evident in all types of normativity discussed in this 
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study and it provides a rhetorical explanation for the popularity of celebrity 
mockery in contemporary media culture. 
To oppose “too personal” ethos constructions, participants of ONTD contributed 
to five types of normativity: virtual, voyeuristic, playful, disparate, and aesthetic 
normativity. In virtual normativity, the life within the entertainment industry and 
the online community of ONTD, literally on the screen, is strictly separated from 
moral issues taking place behind the screen. Voyeuristic normativity, moreover, is 
a means of condemning ways of interfering in celebrities’ actions. Such 
normativity highlights the pleasure of watching what happens on the screen. 
Playful normativity was utilized to mock participants who had identified with a 
celebrity as if they played the role of the hated celebrity by virtue of sympathizing 
with her. Disparate normativity emerged as a means of arguing that celebrities, as 
attention-seekers, are not comparable to other people. Lastly, aesthetic 
normativity involved the idea that a celebrity’s appearance is the sign of his/her 
character.  
These types of normativity are ways of ethos control that support the idea that 
celebrities are made for the pleasure of the media audience as the “crowd” of 
mediated displays. In other words, by not identifying with a celebrity who is seen 
as completely artificial, one indicates being media-savvy enough not to take 
superficial media content and characters seriously (see Ahva et al.194–195). Such 
awareness as the criterion of a media-savvy participant involves phronesis as a 
more or less implied reasoning based on the knowledge of the frivolous ethos of a 
celebrity. By highlighting their interest in the frivolous as the sign of their own 
credible ethos, gossip participants support moral disidentification with celebrities 
and make unserious readings the morally preferred means of participation (see 
Hermes 133–141). I what follows, I will explain moral disidentification through 
role ethics as well as Baudrillard’s and Bauman’s theories of communication in 
the late-modern era.  
The types of normativity found in this study contribute to the idea that a credible 
ethos is based on excellence in role performance (see MacIntyre 200). In other 
words, morality in new media contexts, such as on celebrity gossip sites, is not 
only different from, but may also contradict a moral stance in which the sincerity 
(not role-playing) of participants is seen as trustworthy (see Gardner 99–106). 
Because role-playing is the characteristic of a trustworthy online ethos, arete as 
the sign of the moral self is excluded, while eunoia as the shared enjoyment of 
watching celebrities humiliating themselves in mediated displays is preferred. 
Although online celebrity gossipers argue that celebrities should not be taken too 
seriously or personally, their Schadenfreude involves affective force with the 
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enjoyment caused by celebrities’ self-embarrassment when they have “sold” their 
ethos for public humiliation. Although such affect focuses on celebrities as 
amoral beings, it nevertheless is morally noteworthy because it places certain 
celebrities, particularly women in entertainment industry, beyond moral concerns. 
Such dehumanization of particular types of female celebrities contributes to sexist 
oppression in which certain groups of people are seen as mere objects to be 
laughed at.    
The refusal to naively identify with “artificial” media characters is not only an 
individual, but a communal basis of ethos in online gossip. In the demotic turn, 
not only celebrities, but also ordinary people are playing roles. It is a paradox that 
such role-playing becomes the sign of a trustworthy ethos in online gossip, since 
online co-participants are not more authentic or personal than celebrities as the 
objects of their common disidentification. Essential in online ethos is that 
participants are expected to form a community with their interlocutors who 
remain unknown and never reveal themselves (Miller, “Expertise and Agency” 
212–213). In Bauman’s terms, such communication involves a moral problem in 
which individuals become part of a faceless crowd (Postmodern Ethics 115; 130–
131; 155). I a wider, cultural sense, celebrity mockery is a sign of the 
disempowered celebrity audience that is now seeking moments of empowerment 
by making fun of celebrities as well as celebrity media industry. As the examples 
analyzed in the present study showed, such mockery involves a paradox of ethos 
in which online participants reject media-made celebrities as too artificial for 
identification in order to cooperate with gossipers whose ethos derives from the 
same sources of media-made celebrity culture they first rejected. 
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